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This thesis examines and analyses the 'rule oflaw' concept and its importance to the 
enlargement of the European Union to include Central and Eastern European countries. 
The main focus of the thesis, revolves around the argument that the differences in 
conception of the rule oflaw within the European Union (both member states and 
institutions), is problematic to further transition and development ofthis important 
principle in Central and Eastern European countries seeking EU membership. The rule 
of law has been identified by the EU as a fundamental principle and criteria with regard 
to the current enlargement process. In addition to this, the European Union has not 
defined what it means by 'rule oflaw' and has instead stated its belief that new members 
will develop their own 'brand' of rule oflaw and democracy that takes into account 
individual cultures, histories and experiences. Despite such declarations, the EU have 
made suggestions for the reform or formation of particular institutions and procedures 
within prospective member states, that suggest particular understandings of what the rule 
of law is and stands for. This conflicting message to prospective members has left many 
of them in the situation where they are making changes to their institutions and practices 
so as to mirror 'Western European' countries, but without the knowledge of how to 
utilise such things. The situation is also potentially problematic for the European Union, 
as it calls into question its own practices relating to reform and enlargement, such as how 
does the EU decide whether prospective member states have met the criteria of having 
established the rule oflaw, when there is no formal consensus on what establishing the 
rule of law entails or how the principle is defined. 
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NOTE ON METHODOLOGY OF THESIS 
This thesis takes a broad approach encompassing the utilisation of primary European 
Union documentation, secondary literature, and supplemented by interview material. 
The primary EU documentation and secondary literature were gathered from library, 
intemet, EU documentation centre, and other sources. The interview material while 
noted within the thesis does not identify specific individuals/sources, as they have asked 
to remain anonymous. However, with regard to these sources, they were selected for 
their knowledge and understanding of the EU enlargement and accession processes 
and/or of the applicant countries involved in this process, and their potential 
understanding of the rule oflaw within these contexts. Others were selected on the basis 
of recommendations of other sources from EU institutions, with which the author had 
contact during an initial round of interviews. Sources from outside of the EU institutions 
were specifically selected for their knowledge of applicant country perspectives, 
understanding of the rule of law, or for their knowledge of programmes and projects 
created to establish and support the rule of law in transition countries. Again, some of 
these contacts were established on the basis of contact details and recommendations 
) from previous interviewees. 
Upon selection of potential contacts, a list of questions was established, focused 
upon similar ideas/lines - the rule of law, democracy, enlargement and accession, rule of 
law programmes and projects - but with different emphases dependent on the 
interviewees in question. These questions were drawn up and discussed in detail with a 
number of individuals with whom the author has had numerous discussions about 
interviews and interviewing and the overall thesis plan. The list of questions was meant 
as a guide for the interviewer, rather than a checklist of questions to ask. It assisted in 
gathering information on understandings of the rule of law with regard to the 
lX 
enlargement and accessiOn processes, whilst also gauging whether interviewees were 
receptive to more detailed and specific questions related to points of interest, and their 
own specific work in light of these points. 
X 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role the rule of law has 
within the wider context of European Union enlargement eastwards. Its focus is two-
fold, firstly, to understand what the rule of law is and means to the European Union 
(both member states and institutions), since it has been repeatedly stated as an important 
principle to which countries within the Community and those proposing to join it, should 
be committed. Secondly, it is intended to demonstrate that the EU's commitment to the 
rule of law has not extended to actually defining this principle. This lack of definition is 
problematic for the EU, especially with regard to its further enlargement to include 
countries that have little recent experience of democratic values and ideas. 
The intention of this work has not been to develop yet another definition for the 
rule of law, (which should be utilised by the European Union), but to demonstrate that 
understandings of the rule of law are diverse. The diverse understandings reflect the fact 
that the rule of law is a contested concepe, as is evident from the work of other authors 
covered, such as Habermas, Shklar, Craig, and Walker2. More importantly the thesis will 
illustrate and highlight some of the ambiguities and deficiencies associated with various 
conceptualisations of the rule of law. It will do so through review and outlining of 
different conceptualisations of the rule of law and its affect on the development of 
modem legal and economic systems across the European Union. This is relevant, as 
understandings of the rule of law greatly influence the shape of legal systems, and at the 
same time, legal systems have an impact on the continued development of this 
fundamental principle in many countries. 
Why the rule of law? Mainly because it has been identified in EU documentation -
as a 'fundamental principle' for ensuring democracy and democratic institutions and 
structures. For instance, a notable ambiguity covered in chapter one of this thesis, deals 
1 
with the conflation of the rule of law and democracy. The relationship between these 
two important concepts is a complex one. 3 Chapter One will cover the conflation of 
these concepts and will demonstrate that the conflation of these concepts neglects the 
fact that there are three possible ways of looking at the relationship between the rule of 
law and democracy. The three ways in which one can contemplate this relationship are 
1) democracy is important for the effectuation of the rule of law; 2) that the rule of law 
can also be judged as a retardant to the development of democracy; or 3) that democracy 
itself, can be used to justifY suppressing the rule oflaw.4 The importance of this review 
is to demonstrate that the ambiguities alluded to, (described in earlier parts ofthis thesis), 
have not been dealt with sufficiently to-date, by current EU member states and 
institutions. 
This will be illustrated through review ofEU documentation and the utilisation of 
interview material to supplement the documentation. What these sources of information 
seem to allude to, is that the European Union currently lacks any formal universal 
understanding of the rule of law. Throughout EU documents there is mention of the 
term 'rule oflaw', but this term, usually connected with democracy and human rights, has 
not been defined in any of the Community's documentation. What is more interesting 
with regard to this term is the fact that despite lacking a definition for the principle, the 
EU claims the rule of law to be a fundamental principle upon which member states and 
the European Union itself are based. 
This poses an interesting situation for the Community, as will be discussed later, 
that the term rule of law was not specifically mentioned as a pre-requisite for previous 
enlargements, despite it being cited as a fundamental principle of the European Union. 
In previous enlargements, it was assumed that countries applying for membership shared 
similar ideas and conceptions of important values, so no formal set of procedures or 
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criteria for enlargement existed. There were informal procedures and practices for 
enlarging the Community, without a formal or specific set of guidelines listing 
procedures, practices, criteria. It is only with the Copenhagen summit and the 
development of the Copenhagen criteria for the current enlargement discussions, that the 
rule of law is mentioned specifically, although again, without a definite sense of what is 
meant by use of the term. 5 
There are, however, some significant reasons for the lack of development of a 
uniform conception within the European Union that will be covered in chapter two. The 
historical and cultural differences and experiences between various member states, is one 
reason for national differences in the understanding and defining of the rule of law. For 
example, differences between British, French and German notions of the rule of law6 
have been shaped by each country's historical and cultural developments and experiences. 
These have shaped their understandings of law - its role and the basis of its legitimacy, as 
well as their understandings of the relationship between individuals and the government. 
In turn, these have been important factors in the development of democratic institutions, 
procedures, and values in these member state countries. These differences, which are a 
part of the entire culture and society of individual member states, makes it difficult to see 
member states developing a uniform definition of the rule of law that would satisfy all 
without anyone having to make specific changes to their governing and legal systems. 
This is the underlying reason for the rule of law remaining vague in definition. Further 
discussion of these influences are covered in chapters two and four. 
Such discrepancies and variations have led to problems that are beginning to 
appear which can be attributed to variation in understandings of the rule of law. 
Differences in defining the rule of law had an impact upon the various levels within the 
Community. For example, three key issues examined with respect to this were a) 
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potential challenges to the Community legal order; b) different attitudes to judicial 
discretion; and c) citizenship, taken at the three different levels of decision-making in the 
EU. 7 The variation in perspectives on such issues as citizenship or judicial discretion, or 
the issue of primacy of Community law, will be reviewed in chapter two and serves to 
illustrate the existent problems and difficulties that a lack of uniformity produces. These 
problems exist even before compounding the problem with a further expansion of the 
Community to include countries with different legal systems, and some would say, less 
developed legal cultures. 
The understanding of the rule of law within countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe are in general, not as developed as in western European countries. Assessment 
of a few of these countries will be made in chapter three of this thesis. The reasoning for 
the lack of a developed understanding of this principle by citizens and government 
officials can be attributed to several factors. Two of the main factors identified and 
supported by comments from interviewees, are the focus on improving economic 
conditions and situations, and the past abuse of the rule of law by previous regimes. 8 
These are some ofthe common problems experienced by ordinary citizens, which impede 
the development of understanding the rule of law. Opinion polls conducted in several 
Central and East European countries seem to confirm the prevalence of these problems. 9 
Therefore, in order for rule-of-law reform to succeed in such countries, reform must get 
at the fundamental problem of 'leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law. '10 
However, these difficulties seem to be compounded by the EUs inconsistency. 
One the one hand the EU has encouraged these states to develop their own 'brand' of the 
rule of law. 11 Discussion of this in chapter two (section three on a lack of uniformity 
and its implications), chapter three, and chapter four (returns to problem of lack of 
uniformity in the EU), support perceptions that the EUs inconsistent policy towards the 
4 
rule of law seems to fit m with the status quo within the current EU, which is 
characterised by diversity of approaches to the rule of law. However, the major 
difficulty this inconsistency causes are approaches to reform and development of 
institutions and procedures that are not necessarily productive to states that lack the 
experience and traditions of the rule of law. The pre-requisite of the rule of law without 
a definition, EU encouragement of developing 'own brand' or forms of rule of law, and 
then the added assistance of modelling their approaches to the rule of law on 'partner' 
states of the existing EU12, cause confusion and discrepancies to occur in many 
prospective member states. 13 However, the inconsistency of the EU in its treatment of 
the prospective new members while important, is not however the main problem. The 
main problem is that enlargement to include these countries threatens to exacerbate the 
existing problem of diversity that the EU has refused to face up to this point. 
Such differences in understandings will be discussed throughout the thesis. These 
differences have already led to differences in the implementation of the same law across 
the current Community of fifteen states. Problems of differentiation in application of law 
and understanding of the relationship between Community and national domains are 
beginning to appear within the European Union. Discrepancies regarding laws in direct 
conflict with parts of national constitutions and laws have occurred in some member 
states. 14 The problems illustrated within a Community of fifteen states has the potential 
to become magnified with the further enlargement of the European Union to include 
countries as diverse as those from Central and Eastern Europe. This is of particular 
significance as it demonstrates some of the real and potential problems the European 
Union faces from its lack of a formal, shared understanding of the rule of law. 15 The 
reluctance to respond to the problems of diversity the European Union desires, is also at 
odds with the deeper integration plans it is seeking to implement. 16 The issue of further 
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integration is one that will not be easily solved. This is set to become worse with a larger 
number of diverse member states involved in the process. 
This thesis investigates merely one aspect - one principle (the rule of law) 
considered to be an important aspect and criterion for determining future European 
Union membership. Study of the rule of law within the wider context of European 
Union enlargement eastwards is both timely and of significance, as the European Union 
continues with the integration process - taking another step forward economically with 
the single currency. At the same time, it continues its discussions and plans to enlarge 
the Community to encompass another twelve countries. The rule of law is significant in 
this period of transition, as it has been identified as an important principle upon which 
economic, legal and political systems should be based in the European Union. 
1 Chapter Two, Section One, best illustrates the diverse conceptions of the rule of law 
which exist across European Union member states. Here, it will examine the 
understanding of the rule of law held by Britain, Germany and France. These three 
member states were focused upon for two reasons. Firstly, they illustrated Dyson's 
Anglo-Continental dichotomy of the rule of law (Britain and Germany); Germany and 
France were examined because although Dyson's dichotomy was useful, it was also 
limited in the fact that it did not account for differences in understandings of the rule of 
law held by different Continental countries. And secondly, these three were countries 
were chosen in particular, as they illustrate the differences in traditions and form a 
natural point of reference for smaller countries (especially those in Central and Eastern 
Europe seeking EU membership). 
2 This list of authors here are not conclusive, but merely a short list of a few of the 
writers examined and whose work will be utilised within this thesis. 
3 See Chapter One, Section Two. This section outlines in detail, the ambiguities and 
concerns related to the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. Most 
problematic in this relationship is the fact that the two terms have at times been used 
interchangeably, whilst neglecting the contradictions that crop up between what the two 
ideas mean and the manner in which they have traditionally and contemporarily been 
understood. 
4 See Chapter One, Section Two, for further detailed discussion about the conflation of 
the rule oflaw and democracy. 
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5 The Copenhagen criteria, developed out of the European Council's meeting in 
Copenhagen in June 1993, was the 'first clear rules for membership ofthe EU, and 
continue to form the basis for all negotiations with applications.' The European 
Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, Guide to the 
Enlargement ofthe EU, The EU Committee, 1998, p.7. Prior to this criteria, previous 
enlargement procedures were derived from ongoing practices, following Article 98 of 
the ECSC Treaty, Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, Article 205 ofthe EAEC Treaty, and 
Articles 0 and F of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). 
6 Dyson's dichotomy will be used with additional materials to compensate and explain 
differences that existed even within Dyson's dichotomy of Angle-Continental 
differences in understanding of concepts like the rule of law. 
7 Chapter Two, Section Two discusses the impact of different legal cultures on three 
particular issues: 1) the potential challenges to the Community legal order; 2) 
examination of the different attitudes towards the idea of judicial discretion; and 3) 
looking at the issue of citizenship from the three different levels of decision-making 
existent in the European Union (Community level, national level, and individual level). 
8 Statements from interviewees from EU institutions and from a few of the associated 
countries (conducted between March 1998 and June 2000), will be utilised to further 
discuss this issue. 
9 Surveys/Opinion Polls were presented in the New Democracies Barometer and in 
Richard Rose, Survey Measures of Democracy, Studies in Public Policy no.294, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK, 1996. Research and surveys were conducted 
by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK. 
10 Comments that arose during various interviews suggested and stated that particular 
associated countries modelled their legal systems and laws on current EU member 
states, while taking into account differences between themselves and these member 
states. It was also acknowledged that it would take more than the mere transfer of 
institutions and ideas from western European countries, implanted into Central and East 
European countries for the rule of law to be developed and supported. This was also 
reiterated in the work of Thomas Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival', Foreign Affairs, 
vol.77, no.2, March-April 1998, pp.95-106. 
11 Comments similar to this one, were made during Interviews A and C conducted in 
Brussels on the 5 and 6 May 1998. 
12 Chapter Three of this thesis will emphasise the diversity of conceptualisations that 
exist across prospective member states in Central and Eastern Europe. What this 
provides is a glimpse at the reasons behind particular developments regarding the rule 
of law in this region. For example, the chapter illustrated how the Czechs seem to be 
developing their own 'idea' of the rule of law, but are unsure of what it should do. 
While the Hungarians on the other had, have developed an understanding of the rule of 
law similar to the German conception discussed earlier in Chapter Two. Then there are 
the Poles, who have shown more positivist inclinations in their conceptualisation of the 
rule of law. All of these illustrate the differences in understandings which exist in the 
region. 
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13 What this illustrates is the lack of unifonnity and diversity that the Community is 
emphasising on the one hand, while at the same time, it is prescribing that prospective 
members include certain institutions or procedures that are connected with a more 
uniform understanding of the rule of law. This demonstrates the uncoordinated 
developments that have been taking place across the Community. It supports the 
conclusion, that while the Community is saying one thing, its actions are 'saying' the 
opposite. They want to encourage diversity and have stated that prospective countries 
will develop their own 'brand' of rule of law that is culturally sensitive. What this is 
supporting it seems, is the support of the status quo in the Community - that current 
member states can have variations in their understandings of the rule of law. This has 
potential implications on the integration process of the Community, that is only 
beginning to come to light. 
14 Examples of this can be cited from France and Germany. This will be covered in detail 
in Chapter Two- in examination of member states' understandings ofthe rule of law. 
15 In much of its documentation containing the term 'rule oflaw', the European Union has 
linked it with the idea of democracy - linking the two terms as synonymous or invariably 
intertwined and necessarily connected. This perspective does not take into account that 
the two concepts are at times, at odds with one another and contradict what the other 
proposed to stand for. 
16 For example, the EU has criticised some associated countries for lacking the proper 
implementation of particular institutions and procedures. (Signs from the Community 
have pointed to their move towards placing more emphasis on the proper implementation 
of institutions and procedures and not just with having them in place.) They are 
concerned with the operation of these in practice in prospective member states, but 
perhaps have overlooked the fact that within the current Community, there are some 
member states who perhaps either lack these same institutions or who have them, but 
lack proper implementation of them, which has been sometime 'required' by prospective 
members in the enlargement process. 
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Chapter One: The Rule of Law 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the complexity of the concept of the rule 
of law and its contested nature. It is also meant to illustrate some of the ambiguities in 
various approaches to the rule of law, as discussed by writers such as Judith Shklar, 
Geoffrey de Q. Walker, and Paul Craig. There is a need for a more complex 
understanding of the rule of law, than is currently offered by many writers. Because of 
this need, this first chapter will focus on the relationship between the rule of law and the 
ideas of democracy, the judiciary, and a market economy. Focus upon these particular 
relationships are of relevance and importance because many conceptions and 
understandings of the rule of law have developed with reference to one or more of these 
ideas. The distinctions made in this first chapter serve as foundations for subsequent 
chapters, and are important for the subsequent consideration of approaches to the rule of 
law by particular European Union institutions, member states and associated countries. 
Overall in Europe, development of diverse ideas and understandings of the rule of law is 
illustrative of the ambiguities that exist. 
The first section of this chapter will examine the rule of law. This will entail 
discussion of two main distinctions made in defining the rule of law: 1) of the rule of law 
as a way of life (values oriented) as compared to a set of institutions; and 2) the formal 
or substantive conceptions of the rule of law. The first distinction, referring to the rule 
oflaw as a way of life or in terms of institutions, is one that was made by Shklar. 17 The 
second distinction in defining the rule of law has been put forward by both Paul Craig 
and Maria Esteban. 18 The importance of this particular distinction between formal and 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law, is that it is crucial 'in determining the nature 
of the specific legal precepts which can be derived from the rule of law.' 19 Each of these 
meanings is of importance because each implies particular sources for the derivation of 
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law, which in turn, has particular implications regarding the role of government, the 
extent of individual rights, and the way in which law is perceived and applied. The 
distinctions drawn out each dictate the existence of a specific hierarchy between values 
and the institutions that have been created to protect these values. Examination of this 
distinction is of importance as it will provide a more 'well-rounded' understanding ofthe 
concept 'rule of law', and its complexity. These distinctions made in defining the rule of 
law will be examined in more detail later in the first section of this chapter. 
The chapter will then continue with a section (section 2) on democracy. This 
section will only focus on the two main descriptions of democracy. The first definition is 
of it as direct or participatory democracy, and the second as representative democracy. 
The importance of examining these two different definitions of democracy is that each 
implies a specific type of relationship between government and individuals. 
After examining the two main understanding of democracy, the section will then 
centre on the relationship between the principle of the rule of law and the contemporary 
conception of democracy, i.e. representative democracy. This is of importance as it 
concerns what the relationship is between the rule of law and democracy, terms that are 
often presented as interchangeable. 20 
The third section of this chapter (section 3) examines the relationship between the 
judiciary and the rule of law. The judiciary has been established, among other things, to 
provide individuals with the means by which to hold the government accountable for its 
actions. However, the judiciary has the task of serving as judge of law and at the same 
time, it is subject to the law. 21 The role of the judiciary, especially the role and powers of 
judges, is directly affected by the way in which the rule of law is defined or interpreted. 
This determines the shape of the judiciary and the idea of judicial review. This can be 
10 
illustrated with reference to examples of current member states, and to the EU, through 
the Court of Justice. 22 
The last section of this chapter (section 4) focuses on the problems or 
contradictions inherent in the relationship between the rule of law and building a market 
economy. The main conflict with this relationship is that the building and constant 
support of a market economy demands actions (intervention by government) that 
contradict what some understand the concept of the rule of law to represent. According 
to some, the rule of law supports the idea of limited government intervention in society, 
while others believe a market economy demands the intervention of government to assist 
and ensure competition and the regulation ofthe market23 (such as in the U.S.- Microsoft 
case and other high profile merger cases reviewed by the European Union in recent 
history). 
Section One - The Rule of Law 
This section examines the various ideas in defining the term 'rule of law'. The term 'rule 
of law' is relevant for formulating a general understanding of the development of legal 
systems of European Union member states, of associated member states of the EU, and 
of the EU institutions that have been created and developed. This understanding is of 
importance to the overall thesis, as the thesis undertakes to examine how the rule of law 
is defined, understood, and utilised within the enlargement process of the European 
Union, specifically, enlargement eastwards. The overall relevance of the term 'rule of 
law', is that it has been identified as a main democratic principle upon which the EU 
institutions are based, upon which current EU member states are based, and upon which 
associated countries should be based, if they aspire to EU membership in the future. 
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According to Judith Shklar, the term originally 'referred to either an entire way of 
life, or merely to several specific public institutions.'24 Geoffrey de Q. Walker makes a 
similar distinction- examining the rule of law in terms of values and institutions. The 
former meaning of the rule of law, as a way of life, 'equates the Rule of Law with the 
rule of reason', which Fallon attributed to Aristotle.25 Shklar, also acknowledged its 
origins as 'very Aristotelian', when she stated that the rule of law is 'nothing less than 
the rule of reason' ?6 There are then arguments for defining the rule oflaw according to 
the idea that it is a way of life, as compared to defining it along institutional lines. 
Accepting this meaning of the rule of law implies a particular view of individual rights, 
the role of government, and of the law. 
It implies that authority and sovereignty are vested in the population. The 
implication is that there are particular values and norms that are accepted by all 
individuals without having to be stated, and that laws originate or are created from these 
values. The problem with this conception is that this meaning is dependent on the idea 
that individuals are rational, reasonable, and able to practice self-restraint. The rule of 
law as a 'way of life', can be conceived of as the way in which individuals are expected 
to behave, (reasonably, showing self-restraint, ethically), as members of a society, by 
knowing how laws will affect them. The implication here is that there is a right and a 
wrong 'way', and that the right way is the only acceptable way. According to Shklar, it 
also implies that there will always be those members of society who are unable to meet 
the ideal of what an individual should be. This definition relies on the few individuals 
who are sane, intelligent and ethical in character, 'to persuade others to practice some 
degree of self-restraint and to maintain the legal order that best fits the ethical structure 
of a polity. ' 27 This view of the rule of law acknowledges that there is subservience of the 
individual and individual rights to a higher order- in this case, societal norms rather than 
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the government. 28 The conception of the rule of law in this manner, deriving its 
legitimacy from societal norms, makes the assumption that these norms are derived from 
an authority above society and the government, be it God or Nature. Individual rights 
are secondary to what is considered to be important or best for the entire society. 
Walker shares a similar perspective in his 'values approach' to the rule oflaw. He 
writes of 'the forces, drives, or purposes' behind the creation of the legal and 
government institutions and which these institutions serve, rather than focusing on the 
institutions themselves. 29 This view is shared not only by Shklar in her 'way of life' 
conception of the rule of law, but it is also shared by the International Commission of 
Jurists, in their 'holistic' conception of the rule oflaw.30 
Raz points out the problem with this idea that the rule of law should be conceived 
of as a 'way of life'. 31 He believes that to follow this line of argument would be 
detrimental to the idea of what the rule of law stands for, and that it is often used to 
cloak and justify the decisions reached and robs it of any independence. The problem for 
Raz, is that 
.. .if the rule of law is taken to encompass the necessity for 
"good laws" in this sense then the concept ceases to have any 
useful independent function for the following reason. There is a 
wealth of literature devoted to the discussion of the meaning of 
a just society, the nature of rights which should subsist therein, 
and the appropriate boundaries of governmental action .... To 
bring these issues within the rubric of the rule of law would 
therefore have the effect of robbing this concept of any function 
independent of such political theories. 32 
Approaching the rule of law as set of institutions has different connotations. 
This, Shklar sees 'as those institutional restraints that prevent governmental agents from 
oppressing the rest of society.'33 Walker identifies an approach similar to the one offered 
by Shklar. In his 'institutional approach' of the rule of law there is the inclusion of not 
just the institutions whose main function is to maintain and support the rule of law, but 
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also the principles and procedures involved. This approach focuses on the 'principles of 
legal organisation of the society. ' 34 
This conception of the rule of law implies a limitation on government agents and 
institutions. Justification for this view of a limited role for government, was expressed 
by Montesquieu. He argued that the rule of law was meant to protect individuals from 
the coercive and oppressive actions of government and to regulate mutual relations 
between members of a society. The rule oflaw stands for a limited number of protective 
arrangements for the 'benefit of every member of society'.35 Similarly, A. V. Dicey 
presents the principle as 'presupposing the absence of arbitrary power', and as providing 
the 'assurance that the individual can ascertain with reasonable certainty what legal 
powers are available to government if there is a proposal to affect his private rights. '36 
Hayek makes similar claims, that the rule of law should restrict government 'only in its 
coercive actions', from using its powers to coerce individuals 'except in the enforcement 
of a known rule. '37 He states that while these are important, it is also worth noting that 
'these [activities] will never be the only functions of government. '38 Moreover the 
limitation of governmental powers and actions, is the needed to ensure legal certainty. 
Legal certainty requires that 'true laws be known and certain', as this is 'important for the 
smooth and efficient running of a free society. '39 But even this, for Hayek, is not enough. 
It is not enough that the rule of law requires legality in all government actions and 
activities, for it is necessary 'that all laws conform to certain principles. '40 This is not to 
say that he believes procedural safeguards such as habeas corpus or trial by jury, are of 
little importance to the conception of the rule of law. What Hayek is saying, is that 
although the rule of law can be defined in terms of institutions, institutional and 
procedural restraints on government actions, there is still the issue of the ideals behind 
these institutions and procedures. He believes that the rule of law needs to be a part of 
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the 'moral tradition of the community', despite the potential problem this can lead to, 
such as the fact that such an ideal is what 'we can hope to approach very closely, but can 
never fully realise'. This is problematic, as when individuals cease to strive for the 
realisation of such ideals, upon which the government's institutions and procedures are 
built, then 'society will quickly relapse into a state of arbitrary tyranny. '41 
A similar perspective of the idea of the rule of law is presented by T .R. S. Allan. 
The centre of his conception of the rule of law is that the law provides the most secure 
means of protecting individual liberty. In this case, the rule of law 'constitutes a standard 
by which a legal order can be measured and assessed. '42 Similar to Hayek and Dicey, 
Allan believes that the rule of law requires that the 'nature and limits of official 
government infiingement on the liberties of citizens, be clearly stated in advance of any 
action taken by the state against the citizen. '43 This is an important aspect because it 
illustrates how the rule of law is central to the setting of a framework in which relations 
between individuals, and between the government and its citizens, are to be regulated 
and understood. 
Formal conceptions of the rule of law 'do not seek to pass judgement upon the 
actual content of the law itself, they are interested in 'the manner in which the law was 
promulgated; the clarity of the ensuing norm; and the temporal dimension of the enacted 
norm. ' 44 What this definition of the rule of law is mainly concerned with is whether laws 
are authorised properly, are sufficiently clear for everyone to understand, and whether 
they are 'prospective or retrospective' .45 It has been claimed that the problem with this 
particular definition of the rule oflaw, is that because it is not concerned with the content 
of laws, it does not differentiate between good or bad laws. Although to legal positivists 
there is essentially nothing wrong with the creation of bad laws so long as they are 
properly created and implemented, it seems from the opposing perspective, that the value 
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of law is diminished. The value of law seems to be diminished if any law, whether good 
or bad, as long as authorised by the proper authority and in a correct and clear manner, is 
considered to be a law. 46 
Furthermore, as Walker articulated, the problem with this kind of conception of 
the rule of law [a legal positivist conception] which focuses on 'quantity and position 
rather than with quality,' is that it has 'left legal science without any tools for dealing with 
questions of value or meaning. '47 This has 'led lawyers complaisantly to recognise as 
'law' the decrees of totalitarian rulers [such as the example ofNazi Germany and Hitler], 
so long as such regimes clothe their commands in some formal legal garb.'48 Nazi 
Germany was widely cited because here was an example of a regime implementing a rule, 
such as the Nuremberg Laws, which many considered immoral, but did so according to 
proper procedures and by an authorised authority. According to Hart and other legal 
positivists, this would be considered a law, just a 'bad law'. 
Therefore, there is the potential for bad laws to be implemented, or worse still, 
for governments to implement laws which are clear and properly authorised by the 
legislature, but which go against basic ideas of how individuals should be treated. Such 
experiences induced Gustav Radbruch to suggest that law, 'after the experience of 
Hitler,, must be more than simply rules and commands. ' 49 According to a 'formula' 
devised by Radbruch, 
The conflict between justice and legal certainty should be resolved in 
the positive law, established by enactment and by power, has primacy 
even when its content is unjust and improper. It is only when the 
contradiction between positive law and justice reaches an intolerable 
level that the law is supposed to give way as a 'false law' [ unrichtiges 
Recht] to justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper line between the 
cases of legalised injustice and laws which remain valid despite their 
false content Where justice is not even aimed at, where equality- the 
core of justice- is deliberately disavowed in the enactment of a 
positive law, then the law is not simply 'false law', it has no claim at 
all to legal status. 50 
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Proponents of a positivist conception of the rule of law, who see law as 
something separate from morals, and are not concerned with the content oflaw, claim, as 
Hart did, that 'Because a law is immoral, it does not make it any less a law. It simply 
becomes a bad law. ' 51 This is because legal positivists have drawn 'a sharp distinction 
between positive law [laws created and 'presupposed to be sufficiently reasonable 
ones'
52] and its moral roots. '53 Although positivist approaches to law have been accused 
of issuing in a na.lve supposition, that the judge or constitutional lawyer is merely the 
mouthpiece of the law, self-avowed positivists have not necessarily accepted this 
limitation. Interestingly, that is true of some of the most prominent self-avowed 
positivists ofWeimar Germany. The Weimar period is especially illuminating for it was 
then that the vices of positivism were supposedly so cruelly exposed. More specifically, 
legal positivism was said to have proven itself impotent in the face of authoritarian critics 
of democracy, and most importantly, in the face of the Nazi party which held the reins of 
power. Yet it has been observed that it was precisely the legal positivists who proved to 
be the staunchest defenders ofWeimar democracy. 54 
These same constitutional lawyers acknowledged that purely formal and strict 
deduction was often impossible. Thus Richard Thoma notes that 'The legal dogmatist, 
be he a theorist or a judge who is obliged to reach a decision, is rather dogged by 
problems for whose solution contradictory but in themselves logically unobjectionable 
constructions and conclusions offer themselves. ' 55 In these cases the theorist or judge 
had to refer to values or wider tendencies in order to reach a decision. In fact, as Craig 
states, 'formal conceptions of the rule of law are themselves based upon substantive 
foundations, namely ideas of moral autonomy and the respect for the individual. Given 
that this is so, it is unrealistic or implausible to preserve the dichotomy between form and 
substance. '56 There were, of course, dangers in opening up a strict positivist approach. 
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Thoma noted that it was precisely these dangers that induced another prominent 
positivist, Hans Kelsen, to acknowledge these non-deductive features of law only to 
banish them from the realm ofthe science oflaw.57 Indeed, Kelsen's suspicions and fears 
were well-founded. Commenting on those who argued that there were vital national 
interests which overrode positive law, Kelsen sarcastically replied that 'Behind such 
guileless reassurance that the state must "live", lies mostly only the ruthless will that the 
state must live in the manner which those who avail themselves of the justification of a 
'state right of emergency' regard as right. ' 58 
It has also been argued that the implementation of law in National Socialist 
Germany relied not only upon iniquitous positive law but also upon highly elastic 
indeterminate principles. Thus Otto Kirchheimer emphasised the role played by the 
notion of the 'sound feelings of the people' in jurisdiction, both where such terminology 
was incorporated in relevant legislation and where is was not. 59 
Self-avowed positivists have also argued more generally that it is precisely their 
position that captures the essential ambiguity ofthe rule of law, that it contains elements 
of the ideal or normative and elements of an enforced positive legal order. The 
implication is that to attempt to deny or escape this ambiguity is to undermine the reality 
of the rule of law. It is this position which is evident in Hans Kelsen's conclusion that 
'The problem of the positivity of law consists precisely in this, that it figures 
simultaneously as both "ought" and "is", although these two categories logically exclude 
each other. ' 60 
Substantive conceptions of the rule of law on the other hand, go beyond formal 
conceptions. According to Craig, 'Certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or 
derived from, the rule of law. The concept is used as a foundation for these rights, which 
are then used to distinguish between "good" laws, which comply with such rights, and 
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"bad" laws which do not. ' 61 This conception focuses on the content of laws. The 
problem with this conception of the rule of law, is that it is inter-linked with the formal 
conception which itself is based on morals and values, whether acknowledged or not 
According to Dworkin's conception of the rule oflaw, there is an assumption, 
that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one 
another, and political rights against the state as a whole. It 
insists that these moral and political rights be recognised in 
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of 
individual citizens through the courts or other judicial 
institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is practicable. 62 
His argument for defining the rule of law according to a substantive 'rights' conception, 
not only opposes a division between formal and substantive conceptions, but it also 
'requires the articulation not simply of general concepts ofliberty, equality and the like. It 
demands that the particular conception of these broader concepts be revealed. '63 
However, there are differing ideas of what these concepts mean, though all are based on 
the moral values and ideas of society, derived from a higher order or nature itself 
Summary 
The consequences of these divergent approaches are substantial. As presented in Craig's 
article, Dworkin's own argument 'serves to emphasise that the very meaning of the rule 
of law will be inextricably linked with one's definition of law itself and with the proper 
adjudicative role of the judge. '64 Thus the dispute over how the rule of law should be 
defined, evident in disagreement amongst theorists such as Hart, Habermas, Allan, and 
Dworkin, concerns whether there should be and is a division between law and morals. 
Legal positivists have argued that there is and should be a distinction between the two. 
The absence of a distinction would lead to the rule of law becoming prone to political 
influences. By this, they meant that if laws and morals were too closely associated, any 
changes in perspectives of particular morals, for example abortion, could then influence 
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laws made with regard to this particular moral, leading the rule of law to be politically 
influenced. However, critics have argued that the distinction made by legal positivists is 
also problematic, as it leads to the possibility of totalitarian or other regimes, making 
immoral rules by the proper procedures and authority, thereby making 'bad laws'. The 
problem, as even advocates of legal positivism have sometimes conceded, is that these 
bad laws become difficult to change because they have been created through proper 
procedures. The main disagreement between the two sides, can ultimately be attributed 
to a fundamental disagreement about the way in which legal norms are identified, and 
concerns the 'very nature of law'. 65 
This fundamental disagreement about the nature and source of legitimacy of law, 
and hence the rule of law, has implications for the practice and support for this principle. 
In practice, approaches to the rule of law can be divided along the lines of what method 
is seen as best for supporting and protecting it- making it a way of life through instilled 
societal norms, or through the creation and development of particular government 
institutions. As will be seen further along in this chapter, the 'practice' of the rule of law 
is affected by the inherent assumptions regarding sources of its legitimacy and authority. 
This has an effect on the relationship of this principle to ideas associated with it, such as 
democracy- which the next section will examine. 
Section Two - Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Although there are many conceptions and approaches of democracy, the two long-
standing conceptions that are usually cited are direct (or participatory) democracy and 
representative democracy. The significance of distinguishing between these two main 
conceptions of democracy, is that each implies a specific kind of role for both 
government and individuals. This distinction will then provide a foundation for 
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documenting the relationship between democracy and the rule of law. It will also 
illustrate the potential problems with this relationship, namely the conflation of these two 
terms. The conflation of the rule of law and democracy in theory and practice is 
problematic as it seems to neglect the existence of diverse conceptions of the rule of law. 
This will be dealt with in more specific terms later in the thesis, with further details of the 
potential problems this has in the context of the European Union, and with its 
enlargement to include countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Democracy 
There are varying definitions of what is meant when referring to a state as a democracy. 
In the Little Oxford Dictionary, democracy is defined as a 'government by the whole 
population, usually through elected representatives; state so governed. '66 This definition 
of democracy can be identified as 'representative democracy'. Similarly, Kaldor and 
Vejvoda, in their article Democratisation in Central and East European Countries', 
described democracy from an institutional perspective. They described it as a 'set of 
formal institutions and a way of redistributing power. '67 Georg S0rensen offers a 
discussion of democracy that reiterates what Kaldor and Vejvoda have stated. In his 
discussion, he focuses particularly on the conception of representative democracy as 
understood by Joseph Schumpeter. He states that Schumpeter formulates a 'narrow 
conception of democracy', defining it as 'simply a political model, a mechanism for 
choosing political leadership. '68 In Schumpeter's words, "The democratic method is the 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. "69 
Weale, although holding a similar idea of democracy, places emphasis on 
representation and representatives, rather than on the method or institutional model. He 
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believes that the central principle of this form of government is 'that major decisions 
should be taken by political representatives meeting in a legislative chamber, who reflect 
in their characteristics and opinions a wide variety of views and experience. '70 This 
illustrates an understanding of democracy as representative democracy. Individuals 
choose representatives through procedures and institutions, and representatives make 
decisions on behalf of individuals. His reasoning for this particular formation of 
government is based on 'various reasons largely to do with size', and the claim that 'we 
should not expect the people to rule directly, but nevertheless policy choices should still 
reflect opinions that are representative of a broad swathe of opinion in society.'71 These 
descriptions of democracy have focused on the redistribution of power, illustrating the 
idea of a representative form of democracy based upon the creation and development of 
particular institutions that distributes power without full direct participation of the 
masses, but participation nonetheless. 
In contrast to the definitions of democracy offered above, Hutchinson and 
Monahan, in their book The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, defined a democracy to 
mean the 'greatest possible engagement by people in the greatest possible range of 
communal tasks and public action . .n What Hutchinson and Monahan were referring to 
was direct or participatory democracy. 
Jean Hampton offers another description for the term 'democracy'. According to 
Hampton, the use of the term 'democracy' refers to a style of government. 73 What 
Hampton was implying in her understanding of democracy, was that it was a structure of 
government based on the idea of individual will. Hampton's understanding of democracy 
has also been shared by Rousseau in his conception of direct democracy. This however, 
is where the similarity ends between Hampton and Rousseau, and the two become 
distinct. The distinguishing factor between the two ideas is the emphasis. While 
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Hampton focuses on individual will, Rousseau has taken this a step further, emphasising 
the necessity of a collective will - although individual participation is still a fundamental 
aspect of democracy, as it is for Hampton. 
For Rousseau, the idea of a direct or participatory form of democracy was based 
on the underlying value of autonomy of the individual and the idea that government 
needed to be founded upon this for it to be considered legitimate. What he meant by 
participation was 'participation in the making of decisions'. 74 His conception of 
democracy demanded that citizens are able to 'determine for themselves the rules and 
laws that they will be obliged to follow', as without this participation in what he termed 
'determination of the general will', 'there would be no legitimate way of making public 
decisions.'75 What distinguishes Rousseau's idea from Hampton's, can be illustrated 
clearly in his argument that ' ... sovereignty, being nothing other than the exercise of the 
general will, can never be alienated; and that the sovereign, which is simply a collective 
being, cannot be represented by anyone but itself- power may be delegated, but the will 
cannot be.'76 
David Held provides another perspective similar to what has already been 
discussed. He developed a principle of autonomy on which his conception of democracy 
stands. He believed that this principle of autonomy required 'both a high degree of 
accountability of the state and a democratic reordering of society.' His principle states 
that: 
Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the 
conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal 
rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification 
of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities 
available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework 
to negate the rights of others. 77 
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Democracy based on the rule of human will, as defined by Rousseau, Hampton, 
and Serensen, emphasises the rule by individuals, according to individuals' interests and 
desires. There is an element of unpredictability to this type or form of democracy, 
because the 'human will' could give rise to arbitrary actions. This conception of 
democracy is narrowly focused on the individual, where it defines democracy as a 'direct, 
not representative system', and does not conform to classical democratic theory 
definitions, such as those put forth by Schumpeter. 78 The relationship between direct 
democracy and the rule of law will be discussed further, later in this section. 
In contrast to these ideas is the idea of democracy as a set of institutions. This 
idea has its own problems and limitations. Most importantly, this definition of 
democracy (as a set of institutions), gives rise to a larger role for the government, as the 
source of authority and legitimacy rests with the institutions and procedures developed. 
These institutions and procedures were developed to ensure the protection of individual 
rights and liberties, but in this pursuit, it accords government institutions the power to 
override an individual's rights in the name of protecting the rights of all individuals. This 
puts forth the possibility of threats to any individuals' rights. 
Reviewing the various perspectives, definitions, and uses of what is meant by the 
term 'democracy', provide some general and common themes. Writers from Rousseau to 
Hutchinson and Monahan to Hampton or Kaldor, have taken democracy to mean a type 
of government based on either 1) the idea of individual participation or 2) a set of formal 
institutions. These definitions of democracy imply particular ideas about the sources of 
authority and legitimacy, as well as limitations. The implications have far reaching 
effects, such as the role assigned to both government and individuals; the extent of 
individual rights granted; and most importantly, entails the perception and application of 
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law. Each of these definitions of democracy, each prescribes a particular notion of the 
rule oflaw, as will be examined further. 
Democracy and the Rule ofLaw 
The main focus of this sub-section will be to consider the nature of the relationship 
between Democracy and the Rule of Law - are they synonymous and interchangeable or 
are there inherent contradictions between the two. This section will focus on two 
separate arguments. Firstly, it will briefly present and clarify the point that different 
conceptions of democracy tend to go together with particular conceptions of the rule of 
law. Secondly, this sub-section will review how the conflation of these two terms 
(democracy and the rule of law) in theory and especially in practice, employs a more 
narrow view of the rule of law and ignores tensions between democracy and the rule of 
law. This is of significance, as the conflation of these terms has particular implications. 
It affects: a) the role both the state apparatus and individuals within the state, b) the 
manner in which the state is governed, and c) the legitimate source of authority- in the 
government (through laws) or in the people (through morals and beliefs). 
Connections Between Various Understandings of Two Terms 
As noted above, there are particular forms of democracy that tend to be 
associated with particular conceptions of the rule of law. For example, participatory 
(direct) democracy tends to be associated with the conception of the rule of law as a way 
of life; and representative forms of democracy are associated with more formal 
conceptions of the rule of law. 
Direct or participatory democracy and the rule of law (conceived of as a way of 
life), tend to be associated with one another because of the main ideas which they both 
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serve to support. The reasoning for this association is that both support the idea of 
individual autonomy and participation, and emphasise, as was noted earlier, the 'central 
importance of the individual'. The manner in which each concept attempts to achieve this 
overriding goal may differ slightly. However, the fact is that this 'shared' goal is based on 
participation of individuals, where participation is an accepted part of life in a society. 
Review of this relationship identifies one of the potential problems with its emphasis on 
the individual. As was stated previously, the focus or emphasis on the individual in this 
relationship, allows room for variations based on individual interpretations of what both 
'democracy' and 'the rule of law' encompasses. 
Representative democracy on the other hand has tended to be associated with a 
more formal or institutional conception of the rule of law. In the seventeenth century 
and subsequently, despite modifications, the rule of law has been defined in an 
"institution-type" manner which has become associated with representative democracy. 79 
Similarly, as was discussed earlier in this section, representative democracy has been 
defined as the 'institutional arrangement' for making political decisions and distributing 
power. These two conceptualisations (rule of law and representative democracy) are 
readily associated with one another because both are seen as methods for the practical 
participation of individuals in the decision-making process, through the distribution of 
powers. 80 Martin Diamond illustrates this association of meanings further, in his 
definition of democracy. He believes that protecting individual liberty is the main 
objective and that democracy is merely an instrument or method in which to safeguard 
individuals' freedom and rights. 81 In this case, association of democracy (in its 
representative form) and formal conceptions of the rule of law, can be seen as providing 
a framework for the more efficient organisation of power, while ensuring that individual 
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liberties are protected from being overridden by the 'hannful effects of collective 
decision-making'. 82 
Andnis Saj6 phrased it another way when he stated that, 'representative 
government- the expression of the general will in elections and people's sovereignty' 
gives precedence to collective decisions or majority rules, but there also needs to be the 
protection and opportunity for the 'minority voice' in the process83, and this is what the 
rule of law provides. From this, it can be concluded that the rule of law assists in 
strengthening the concept of democracy by ensuring that the governing authority's 
actions stay within the rules adopted. 84 The rule of law is important to democracy, as it 
provides protection of individual rights and guarantees self-determination, which are 
sometimes overlooked in modern democracies, where individuals entrust those chosen to 
represent them, with taking part in the governing of the state. Dworkin believed that in 
the end what was most important was the protection of individual rights, and that the 
notion of public good should take a secondary seat to these rights. Theorists and 
writers, such as Ronald Dworkin, concur that the rule of law "enriches democracy by 
adding an independent forum of principle". 85 
From another perspective, T.R.S. Allan believes, in agreement with others on the 
topic, that the rule of law 'represents a limit on the scope of parliamentary authority and 
the imposition of constraints on the political power of the sovereign body in the interests 
of minorities or for the protection of individual liberties is the essence of 
constitutionalism. '86 It is seen as assisting 'in preventing the subversion of the political 
sovereignty of the people by manipulation of the legal sovereignty of Parliament. '87 The 
term stands as 'the basic constitutional principle' providing a 'powerful breakwater, if not 
an impenetrable dam, against encroachment on important rights and liberties by means of 
statutory authority. '88 Therefore, it can be stated that in this instance, the rule of law is 
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serving as an instrument for the realisation and the reinforcement of democracy and 
associated ideas. It does this by providing a frame of reference for the protection and 
realisation of individual rights within this form of government. 
Conflation ofTerms 
Historically, the terms, democracy and the rule of law have been conflated due to the 
general understanding that the two terms represent similar ideals. Democracy is 
generally understood as a governmental structure of institutions, checks and balances, 
separation of powers, to both ensure limits on government actions and by the 
institutional design, to promote protection and support for individual rights and 
autonomy. There has been general agreement that democracy is 'generally seen as a 
combination of institutions (free elections, political rights, independent judiciary), 
political values (accountability, toleration, participation), and a propitious political 
context (a wide availability of alternative sources of information, an ability to meet the 
basic needs of individuals, an educated population). '89 The rule of law is understood in 
general terms, as the protection of individual autonomy and rights, and the limitation of 
government powers and actions. In essence, both of these terms, have in historical and 
contemporary uses, been conflated. They have been conflated based on general 
understandings which have shown them to both be based on the 'central importance of 
the individual', ensuring that 'policies applied, and legislative provisions' are interpreted 
with respect to civil and political freedoms which are considered fundamental in 
society. 90 In his work, Timothy Kenyon reiterates similar reasons for this occurrence. 
He states that 'the rule of law has been closely identified with what might be termed a 
'procedural view of democracy' whereby emphasis is placed upon protecting the rights 
and liberties of citizens from the illegitimate interference of government. m 
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Despite the use of the two concepts interchangeably, the nature of the 
relationship between variations in ideas of the rule of law and democracy, is a complex 
one. The conflation of these two terms generally, has obscured these variations and their 
links. The general use and conflation of democracy and the rule of law has obscured the 
fact that forms of democracy are linked to particular conceptions of the rule oflaw. For 
example, direct or participatory democracy has been linked with the rule of law as 
conceived as a way of life. Similarly, representative democracy and its association to the 
formaVinstitutional conception of the rule of law are neglected by the general conflation 
of the two concepts. 
It has been generally understood that the rule of law can exist without 
democracy, but that democracy cannot exist without the rule of law. Both of these 
generalisations will be further expanded upon. Starting with the first generalisation - the 
rule oflaw can exist without a democracy. lfby use of the term democracy, it is taken to 
mean the contemporary idea of democracy as exists today, then the governing system, 
which existed in Eighteenth Century England, illustrates the existence of the rule of law 
without a democracy. Despite widespread acceptance of Dicey's ideas about the rule of 
law, and a belief that Britain was in fact based on the rule of law, Britain lacked 
democracy. 92 Similarly, Wilhelmine Germany in the early 1900s provides another 
illustration of this. The government in Germany at this time was formed on a system that 
supported autonomy of the monarch and a lack of responsibility on the part of the 
Chancellor to the Reichstag. Germany at this time, like Britain, lacked democracy in its 
modem sense. Another example of the a system in which the rule of law existed, but 
which would not be considered a democracy by today's standards, is the system which 
existed in France in the late Eighteenth Century. The country had a system which was 
based on the 'rule-of-law principle of the supremacy oflaw', whereby the king (as a state 
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organ) governed by the law and 'it is only in the name of the law that he can demand 
obedience. ,93 
While there are examples to illustrate that the rule of law can exist without a 
democracy, a democracy is said to need the rule of law in order to satisfy the 
requirement of participation in government by individuals, either directly or through 
representation. Hutchinson reiterates and emphasises this when he quotes from 
Chemerinsky94, ' ... democracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule 
oflaw.'95 The rule of law is important in a democracy because it implies that individuals 
have the ability to exercise their right to participate in the governing of their state, as 
defined earlier, that democracy is a state governed through the sovereign will of the 
people. 96 From this perspective of the relationship between democracy and the rule of 
law, it can be said that the rule of law is a foundation for developing a democracy. This 
is because democracy supported or based on the rule of law, is seen as a state which 
enables individuals to best utilise their rights to ensure the protection of them from the 
arbitrary and coercive actions of others. This is one view of the rule of law and 
democracy, which sees the rule of law as a necessary component to democracy. There is 
another approach to this relationship, one which views the rule of law as a 'clear check 
on the flourishing of a rigorous democracy,97, thereby illustrating the complexity of this 
relationship between democracy and the rule oflaw. 
The basis for the above perspectives rest upon the fact that there are inherent 
contradictions between the two concepts, based on their definitions. This exists 
notwithstanding the general understanding of the two terms as synonymous, 
interchangeable, or inter-linked.98 Despite some evidence to support the conclusion that 
democracy and the rule of law can be described as synonymous, the 'opposite often 
seems to be true: the Rule of Law has functioned as a clear check on the actual impact 
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and expansion of a rigorous democracy.'99 Dworkin makes a similar point, alluding to 
the possibility that democracy may not be a good form of government for the rule of law. 
He argues that individual rights should take precedence over the public good, and that 
the rule oflaw is a "system ofuniversal freedom and equality, but that it is perverted by 
the development of the state."10° From this perspective, it can be concluded that the 
development of the state into a democracy actually suppresses the concept of the rule of 
law. The rule of law is suppressed by the development of the state because ideas of the 
public good are given greater credence. This is because democratic decisions could 
override the rights of the individual, thereby allowing for the majority to decide to 
sacrifice the minority for the supposed greater good. In practice today, the development 
of democracy has precluded the relinquishment of certain levels of control of individual 
liberties to a selected group of individuals for the governing of the state. Thereby 
providing a restraint on the promotion and utilisation of political rights, and diminishing 
the influence of the rule of law to protect individual liberties from arbitrary and coercive 
actions taken against an individual or group of individuals. 
Historical development of different forms of democracy have shown themselves 
to be a 'by-product of a preoccupation with private autonomy' and that the rule of law 
has served as a principle to effectively 'check the indulgent abuse of power by the few 
over the many.'101 This is because 'the Rule of Law is premised on the ideal of limited 
government; it has stood as a constitutional barrier between governors and the governed, 
between power and people. The existence and extent of democratic governance is only 
justified insofar as it better serves the enhanced liberty of individuals.' 102 Therefore, the 
rule of law stands for limited government (be it by direct participation, representation, or 
acknowledgement of a 'collective will' - in the interest of enhancing the rights and 
liberties for all individuals. This illustrates the conflicts within this relationship between 
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forms of democracy and conceptions of the rule of law_ Although there have been 'recent 
valiant attempts to reconcile the Rule of Law with democratic theory', writers like 
Hutchinson and Monahan have shown that the rule of law has acted as a clear check on 
the further development of democracy103 and that it 'has served to inhibit the flourishing 
of any governmental system of direct democracy. '104 
Thus, it has been suggested that while the rule of law is an instrument for the 
realisation of democracy, it has also been seen as a restraint upon democracy. It has also 
been argued earlier that the rule of law can exist without democracy. Despite these 
assumptions, democracy, in contemporary usage, has been assumed to be the 'most 
consistent' form of government for the utilisation of the rule of law. 105 This is because 
'adherence to the Rule of Law has come to be synonymous with compliance with a liberal 
scheme of govemance'. 106 It has been observed that 'some form of representative 
democracy has become a modem component of this model [of governing]', and that the 
'history ofthe Rule ofLaw's theory and practice reveals that it is more an optional extra 
than an essential condition. '107 By this it is meant that despite tendencies towards linking 
the rule of law and democracy exclusively, there are those writers such as Monahan and 
Hutchinson, who have also pointed out that the rule of law is can still be seen as optional 
and not essential to democracy. 
Habermas takes a very opposing view to the one offered above by Hutchinson 
and Monahan. He argues that both the rule of law and democracy are both equally 
necessary and mutually dependent on one another. Saj6 supports and illustrates 
Habermas' argument that democracy and the rule of law are mutually dependent 
Democracy can be seen as necessary to the rule of law, as it would alleviate some of the 
extremes caused by the strict application of the rule of law. This is because, as Saj6 
states, 'strictly applied, the rule of law allows no consideration of equity or the human 
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condition.'108 It restricts not only the 'will of the authorities, those that use force, and 
those that hand out benefits-safeguards citizens, at the same time it puts them at the 
mercy of government's impersonal and mechanical forms. '109 Therefore democracy, as a 
form of government, would assist in balancing this inherent inequality and inflexibility 
that is a part of the rule of law. 
The picture is further complicated by the existence of theorists who accept the 
historical and empirical discrepancy between the rule of law and democracy, but 
simultaneously argue that the two ideas complement one another. Again, Jurgen 
Habermas is the most prominent representative of this approach. He accepts the 
historical and empirical possibility of the separation of the rule of law and democracy-
that the 'rule of law may exist without democratic forms of political will-formation. ' 110 
However, he argues from a normative stance, that both democracy and the rule of law 
must be implemented together. The reasoning behind this is that there needs to be 
protection of individual rights, in order for individuals to be able to make use of these 
rights within a democratically governed state. 111 Habermas put this another way when he 
stated that «The private autonomy of equally entitled citizens can be secured only insofar 
as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy."112 
Summary 
As the differing perspectives of the relationship between the rule of law and democracy 
have suggested, this relationship is a complex one. The general understanding of what 
each of these terms mean, involves the conflation of them with a disregard or 
unawareness of the implications involved. The understanding of the rule of law 
developed within such a framework (conflated with the understanding of democracy), is 
one which does not take into account the complexity and variations in defining the rule 
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oflaw. In conflating these two terms and treating them as synonymous, there has been a 
lack of understanding as to the complexity of the relationship of the two ideas. The rule 
of law has in historical, but more importantly in contemporary uses, been described as 
necessary for the development of democracy. What this restricted perspective of their 
relationship has done, is to neglect the fact that it can also be argued that 1) democracy is 
important for the effectuation of the rule of law; 2) that the rule of law can also be 
judged as a retardant to the development of democracy; or 3) that democracy itself, can 
be used to justify suppressing the rule of law. To subscribe to the view that the rule of 
law and democracy are synonymous or to conflate these two ideas is to subvert the 
complexity and variations of relations between these two ideas. It subverts the 
distinctions made - firstly, of the rule of law as a way of life with direct or participatory 
democracy, as distinct from the rule of law as a formal/institutional model associated 
with representative forms of democracy. This is because the conflation of these terms 
reinforces and emphasises a conceptualisation and defining of each term in relation to 
one another. It provides a restricted understanding of the rule of law, as a method of 
protecting individual rights and limiting government actions (the protection of the private 
and public spheres). At the same time, it views democracy similarly, as a means and 
method of limiting government in the pursuit of protecting individual rights and 
autonomy, from any illegitimate and oppressive actions of the government. 
Section Three- The Rule of Law and the Judiciary 
Within this section, the focus turns to setting out what affect various conceptualisations 
of the rule of law have on the judicial system. Variations in the conceptualisation of the 
rule of law affect perceptions of both the issues of judicial discretion and judicial review. 
The relevance for focusing upon this relationship is two-fold. Firstly, because the 
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judiciary and judicial system are regularly associated with understandings of the rule of 
law, it is useful to examine this relationship to attain a better understanding of it. 
Secondly, as will be illustrated in the next two chapters, the judiciary and examination of 
the judicial system is an important part of the enlargement process for the European 
Union. The judiciary is seen as an important institution for supporting, protecting, and 
ensuring the rule of law in countries, as the judicial system is supposed to be unbiased, 
and its foremost task is to ensure the protection of individual rights. 
To illustrate the conflicts and disputed claims made about the relationship 
between this ideal (rule of law) and particular institution (the judiciary), the section will 
begin with an overview ofthe two main understandings ofthe rule oflaw (the rule-book 
and the rights-based conceptions). A brief overview of the main differences between 
these two understandings will be followed by the main arguments and connections 
associated with subscribing to a rule-book/positivist understanding of the rule of law. 
Contentious points relating to this definition will conclude with a review of some of the 
concessions and criticisms associated with the rule-book conception. Non-positivist and 
rights-based conceptualisations of the rule of law are then presented. Linkages between 
these ideas and the issue of judicial discretion and the role of judges can then be made. 
Rule-Book versus Rights-Based Conceptions of the Rule ofLaw 
There exists within the literature on the relationship of the rule of law and the judiciary, 
conflicts and disputes illustrating the fact that differing conceptions of the rule of law 
have been associated with certain perceptions of judicial interpretation and discretion. 
Over the past few years, there has been debate over the judiciary's use of interpretation 
and discretion. Current debate has centred on the use of this power by judges for 
reviewing government decisions and legislation. 
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The two different conceptions of the rule of law, which can be associated with 
views on ~he use of judicial discretion, are the 'rule-book' conception and the 'rights-
based' conception. The first conception ('rule-book'), 'insists that, so far as is possible, 
the power of the state should never be exercised against individual citizens except in 
accordance with rules explicitly set out in a public rule book available to all.' 113 The 
second, 'rights' conceptualisation of the rule of law, 'assumes that citizens have moral 
rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against the state as a 
whole.' In this case, the rule of law is seen as the 'ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights. ' 114 These two conceptions of the rule of law, have the 
effect of providing 'very different advice on the question of whether judges should make 
political decisions in hard cases', and subscribes to a different ideas oflaw, as well as the 
legitimacy and authority of laws. Which idea of the rule of law a state subscribes to, will 
determine its attitude towards judicial discretion and interpretation. 115 
Rule-Book Conception as Positivist Rule ofLaw? 
The 'rule-book' conception of the rule of law can be linked to a positivist 
conceptualisation of the rule of law -this will be further defined and discussed, and the 
connections between them drawn out below. 
First, it is necessary to define and distinguish what the positivists' view the rule of 
law is, in comparison to the non-positivists' perspective. According to the general legal 
positivist conceptualisation of the rule of law, 'principles and rules which are not 
embodied in legal texts - e.g. rule of justice or rationality principles - are not sources of 
law, so our legal rights and duties may not be derived safely from them. ' 116 The other 
prevalent understanding of legal positivism 'holds that the standards for legality and for 
morality can be distinct. ' 117 Another perspective oflegal positivist theory offered by Ian 
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Ward, states that 'positivist theory seeks to analyse the legitimacy of law by locating 
sources of constitutional legitimacy and sovereign authority. ,us This branch of 
conceptualisation of the rule of law can be traced back to the nineteenth century, which 
saw it in its 'most mature and comprehensive form'. Legal positivism broke with 
tradition (Old Roman legal tradition), 'according to which rules of justice are intrinsic 
and immanent components of every legal order, even if a legislator did not explicitly refer 
to them. ,ug This conceptualisation of the rule of law, is very limited and considered to 
be low-risk, as the sources of law are limited to those 'norms embodied in official legal 
texts', such as 'statutes, acts passed with the authorisation of statutes in civil law 
countries'. 120 The notion of law reduced to referring only to statutes and all normative 
acts authorised by statutes, was the product of German Positivism - whereby das Recht 
is equal to das Gesetz. 121 Here, 'traditional statutory positivism' is a 'method of 
interpretation which is just based upon the written legal texts. '122 It rejects the idea that 
law is based on 'moral or other evaluative judgement' and states that law instead, is 
based on 'social facts'. 123 
In comparison to this perspective of the rule of law, the non-positivistic 
perspective was premised on three main ideas. The first point of difference is that 'the 
source of law and thus of our legal rights and duties may be not only norms embodied in 
official legal texts but, in exceptional situations, also extra-textual norms'. 124 Secondly, 
'legal norms may be repealed not only by statutes or precedents but may also lose validity 
if they violate extra-textual rules in extreme and intolerable ways'. 125 Lastly, 'in 
exceptional situations extra-textual norms may justify departures from legal norms (acts 
of civil disobedience are admissible or at least tolerable in certain circumstances).'126 
Those who reject positivist notions, do so on the assumption that 'positivists believe that 
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legal materials resolve a great deal, leaving little to the moral sense of judges', but are 
wrong to do so. 127 
The main difference between positivist and non-positivist views of the rule of law 
is that the latter allows for an expanded notion of what can be considered to be sources 
of law than the former. The other main difference between the two perspectives, is how 
each resolves the conflicts and questions of the relationship between law and morality. 
Legal positivists take the view that 'the law was what someone had posited for individual 
circumstances, not what was morally right.' 128 This position supports the view that even 
'unjust laws' or 'immoral laws', if they are properly created and implemented, would still 
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be considered law. Legal positivists have been challenged on their position of unjust 
laws as laws. They have however, stood by their position on the basis that the injustice 
of some laws is not sufficient for these 'unjust' laws to be disregarded by officials or 
citizens. The reasoning for this steadfast position by legal positivists, has been that to 
disregard some laws as unjust, would be to make a judgement that they are unjust, which 
is potentially problematic as there are variations in ideas of justice. 
The legal positivist perspective of the rule of law as shown above, can be 
described as narrowly conceived, and prescriptive, leaving little room for discretion in 
determining law. This is similar to the 'rule-book' conception. To re-state this 
perspective of the rule of law in more general terms, it 'is a set of negative safeguards 
against the abuse of power. ' 129 It is considered by Selznick to be 'a negative, limited, 
low-risk understanding of the rule of law' .130 This is reiterated by Raz, who states that 
'the rule of law is . . . merely designed to minimise the harms to freedom and dignity 
which the law may cause in pursuit of its goals however laudable these may be ... ' 131 
This conception is labelled as limited and low-risk as it is designed to limit, or as Selznick 
describes it, 'to chain down' officials by 'constitutional constraints, procedural rules, 
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including rule of evidence, and institutional arrangements, such as a hierarchy of 
courts.' 132 
The rule-book and legal positivist versions of the rule of law, hold to the idea of 
'autonomous law' 133 which holds that all officials bound to uphold and to be accountable 
for, 'sustaining respect and obedience' to the law. Sustaining and supporting the idea of 
autonomous law 'directs judges to try to form semantic theories', so that judges are able 
'in good faith, to discover what the words in the rule book really mean. ' 134 There is an 
insistence or distinguishing between lawmaking and adjudication - leaning more towards 
acceptance of the rule of law as 'a "law of rules" - rules that sharply limit judicial 
discretion.' 135 The rule-book limits judicial discretion as it forces judges to focus on 
questioning the intention behind the particular piece of law and delves for the legislators' 
intention when they conceived the particular piece of legislation in question. It is 
believed that the judges who in difficult cases, question the intention of the law made, 'is 
at least doing his best to follow the rule-book model and therefore to serve the rule of 
law.' 136 
Despite the theoretical divide that has long existed between legal positivists and 
non-positivists, this divide has been confused and clouded over in recent times, as some 
positivists stray from the hard-liners' position on the relationship between law or legality, 
and morality. 137 The conceptualisation of the rule of law in limited terms, referring only 
to official legal texts such as statutes and acts authorised by statutes as sources of law, 
has undergone some changes as concessions have been made by positivists to this 
understanding. Even Hart, (considered to be one of the 'most influential modem 
positivists in the English-speaking world'), who despite rigidly clinging to 'the basic 
positivist idea that we must "distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as 
it is from law as it ought to be" in an article in 1958', 138 has made a modest concession to 
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his positivist position. As Greenawalt put it, Hart 'made a very modest concession to 
natural law positions, acknowledging that as a matter of "natural necessity" the 
substantive principles of any society's morality and legal system would contain some 
basic overlapping content.'139 Generally, Hart felt that the 'typical positivist assertion' 
that "there is no necessary connection between law and morals" would be a denial that 
within all legal systems, there is an overlap between morals and laws developed. 140 This 
is especially the case in the face of such examples as laws upholding the belief that 
wanton killing and theft is punishable. Another ground on which some positivists have 
made concessions to their position, has been on whether unjust laws are laws. 
According to Neil MacConnick, 141 "laws we judge unjust or detrimental to the public 
good are on that very account laws we judge essentially deficient examples of the genus 
to which they belong."142 MacCormick's agreement with Finnis on this issue is a big 
concession in the mainstream positivist perspective of unjust laws- as mentioned earlier 
in Hart's argument that unjust laws are still laws. MacCormick went as far as to claim 
that 'every proper understanding of law includes a sense that an unjust law fails in some 
basic essential of lawness, though it may none the less be a valid law.' 143 
However, this leaves open the question of whether 'law and morality are 
necessarily connected in more powerful ways, most importantly whether standards of law 
will include moral criteria.'144 Other positivists have not even gone as far as MacCormick 
has. They have refused to concede any connection between law and morality, stating 
that 'moral quality has nothing to do with 'lawness'.'145 For some theorists such as Jules 
Coleman, one way to support the thesis that law or standards of legality are separate 
from morality, 'is as a denial that moral criteria will inevitably be standards of legality in 
every imaginable legal system.'146 
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CLS and Non-Positivists' Quandaries 
Despite concessions made by legal positivists in general, there is stili much criticism of 
positivism for its belief in the separation of law and morality, especiaiiy by those who are 
characterised as belonging to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. The critical 
legal studies movement, it has been suggested by Mark Kelman, is 'dedicated to 'trashing' 
the various mythologies of liberal legalism, particularly notions of adjudicative 
neutrality.'147 One of the main criticisms made of positivists by the critical legal 
perspective, is that positivists often deny that 'legal judgement is intertwined with moral 
and political judgements. '148 
CLS scholars strongly disagree and reject claims made by positivists 'that issues 
can often be settled by language chosen in advance and that reason can discover what 
legal materials indicate in instances when that is not obvious. ' 149 They are critical of 
legal positivism because the indeterminacy of law and existing legal materials allows 'for 
very substantial creativity by the judge who sees clearly that law is politics.' 15° CLS has 
its own ideas about law and the nature of law that clashes with positivists' more limited 
notion of the sources of law. One of the main assumptions made in rejecting positivism, 
has been on moral grounds- that law and morality are inter-linked or overlap, so that a 
clear distinction between the two is a false perception. The other assumption is that 
'legal positivism just is (definitionally) the attitude of blind obedience to law.'151 Another 
criticism of positivism 'refers to the fact that the positivistic rule of law does not meet 
rationality requirements of modem interventionist states and the ideology of the welfare 
state. ' 152 
These arguments often push to the limits, the essence of what the rule of law is, 
thereby undermining it. The CLS scholars argue that the written law cannot account for 
everything, so to rely on it alone would be insufficient. Despite this argument, CLS 
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scholars are also critical of the fact that the indeterminacy of law allows judges to make 
what are considered to be 'political' decisions. On the one hand, the CLS criticises legal 
positivism for its reliance on a limited conceptualisation of what is law, and at the same 
time, it criticises the other possibility - of law as indeterminate, because it allows for 
judicial discretion, which they consider to be inappropriate. Arguments like those 
presented above have led proponents of the critical legal studies movement to be side-
lined. It has also led the approach in its bid to decry and criticise legal positivism, to 
undermine the rule of law itself instead. 
While CLS arguments have focused on positivism, the movement has also been 
known to denounce rights-based (non-positivist) conceptions of the rule of law. They 
have criticised rights as 'illusions' or 'myths' that have been designed to mask fundamental 
social, political and economic inequalities within a system of government. The CLS itself 
is a source of controversy, at times contradicting some of its own main and general 
foundations, weakening its criticism of both positivist (rule-book) and non-positivist 
(rights-based) conceptions of the rule oflaw. 
On the Role of Judges- Judicial Discretion Reviewed 
Having previously reviewed the differences and quandaries of both the rule-book and 
rights-based conceptions of the rule of law, judicial discretion and the role of judges can 
now be undertaken. 
First, the role of judges. The role of judges is one that is heavily debated by 
legislators, academics, and judges themselves, in many countries. Much of the debate 
stems from questions of authority and power - between the courts and the legislature. 
Habermas quotes M.J. Perry when he states that the role of judges is to provide 
protection for a community based on the 'way oflife' conceptualisation of the rule oflaw. 
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Specifically, he was highly critical of M. J. Peny's view of constitutional judges as 
'prophetic teachers' who though interpretation of the 'divine word of the Founding 
Fathers', would protect and continue the traditions which the society and state were 
founded upon. 153 
More generally, judges have the roles of defining the limits of power (of both the 
state and individuals) as well as regulating the balance of powers between the various 
institutions of the state. 154 This is done, Habennas states, as judges must play the role of 
reviewer of governmental actions and decisions, sometimes invoking judicial discretion. 
One of the main points of contention on this issue of judicial. discretion, is whether judges 
are merely interpreting the law in line with the intentions with which the law was made, 
understanding of the general public feeling on the law in question, or whether they are 
making new law by the judgements they pass. 
As discussed earlier in this section, rule-book or positivist conceptualisation of 
the rule of law, prescribes a particular view of what law is, and where law is derived 
from. If a state subscribes to such a conception of the rule of law, judicial discretion will 
be severely limited to interpreting legislation according to legal texts and the intentions 
of those who have drafted and passed the legislation in question. 
In contrast, is the view taken by rights-based theorists who advocate judicial 
discretion. Theorists of the rights-based conceptions have often sought to maintain the 
rule of law without reverting to tying themselves to positivist conceptions and ideas. 
The rights-based conceptualisation of the rule of law 'assumes that citizens have moral 
rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against the state as a 
whole.' 155 In this case, the rule of law is seen as the 'ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights.' 156 
43 
Rights theorists have been distinguished from rule-book supporters, in that the 
rights conceptualisation of the rule of law 'supposes that the rule-book represents the 
community's efforts to capture moral rights and requires that any principle, rejected in 
those efforts has no role in adjudication. '157 They do however, share some common 
points with contemporary communitarian followers. The two main points shared are, the 
central idea of participation by individuals and making participation a way of life. 
Returning to the definition set out earlier in this section, the rights-based/way of life 
conceptualisation of the rule of law is seen as rule by participation of individuals in 
conceiving of their moral and political rights. This seems to draw upon the main idea of 
both classical and contemporary communitarianism - where the 'common good lies in a 
preparedness [by individuals] to contribute to the government.' 158 
Both communitarianism and the rule of law encourage individuals to make 
commitments through participation in the governing process, as the governing process is 
a reflection of their values and ideas. Thomas Paine had similar notions of the value of 
'empower[ing] individuals so that they could cultivate their own personal morality as well 
as define their role as citizens within a democratic community. '159 It is through these 
'collective' values and ideas, that Habermas believes a sense of community will be 
restored and founded, mainly through law. 160 Others share his view that active 
citizenship will assist to develop a 'sense of affinity within a political community'. This 
development is very much 'dependent upon an image of ideal government' which the 
citizenry have, as it feels it makes a difference within the whole governing process 
through its participation. 161 Restoration will, Habermas states, depend on the 
'establishment of new forms of participation and arenas for deliberation into the decision-
making process of the administration itself'162 
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The fact that the sense of community will be dependent on laws created, was not 
overlooked by Habermas. He stresses the importance of the role of courts in assisting 
with the building of a community, especially as it is their duty to protect the community 
established. 163 Despite his commitment to the development of a political community 
based upon citizen participation and values, Habermas was in fact, 'enormously 
suspicious of the kind of moral or theoretical totalitarianism which underpins so much 
contemporary communitarianism.'164 As noted by Habermas, the use of judicial 
discretion is a means of applying the rule of law concept through review of governmental 
actions and decisions. 165 In general, there are three grounds on which the judiciary may 
review government actions and decisions. The three grounds are illegality, procedural 
impropriety, and irrationality (or unreasonableness). In implementing any of these 
grounds, judges are applying different aspects of the rule of law. 166 The judiciary's main 
reason for using judicial discretion is to protect the rights, freedoms, and liberty of 
individuals from arbitrary and coercive actions of both government and other individuals. 
According to Saj6, judges may invoke the use of judicial discretion if the laws produced 
fall short of meeting the conditions of rationality, equity, non-discrimination, and 
permitting judicial legal redress. 167 The application of the rule of law here, is meant to 
achieve justice, to ensure that there is consistency in the application and further 
development of the law, and to restrict government from abusing its authority and 
power. From this definition of the rule of law, judicial review is extended until the 
application of certain principles is satisfied, regardless of whether these principles were 
written into the applicable laws. 
This has been part of the problem with the debate on judicial discretion. As 
Dworkin sees it, 'the debate neglects an important distinction between two kinds of 
political arguments on which judges might rely on, in reaching their decisions.' 168 The 
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difficulty with this debate, as supported by critics of judicial discretion, is that there 
seems to be confusion, as cases of procedural impropriety are sometimes mistaken as 
instances of judicial interference in policy outcomes. 169 Dworkin helps to clarify and 
identify the problem with this debate, when he makes a distinction between the two types 
of 'political arguments' which can be utilised by judges in making their decisions. The 
distinction is between 'arguments of political principle that appeal to the political rights of 
individual citizens, and arguments of political policy that claim that a particular decision 
will work to promote some conception of the general welfare or public interest.'170 The 
distinctions Dworkin draws out on the issue of judicial discretion, illustrates the use of 
more rights-based conception of the rule of law. This is tied to the idea of the rule of 
law as a 'way of life'. Along these lines, judicial discretion has been used not merely 
along the lines of strictly examining the legal texts and intentions behind legislation. 
Judicial discretion has attempted to bridge the gap, making the connection between law 
and morality which rule-book theorists and positivists alike, reject. 
Summary 
As earlier sections have shown, the variations in the understanding of the rule of law has 
an effect on what is considered as sources of law and their legitimacy. This chapter 
illustrated the extent of the affect of particular understandings of the rule of law on the 
organisation and functioning of the judicial system and the role in which judges have 
within a country's judicial system. The three conceptions focused upon in this section are 
'rule-book', 'rights-based', and the CLS movement. 
The 'rule-book' conception has been considered synonymous with the legal 
positivist conceptualisation of the rule oflaw. This conception (rule-book/positivist) of 
the rule oflaw is reliant on principles and rules embodied in legal texts as sources of law. 
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Positivists claim that their approach is conducive to impartiality of law and consistency 
oflaw. They also claim that this approach avoids confusion with morality. 
In opposition to this perspective, those who consider positivism as limited, do so 
on the basis that reliance only on texts for basing judgements does not make allowances 
for taking into account changes in society that have not yet become expressed in the 
legal texts. Writers such as Radbruch, supported this non-positivist (rights-based) 
perspective of the rule of law - looking beyond legal texts for law and the legitimacy for 
creating the laws of a country. Rights theorists claim that there must be higher norms 
that guide judges in 'hard' cases and typically argue that these must in turn be veiled in a 
moral consensus. Rights and CLS theorists (as discussed below) deny that the 
positivists' understanding of the rule oflaw is what judges actually do. 
Another important perspective that has been considered in this section, has been 
the CLS movement. The CLS171 claim that the legal systems (especially as construed in 
the positivist manner), systematically conceal and distort political and social choices to 
the detriment of poorer sections of society. More specifically, they claim two things: 
firstly, that the legal system ascribes an 'essential' meaning to words which they do not 
possess (i.e. legal indeterminacy); and secondly, that the legal system relies on a notion 
of legislative intent which is a myth. This movement is of relevance as it provides an 
alternative not only to positivist ideas, but also non-positivist ideas. This perspective 
provides an interesting contrast for discussing the ideas of judicial discretion and the role 
of judges. These two topics are heavily debated in many countries, because it relates to 
issues of the legitimacy and the sources oflaw of a country. It is also important to note 
that the contemporary CLS movement 172 reflects a progressive or left wing bent, while 
the principle of legal indeterminacy has also been used by right wing critics of the rule of 
law. 
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The significance of these disputes and diverse interpretations is that they all, 
albeit in different ways, reveal potential threats to the wider legitimacy of the rule of law. 
Historically, positivist approaches have been seen as both corresponding to several 
changes and as veils for the perpetuation of privilege. Yet, the major alternatives also 
reveal risks. Rights-based conceptions of the rule of law rely on a moral consensus 
whose existence is disputed by the other approaches and may be especially hard to 
discern at times of rapid social change. The CLS approach easily carries criticism of 
positivism to the point where little is left of the rule of law as it dissolves in the sea of 
social choice and political conflict. Even Habermas' nuanced defence of the rule of law 
retreats to a minimalist position and is reliant on processes of discursive will formation 
which, by his own account, are threatened by contemporary forms of political and 
economic organisation. 
These differences are of importance as subsequent chapters focused on the 
European Union and on associated countries, will examine the understanding of the rule 
of law which a state subscribes to, as this will determine its attitude about the judiciary, 
the role of judges, and the use of judicial discretion. 
Section Four - The Rule of Law and Economic Systems 
This section will review the question, 'Is there any necessary connection between the rule 
of law and a particular type of economy?' The main reason for this focus is the 
prominence of the issue within the enlargement debate. On the one hand is Hayek's 
perspective on this question, that there is a necessary connection between the rule of law 
and a market economic system. The other side denies that any such connection exists. 
This dichotomy of pros and cons, serves to illustrate not only the various ideas about 
what particular economic systems need, but also provides evidence of the contested 
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relationship that exists between the concept of the rule of law and the development or 
existence of an economic system. 
A Necessary Connection - As Constructed by Hayek 
Starting firstly with Hayek, the section will explore whether there is a necessary 
connection between the rule of law and a particular type of economic system and the 
reasons behind this viewpoint. It would therefore be useful to briefly outline Hayek's 
main ideas of the rule of law. Following this, a survey of the connection he makes 
between the rule of law and a market economy will be presented. 
Hayek describes the rule of law as a method to "protect infringement of the 
private sphere" from the coercive and arbitrary actions of government authority or of 
other individuals. 173 In defining the concept this way, he makes the point that the rule of 
law should restrict government "only in its coercive activities", thereby restricting it from 
using its powers to coerce individuals "except in the enforcement of a known rule." 174 
This is based on his belief that "government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand". 175 It is in the protection of the private sphere from 
infringement, that Hayek states that the rule of law curbs the discretionary powers of the 
administrative authority as a whole. At the same time, it is the knowledge and 
understanding of the criteria which the rule of law provides, that enables individuals to 
make decisions within a framework that protects their liberty while enabling them to 
exercise their use of liberty for their own purposes. 176 The basic assumption made here, 
is that the rule of law is a concept that forms the basis for the protection of individual 
liberty in all spheres, including in the area of economic affairs. 177 According to Ward, 
'the free market is necessary as a means of preserving wider political liberties.'178 
Therefore, according to him, 'if the market remains free then we can all continue to 
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enjoy a greater measure of choice, and the responsibility that goes with it. In turn, 
political and legal institutions can only be legitimated if they preserve the free market and 
the moral order ofliberty.'179 
In relation to economics and the economic market, Hayek takes the notion of 
protection of the individual and private sphere from infringement, to mean something 
different from other theorists. He takes a less extreme view of government involvement 
than some of his contemporaries, who believed that the role of the state in the economic 
sphere, should be non-existent and objected to any governmental interference in the 
economy. 180 This is because they believe that any decisions made by a government 
ultimately will lead to discrimination against particular individuals or groups. The 
underlying reason behind this belief of non-interference is the desire to protect the 
economy from any arbitrary and discriminatory governmental interference, as well as 
provide a framework and incentives for individuals to pursue their interests and 
participate in economic matters. Hayek specified that individuals should have the means 
to enable them to pursue any plan of action and that the means to act "should not be in 
the exclusive control of one other agent. " 181 By other agent, Hayek was referring to 
government authority. 
Hayek believed that government, (in its limited but working capacity), provides a 
framework and the means for individual decision-making in the pursuit of individual 
purposes. To Hayek, 'freedom of economic activity had meant freedom under the law, 
not the absence of all government action.' 182 He expected that there would be some 
government involvement in the economic sphere, as a 'functioning market economy 
presupposes certain activities on the part of the state'. 183 This conception of the 
economy is based on the classical liberal conception of the state in relation to the 
economy, (market economy). 184 The underlying fundamental principle of this type of 
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economy is that the government ensures that individuals are able to pursue their 
individual economic interests, (without much interference from the government). 
There are some of the viewpoint that 'government's economic responsibilities 
should be restricted to creating conditions within which market forces can most 
effectively operate. ' 185 It is the belief that the rule of law sets the framework in which 
government and individuals act. While the market provides the forum for using 
individual knowledge in order to pursue individual objectives, it has been argued by 
classical liberals, that 'individuals should enjoy the widest possible liberty and have 
therefore insisted that the state be confined to a minimal role.' The role they envisaged 
for the state was to 'provide a framework of peace and social order within which private 
citizens can conduct their lives as they think best.' 186 As stated by Hayek, the main 
criterion regarding liberty is not the number of courses of action available to the 
individual, but whether the individual can "expect to shape his course of action in 
accordance with his present intentions."187 The structure of a market economy allows 
for this individuality and it is also founded upon it. The protection of the individual and 
private sphere from infringement is made possible through the development and 
structuring of the economic system to incorporate legal rules which assists individuals in 
determining their rights and identifies a framework in which they are able to pursue their 
interests. Hayek agreed with this broad idea of a market economy. He believed that 
given an 'appropriate framework individual pursuits could be of benefit to society.' 
Hayek suggests that this idea of a market economy 'presupposes a clear legal and moral 
framework within which individual objectives should be pursued. ' 188 Scheuermann put 
forward similar ideas, stating the 'the rule of law renders the activities of power-holders 
predictable and thereby makes an indispensable contribution towards individual 
freedom.' 189 
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In this light, Hayek is likened to Adam Smith, whereby the framework the 
government produces, "translates a pattern of individuals' pursuit of their own ends into 
a sustainable social order, as long as it is not disrupted by overextended government. "190 
To Hayek, Smith's 'social order' is the economic market. Hayek depicts the economic 
market as a "spontaneous order". By this, Hayek meant that the market was not the 
"product of human design", but nevertheless imposed order on individuals. Hayek 
considered the market to be a "spontaneous order" that "imposes order on life by 
allowing individuals freedom to use their own knowledge in pursuit of their own 
objectives."191 Scheuermann states that 'Weber makes this connection between modern 
capitalism and the rule of law. He believes that both counter "unnecessary 
unpredictability", making life both in the legal and economic spheres, predictable. '192 
The relationship between the rule of law and a market economy is a complex one. 
There will be activities co-ordinated by the government that is both compatible and 
incompatible with the working and functioning of a market economy. As Hayek puts it, 
'a government that is comparatively inactive but does the wrong things may do much 
more to cripple the forces of a market economy than one that is more concerned with 
economic affairs but confines itself to actions which assist the spontaneous forces of the 
economy.' 193 What he means by all of this is that an inactive government is as bad for a 
market economy as an overbearing one. This is because at both extremes you have the 
repression or repulsion of the rule of law. In each case here, individual liberty is no 
longer protected by the rule of law, and this begins to deteriorate the conception and 
existence of a market economy, as it is based in many ways on the protection of 
individual freedom and protection of this freedom. As Hayek states, 'the observation of 
the rule of law is a necessary, but not yet a sufficient, condition for the satisfactory 
working of a free economy.' 194 
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Despite the fact that Hayek believed that the rule of law was a necessary but 
insufficient condition, he has also come to recognise that there is a fundamental conflict 
between democracy as conceived of in contemporary terms, and the idea of a market 
economy. Belatedly, he states that he has come to agree with Joseph Schumpeter, 
there is an irreconcilable conflict between democracy and 
capitalism - except that it is not democracy as such but the 
particular forms of democratic organisation, now regarded as 
the only possible forms of democracy, which will produce a 
progressive expansion of governmental control of economic life 
even if the majority of the people wish to preserve a market 
economy. 195 
What Hayek and Schumpeter were claiming above, is that there is a contradiction 
that exists within this necessary connection between the rule of law and a market 
economy. An example to illustrate this internal contradiction is development and 
protection of various forms of ownership. Within the framework of an economy based 
on market ideas, the state has a duty to create and ensure that conditions favour the 
development and protection of the various forms of ownership. 196 Private ownership is 
the one type of the three mentioned by the Council ofEurope197, that is highly favoured 
within an economy based on market values and ideas. This is because it supports 
competition between firms and provides incentive to improve which triggers more 
competition and improvement. This occurs until the market reaches a point where 
competition has only a few firms left to monopolise the sector, as was the case when 
state-owned firms were the only types in existence. The problem of monopolies within a 
market economy becomes a threat to the protection of the individual and is where 
democratic values and ideas begin to clash with the ideas on which a market economic 
system is based. It pits the rule oflaw against itself- whereby on the one hand it attempts 
to protect individual rights through limited governmental interference in the economic 
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sphere, but at the same time, the use of governmental intervention in the economic 
sphere becomes necessary to ensure that individual rights are protected. 
Hayek states that there is a necessary connection between the rule of law and a 
market economy. This he says, is based on the fact that the rule of law is compatible 
with the ideas and structures of a market economy- focusing on the individual. The 
individual is of vital importance for the development and continued support of a market. 
If individuals do not feel secure or feel they have reasonable means of recourse against 
wrongs done to them, this stunts market development. At the same time, a market 
economy, as seen by Hayek and others like him, seems to be the economic system most 
compatible with ideas of the rule of law and assists in the actualisation of individuality 
within a structure for economic relations. This account of their relationship has recently 
been supported by financial economists who have produced evidence that illustrated how 
'financial markets contribute to economic growth and legal institutions contribute to the 
growth of financial markets. '198 
Despite this recent evidence, there still seems to be some internal controversy and 
conflict at some level, between protection of individual rights through limitation of 
governmental interference by means of the rule of law, and promotion of individual 
rights- especially with regard to a market economy. 199 The rule of law's necessary 
connection with a market economic system can be characterised as due to the evolution 
of liberalism in conjunction with capitalism. They developed together and therefore 
became necessarily intertwined with each other. However, as Marxists have argued, 'the 
formal equality which the rule of law proclaims contrasts, . . . with social and economic 
inequalities ... ' 200 This clearly illustrates the contradiction that exists between the ideas of 
a market economy and the rule of law. 
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While both advocates and critics of market econorrues have accepted the 
connection between markets and at least formal, procedural law, the very connection has 
been questioned by the CLS. 
An Unnecessary Connection - The Critical Legal Studies Movement 
Many writers associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement such as Roberto 
Unger, have responded negatively to the question of there being a necessary connection 
between the rule of law and a particular type of economic system. The CLS scholars 
believe that the 'successive failures to find the universal legal language of democracy and 
the market suggest that no such language exists . .zol This is because the reason for the 
connection between the rule of law and a particular type of economic system - in this 
case a market economy - is based on the contemporary fixation and 'commitment to a 
democratic republic and to a market system as a necessary part of that republic.'202 
Unger, like other CLS scholars, does not accept that the two ideas are 
necessarily connected, but instead, believe that contemporary societies have chosen to 
connect the two because of the institutions chosen and the manner in which these 
institutions have been organised. 203 In their way of thinking, the economic system could 
be either a market-based, command-based, or a combination of these two, in what is 
termed a "mixed economy". Any ofthese would suffice, except that the contemporary 
idea of an economy is the form that has become 'more or less tactically identified with 
the particular market institutions that triumphed in modem Western history.'204 
The main criticism the CLS scholars have of theorists like Hayek, who support 
the thesis that the rule oflaw is necessarily connected to a market economy, is that 'the 
current content of public and private law fails to present a single, unequivocal version of 
democracy and the market.'205 Unger for instance, states that contrary to the idea that 
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the law presents a single idea of democracy and the market economy, it 'contains in 
confused and undeveloped form the elements of different versions'. This allows for 
larger variations in contemporary doctrine than theorists like Hayek suggest with their 
necessary connection theories. 206 
Summary 
From both Hayek and the CLS perspectives, it has been illustrated that in response to the 
question of whether there is a particular type of economic system which is necessarily 
connected to the concept of the rule of law, there are varying views. The underlying 
fundamental problem here is whether there is a necessary connection between the rule of 
law and a market economy. Hayek argues for the necessary connection between the rule 
of law and a market economy.Z07 The CLS on the other hand, claim that there is no 
necessary link between a market economy and the conception of the rule oflaw. 
The ongoing debate between the two perspectives illustrates that there is no one 
answer, and in fact, throughout time, it has been this balance between protecting and 
promoting individual rights, which has prompted the variation in ideas about what type 
of economic system is necessarily connected with the concept of the rule of law. As 
pointed out earlier, it is perhaps preoccupation with the development of a market 
economy and its promotion of individuality that has streamlined contemporary theorists 
to follow in Hayek's shoes. This has prompted many to promote the thesis that the rule 
of law is necessarily connected to a market economic system and that any other 
economic system would not support the rule of law ideals as this particular system 
would. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, the contested nature of the rule of law has been outlined and 
examples have been provided to substantiate this claim. The variations of definitions for 
the rule of law have been echoed by the numerous understandings regarding its 
relationship to concepts such as democracy, judicial independence and discretion, and 
formation of a market economy. 
From examination of the rule of law and its relationships with democracy, the 
judiciary, and a market economy, it can be said that these relationships are complex. One 
main definition for the rule of law was meant to provide for the protection of individual 
freedoms from the arbitrary and coercive actions of others, but especially of the 
government authority. Despite this, at the heart of the variation in conceptions is a 
fundamental disagreement about the source of legitimacy and the very nature of law 
itself. This has been found to have a profound impact on the perceived relationship the 
rule of law has with other important ideas and reflects the contested nature of the rule of 
law. For example, its relationship to democracy illustrates its contested nature, 
influencing the form and structure of democracy that views the rule of law as either a 
fundamental support for the development of democracy, or as a retardant to 
development of democracy. 
Similarly, the manner in which the rule of law has been understood and defined 
has also affected the manner in which other issues - development of a market economy, 
judicial independence and judicial discretion, are viewed and understood. A market 
economy is said to need the rule of law in order to protect individual interests - but 
complexly, it can do this by both limiting government intervention and utilising 
government intervention, further illustrating the complexity of this principle. Judicial 
independence and discretion are treated in a similar manner. The rule of law emphasises 
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judicial independence that seems to dictate discretion, however in some countries, as will 
be discussed in the next two chapters, judicial discretion is not necessarily associated 
with independence. In fact, in some countries such as Germany, judicial independence 
from government is emphasised, but judicial discretion is seen as going against the idea 
of the rule of law. The rule of law here is perceived as rule-book based, and therefore, 
the lack of judicial discretion is the result. 
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Chapter Two: Understanding and Application of the Rule of Law within the EU 
This chapter will review the variation in understanding of the rule of law concept 
amongst European Union member states. Specifically, it has been claimed by writers 
such as Kenneth Dyson, that there is a Continental - Anglo-Saxon dichotomy in the 
conceptualisation of the rule of law. It is the historical and cultural experiences, taking 
into account differentiation in attitudes and understanding of terms such as laws, 
government, individual liberty, and the role each plays in the governing of a state, which 
serves as the basis for variations in the interpretation of the rule of law. These 
differences, and the differences in the implementation of the rule of law, substantiate 
claims that there is a lack of uniformity in the conception of the rule of law across the 
European Union. An awareness of these differences and the reasons for them, further 
illustrates the contested nature of the concept itself, and is essential to understanding the 
implications this lack of uniformity has on the further expansion of the EU eastwards. 
Section One- Contested Concept: Variation in Understandings and Influences 
Across the member states of the European Union, there are a variety of understandings 
of the rule of law concept. The concept is contested because variations in its 
conceptualisation exist across EU member states. 208 It has been suggested that the 
differences in attitudes and traditions between member states, of ideas such as the role 
and function of the state, the legal system, and of law, has had a direct effect on how the 
rule of law has been conceived of in member states across the European Union. These 
differences suggest that despite the fact that some states may share common experiences, 
such as democracy, and share some common governmental institutions, there are 
'profound differences of social, cultural and political idiom', which preclude the 
development of any uniform legal system or legal culture across the European Union. 209 
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The distinction between Anglo and Continental traditions will become evident. 
This distinction, based upon a dichotomy outlined by Dyson, is useful, in that it illustrates 
some of the main differences between understandings of the rule of law held by Britain, 
in comparison to countries on the Continent (like France and Germany). A closer look 
at the Continental countries show that despite Dyson's distinction, there are also 
differences in understandings between many of these countries, based upon their cultures 
and traditions. This chapter will focus particularly on England, France and Germany. 
The reason for focusing upon these three countries in particular, is that they illustrate the 
differences in traditions and form a natural point of reference for smaller countries, 
(especially those Central and East European countries seeking EU membership), as will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
One example of the influences of different traditions and attitudes, is the contrast 
between Continental European and Anglo-Saxon views210, is that the Continental 
European conception of the state refers to it as 'a living entity' and as 'a structure of 
authority and a mechanical organisation of constraint'.211 From this conception of the 
state, the idea of 'legal control over the administration' through 'emphasis on the 
importance of exercising public power in accordance with definite principles', was 
developed. Continental Europe, according to Dyson, had a better understanding of the 
relationship between the role of law and of the state, which was structured to provide 
information on values and how individuals were to conduct themselves in their relations 
with one another and with the state.212 
By contrast, Dyson considered the Anglo-Saxon concept of the state to be 
underdeveloped. This difference can be attributed to the Anglo-Saxon departure from 
continental European ideas of the state, in its development from the seventeenth century 
onwards. 213 This difference in development led to the idea of law as disassociated from 
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the ideas of politics and administration, and 'reflected a medieval notion of the Rule of 
Law that viewed the law and the ruler, though connected, as two different things.'214 
Although law depended on the ruler for its existence, its existence was not owed 'to a 
creative act of will but was regarded as one aspect of the collective life, a set of habits, 
customs and practices that constrained the exercise of power. '215 This was because, 
There was not a conception of the state to which principles and rules 
could be attributed, only a proliferating, incoherent maze of statute 
law complemented by a judge-made patchwork, empirical 
development of common law from accumulated precedents and 
'individualistic' premises. 216 
The conception of law and state are rooted here, in the development of a legal 
culture. The legal culture defines the boundaries of what law and state mean within a 
country. It also defines the role of judges and the role of the government in relation to 
the state and how laws are created and passed. Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal 
traditions developed different ideas of the rule of law which reflected the differences in 
ideas of state, law, the role of judges and the role of government. 
The 'rule of law' is the term developed and utilised by the English. Its closest 
equivalent on the continent is the German Rechtsstaat and the French Etat de droit or 
Regne de la Loi. These terms illustrate not only the contrasts between countries' 
understandings, but also where there are some similarities or shared ideas. F allowing an 
overview of the variations, a summary contrasting the three understandings will be 
presented. 
The Rule ofLaw (British-English Version) 
In Britain, specifically England, the conception of the rule of law reflects the historical 
development of the country's ideas about the source and legitimacy of law, and of the 
relationship between the government and individuals. The difference between the 
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Continental perspective and the one developed in England by A. V. Dicey, illustrates 
England's (Britain's) solution to the dilemmas and conflicts presented earlier. 
With regard to Britain's ideas about the source of law, Dicey's approach to the 
rule of law identifies Parliament-made law representing the norms and values of society, 
as the source of law. This was expressed by Dicey in his description of the relationship 
between law and the constitution, 
That with us the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign 
countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the 
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and 
enforced by the courts; that, in short, the principles of private law 
have with us been by the action of the courts and Parliament so 
extended as to determine the position of the Crown and of its 
servants; thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the 
land.217 
In addition to this, other writers such as Esteban identify the source of law as 
'conceived of as a body of inherited values, mainly distilled from the experience of the 
common law over the centuries (the common law acquired the connotation of unwritten 
law of customary origin by contrast to the written law of statutes)'. 218 After the revolt 
against monarchical rule, the source of codified law was identified as the Parliament. It 
was believed that the Parliament, being of the people, would better serve as a source of 
law that would be representative of the ideas and values of the country. In contrast to 
what was happening in Britain at this time, countries on the Continent had turned to 
enshrining codified law in a written constitution. This differentiation of approaches has 
been attributed to the split during the Eighteenth century, between British and the 
Continental legal traditions. During this period in Europe, although 'many of the 
Continental governments were far from oppressive', there were few countries 'where men 
were secure from arbitrary power'219 as was considered the case in Britain by Dicey. 
This is because unlike many of its Continental contemporaries, Britain utilised what is 
considered a more non-positivist approach to the rule of law. 220 
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According to Dicey's conceptualisation, the rule of law determined not only the 
source of law itself, but also determined the legitimacy of laws created in Britain. This 
was developed based upon historical experiences unique to Britain from the Eighteenth 
century onwards. It served as a method of guaranteeing rights under common law, and 
acted as 'a counter-balance to the absolute sovereignty of parliament. ' 221 This is made 
clear in Dicey's definition of the rule of law as meaning the 'absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and 
excluded the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary 
authority on the part of government. '222 
Similarly, Wade shares this perspective of the British approach, characterising the 
rule of law by four main principles, one of which is that 'government should be 
conducted within a framework of recognised rules and principles which restrict 
discretionary powers'. 223 However, despite similarities between Britain and Continental 
countries on this issue and the idea that 'the law should be even-handed between 
government and citizens' as the rule of law 'ensures that government should not enjoy 
unnecessary privileged or exceptions from the ordinary law'224, there are other 
fundamental differences in the approaches countries have undertaken. For instance, 
Wade and Esteban both reiterate that the British rule of law understands that 'disputes on 
the legality of acts of government are to be decided by judges who are wholly 
independent of the executive. '225 This notion lends credence to reasons behind the 
development of judicial discretion and powers, and the utilisation of judicial reVIew 
procedures that separate Britain from countries on the Continent. 
The rule of law has provided a means of coming to terms with the problems 
described previously in chapter one. Dilemmas such as legitimacy of law, questions of 
judicial power and protection of rights from arbitrary or coercive use of powers, are 
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addressed within Dicey's historical conceptualisation of the rule of law, and this has been 
reiterated in the more recent work of Bradley and Ewing. Bradley and Ewing reiterate 
this, stating that they believe Dicey was contrasting the 'rule of law [in Britain] with 
systems of government based on the exercise by those in authority of wide or arbitrary 
powers of constraint, such as a power of detention without trial. '226 This is because the 
system governed by the rule of law in Britain, constrained the powers of the executive 
and legislative branches, whilst providing the judiciary with more independence and 
discretion to protect individual rights under the law. For instance, the rule of law as 
conceived here, meant 'that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in 
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary courts of the law.'227 This has been considered a 'peculiarity of 
English institutions' and ofEnglish legal traditions.228 
More importantly, Dicey's understanding of the rule of law illustrates Britain's 
non-positivist leanings in its approach to democracy. The balance between judicial and 
parliamentary powers and the role of the courts, as defined by Dicey's rule of law 
conception, provides an example of this. Britain's non-positivist rule of law approach 
believed in 'equality before the law, or equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law 
of the land administered by the ordinary courts. '229 Esteban characterises the British 
approach to democracy as 'government under law', which she understands as 'the organs 
of government must themselves operate not only through the law, but also under the law, 
in the sense that the legality of their actions may be tested by independent courts of law, 
and that law operates as a limitation or constraint upon the actions of government. '230 As 
Dicey phrased it, 'no man is above the law' and everyone is or should be 'under duty to 
obey the laws. ' 231 More specifically, it illustrates British attitudes towards democratic 
ideals, in that 'all citizens (including officials) were subject to the jurisdiction of the 
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ordinary courts should they transgress the law which applied to them, and that there 
should be no separate administrative courts as in France, to hear complaints of unlawful 
conduct by officials. ' 232 
What this understanding of the rule of law illustrates, is a 'perception of fluidity 
between state and society' that leads at times to conflicting or less than clear distinctions 
between the role of each. Nonetheless, this 'perception of fluidity between state and 
society' ... 'can be related to no small extent to the historical conditions of the emergence 
of the British State.'233 According to Laborde, the English use of the term 'state' is 'more 
polysemous than the French, as [in Britain] it may be more readily used to refer both to 
organised political authority and the wider community. '234 She also believes that both the 
term 'state' and 'society' have often been used interchangeably, which 'suggests the 
persistence of a number of assumptions about state and society in Britain. '235 This seems 
to exemplify the potential ambiguities that can exist within a state, as well as between 
states, with regard to the understanding and approaches taken to the rule of law, when it 
[rule oflaw] is conceptually interconnected with the notion of how the 'source of law', 
'state' and 'society' are defined. 
Continental Rule ofLaw 
As mentioned earlier in this section, Dyson made a distinction between English and 
Continental ideas of what the rule of law meant. He presented this distinction because he 
believed that continental Europe shared a number of main ideas based on their focus on 
the state. These core ideas were: 'common with the nature of public authority, a 
rationalistic spirit of enquiry, and a holistic preoccupation with theoretical linkages 
between social forms and political authority. '236 The two main continental ideas which 
are considered analogous to the English 'rule of law', are the French Regne de la Loi and 
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the German Rechtsstaat. Although they are considered analogous, their meanings differ. 
The differences between these two main continental understandings of the rule of law 
will be further investigated, illustrating that the distinction drawn earlier by Dyson is 
much more complex, as there are differences even between continental countries, like 
France and Germany. The following sub-sections will also consider the previous section 
on the English understanding of the rule of law, how the understandings and approaches 
taken by different countries illustrate the solutions these countries have taken to the 
dilemmas outlined in chapter one. 
Regne de la Loi OR Etat de droit (French Version) 
France, like other members ofthe European Union, has adopted an eclectic but skewed 
solution to the dilemmas outlined in chapter one. In terms of the legitimacy of law, 
France turned to an essentially positivistic approach, with the sovereign will of the 
nation, as represented by the Assembly, as the source of codified law. There are evident 
historic reasons for this. According to Dicey the French turned to the rule of law (Regne 
de la Loi OR Etat de droit) 'not because the French King ruled more despotically than 
other crowned heads, but because the French people appeared from the eminence of the 
nation to have a special claim to freedom, and because the ancient kingdom of France 
was the typical representative of despotism. '237 The violent break with monarchism 
ushered in a new principle of legitimacy in which the people, or rather the nation, became 
the source oflaw. 
It is important to note, however, that the eminence of the rule of law was not 
only the product of a revolt against monarchy. Ironically, it was also a revolt against the 
previous judicial system. The courts, that is the Parlements, had acted as a restraint 
upon royal power, invoking, in a thoroughly non-positivistic manner, the 'fundamental 
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laws of the realm'. 238 Yet they had also used their authority to block reform and to 
secure their own privileges. It is here, in response to the corrupt and arbitrary practices 
of the Parlements that one finds the source of Montesquieu's famous declaration that 
judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive 
beings, incapable of moderating its force or rigor.'239 The revolutionaries' antipathy to 
the parlementaires was subsequently made manifest through the guillotine, leading to the 
death of as many as 50% of the parlementaires in Toulouse. Of more lasting 
significance than this was the law of August 1 790 which explicitly prohibited judicial 
review of legislation. The penal code of the following year went even further, making 
judicial review effectively a punishable offence.240 Further confirmation ofthe triumph of 
positivism was evident in the stipulation that in cases of doubt judges had to turn to the 
legislature to find out what had been its true intent. 
Not only was the legislature freed from judicial control but so too was the 
administration. Title II, article 13 of the law of August 13th, specified that 'Under penalty 
of forfeiture of their offices, the judges shall not interfere in any way whatsoever with the 
operation of the public administration ... '241 That did not mean that the administration 
was intended to be arbitrary. To the contrary, as Esteban has argued, the rule oflaw was 
supposed to entail the 'subordination of the entire state apparatus to predetermined 
abstract legal norms enacted by an Assembly which represents the will of the people. '242 
Once again administrators too were supposed to be mouthpieces of the law. 
A positivist conception can also be discerned in the approach to democracy. 
France has arguably had a largely subterranean tradition of participatory democracy, 
philosophically rooted in Rousseau's contempt for representative democracy, which has 
periodically exploded into the daylight in such events as the Paris Commune and the 
'events' of 1968. Yet there is, of course, another side to Rousseau. His very hostility to 
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the divergence of interests, which threatened a consensual way of life, led to the 
emphasis upon the general will and to the obligation to obey that will. The latter has 
indeed been argued to be the most extreme form which a positivist approach to the law 
can take. According to Norobert Bobbio turning positivism into a theory of obligation 
constitutes 'ideological' positivism. 243 
In the light of the dilemmas identified in chapter 1, it is not surprising that the 
French State had difficulty in adhering to such an extreme set of solutions. One of the 
most prominent casualties of the revolutionary model was the prohibition on judicial 
control of the administration. Indeed, so thoroughly had the French developed 
administrative law that the Englishman Dicey found this to be one of the most striking 
differences between the rule of law in English and French law. He even denied that there 
was any term in the language that conjured up the full significance of droit 
adminstratif. 244 This restoration of judicial authority had its limits. Firstly, the droit 
administratif was administered by a separate corps of judges. Secondly, as Dicey 
famously complained, French administrative law privileged the state: 
the government, and every servant of the government possesses as 
representative of the nation, a whole body of special rights, privileges, 
or prerogatives as against private citizens, and that the extent of these 
rights, privileges, or prerogatives is to be determined on principles 
different from the consideration which fix the legal rights and duties 
of one citizen towards another. 245 
While Dicey was not the most sympathetic of commentators he did pick up 
significant characteristics of the French view of the state which have a bearing not only 
upon the approach to administrative law, but also to the French response to the relation 
between the rule of law and the idea of a free market economy. These characteristics 
have been summarised more recently by Cecile Laborde. According to her, the French 
sens de /'"Etat 'refers to the conviction that state institutions pursue aims that are both 
distinct, inherently fragile and corruptible.'246 This has not meant that France has always 
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been hostile to a laissez-faire approach to the economy, despite the Colbertiste tradition. 
As Jack Hayward put it the problem has been rather that 'Most of those who are 
essential to liberal, social and economic democracy are excluded from the economic 
policy community, whereas most of those included-notably the elite economic 
bureaucrats and the select business leaders - have no democratic legitimacy. '247 The 
relation between the French State and the market has of course been affected by the 
process of European integration and wider processes of globalisation. It has also been 
affected by the rise of the Constitutional Council. This body became involved in the 
dispute over the French government's nationalisation programme in 1982. The 
government relied largely on article 34 of the 1946 constitution behind which stood 
'appeals to majority rule and parliamentary sovereignty, that is ... Rousseauian 
orthodoxy.'248 The Council only blocked the government temporarily but it was the form 
and logic of its judgement that was significant. According to Stone, the Council 
'imposed an interpretation of the preamble that was wholly antithetical to the founder's 
intent in 1946.'249 Albeit in the unusual form ofthe Constitutional Council French judges 
had clearly moved a long way from the supposed subservience of 1790. 
It was unlikely that what, in retrospect, looks like an extreme positivist solution 
to the dilemmas outlined in chapter one, would prove tenable. Indeed, in some respects 
an eclectic revision had begun even before the clamour of the revolutionaries had faded. 
For it was Napoleon Bonaparte who began the consolidation of French administrative 
law that Dicey found so distinctive. One can also note the presence of participatory 
elements in the political conception of citizenship predominant in France that have found 
a skewed, but sometimes eclectic and ambiguous answer to the problems posed by the 
rule of law. Moreover, despite the changes, especially in recent years, it is an answer 
that is deeply rooted in French history and culture. 
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Rechtsstaat (German Version) 
Another understanding of the rule of law generally referred to on the Continent, is the 
German idea of the Rechtsstaat. Like Britain and France, Germany developed an 
understanding of the rule of law that reflects its solutions to the dilemmas outlined 
previously. For historical reasons, understanding of the term Rechtsstaat, developed and 
changed over time, providing variations within German history. For example, according 
to Esteban, Germany turned to a positivistic approach that 'originated as the result of a 
parallel evolution (to the one in France) which consisted in the progressive limitation of 
the initially unlimited powers of the German monarchies. '250 However, this 
understanding changed over time and another form of this concept 'arose out of a 
tendency that first appeared during the final years of the Weimar Republic, namely, the 
abandonment of juridical positivism.'251 It developed as the 'direct result of the old ideal 
of the Rule of Law, where an elaborate administrative apparatus rather than a monarch 
or a legislature was the agency to be restrained. '252 During this period, there was a 
change from a 'formal' to a 'material' conception of the Rechtsstaat. 253 
The German approach to dilemmas regarding the source and legitimacy of law, 
judicial review and market economy, can be attributed to its understanding of the state. 
The basis for its approach, known in German as Rechtsstaat, developed through the 
identification and articulation of what is understood as the 'state' throughout German 
history, and how conceptions of this relate to other aspects covered in chapter one. 
The term Rechtsstaat is 'peculiar to the German-speaking world' and has 'no 
equivalent in any other language. '254 In fact, the English translation of this term is 
literally, 'constitutional state' or 'law state'. According to Robert von Mohl, Carl T 
Welcker, and J. C. Freiherr von Aretin, the term Rechtsstaat was 'not a particular form of 
state - in the sense, for example, of the status mixtus - or as a form of government but as 
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a specific type of state' ... ' the state of reason', 'the rational state', or 'government in 
accordance with the reasonable collective will and only what is generally best is 
pursued. '255 Bockenforde summed up the understanding of these three writers, 
explaining the term as 'the state governed by the law of reason, the state that realises, in 
and for human coexistence, the principles of reason embodied in the theoretical tradition 
of the law of reason. '256 
The focus upon the 'state' is an important aspect to the idea of and basis for the 
historical development of the Rechtsstaat. This is reflected in the various conceptions of 
the state incorporated into the German understanding of the term. For instance, N evil 
Johnson differentiates between 'state' in the 'broad' and 'narrow' sense. 'State' in the 
broad sense is used to 'denote the political community . . . a quantity which is itself 
ambiguous for it may indicate those who are engaged in political activities, all who have 
political rights in the community, or the conditions of political activity in that 
community. 1257 Whereas, in the narrow sense, the 'state' refers to 'some or all of the 
institutions of government (and it is not easy matter to draw boundaries here), whilst in 
the narrowest sense to the executive powers alone. '258 Thus the state becomes 'a 
shorthand expression for a statement of the rules or norms by which the community is 
given political unity and coherence. '259 
In modem German usage, the term 'state' generally means 'as providing the 
articulation in practice of the state.' From this, the 'state' is a 'legal construct, but in the 
German context that means that it is equally a political phenomenon, a summation of the 
manner in which political authority in the society is established and justified. '260 The 
understanding of this German term which has been described as something similar to the 
English rule oflaw and the French etat de droit, illustrates how its understanding is inter-
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linked with ideas of the state. It provides an overall understanding of how in Germany, 
dilemmas identified in the previous chapter were handled. 
For example, one such 'solution' to the dilemma of judicial power and review in 
Germany, was the development of a_formal concept of the Rechtsstaat, as 'developed by 
the German late constitutionalist school during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.'261 This conceptualisation is based upon the idea that 'we subject ourselves to 
the authority-or rule-of a text. '262 What can be discerned from this is an underlying 
positivist conception of the role of administrative law and the prohibition of judicial 
discretion. It identifies codified law as raised above everything and everyone else. This 
understanding makes certain demands on the state. One such demand is that the 'state 
should be allowed to carry out its claims only within and by means of law: the law was 
raised above the state'?63 Esteban makes another case for the role of the Rechtsstaat. 
She describes it as laying within the 'formal, procedural sphere and related principally to 
the administration. '264 Accordingly, this 'resulted in the absolute priority of law for the 
administration too, the provision of effective judicial legal protection against the 
administration and the progressive legislative shaping of administrative law. '265 
The claims made by Esteban can be viewed as conflicting. On the one hand there 
is a provision for recourse to the judiciary against legislative actions. Whilst at the same 
time, there is discussion of 'progressive legislative shaping of administrative law' as 
described earlier by Esteban. These conflicting perspectives can be made simultaneously, 
however this overlooks the potential conflicts inherent to such claims based upon the 
notion of superiority of codified law, like for example, the Rechtsstaat is understood to 
demand. Despite such claims, it also makes a naive supposition that the judge or 
constitutional lawyer is merely the mouthpiece of the law, leaving little room for 
82 
discretion by the judiciary in cases where administrative laws that were not necessarily 
in-line with the ideas and values of the society. 
Currently, the concepts of 'rule of law' and Rechtsstaat 'both refer to a set of 
conditions underpinning democracy, including separation of powers, principles of legality 
and adjudication, formal equality, and constitutional rights . .266 Despite this similarity and 
shared ideas, 'due to their different historical backgrounds, the meaning of 'rule of law' 
and Rechtsstaat are not identical. '267 This difference is based on the fact that 'originally, 
the rule of law signified the victory of English people over the absolutist monarchy and 
then a strong Parliament, whereas the Rechtsstaat proclaimed the sovereignty of the law 
and the state without the backing of a sovereign parliament. .268 
In Germany, there has been a strong tendency towards a more strict conception 
of the rule oflaw than has been the case in France. This approach underlies the solutions 
it has devised for dealing with the problems and conflicts posed in chapter one. Its strict 
following has been questioned at various points throughout the country's history. For 
example, the Weimar period is especially illuminating for it exposed some of the vices 
and disturbing sides of positivism. More specifically, during this period in German 
history, legal positivism was said to have proven itself impotent in the face of 
authoritarian critics of democracy such as the Nazi party, which held the reins of 
power. 269 The strict positivism provided little protection against the cruel and unjust 
administrative laws created within the bounds of the legal and governing systems. 
Summary 
Esteban re-states Neumann's argument that the 'crucial difference between Continental 
and English legal theory lies in the fact that English legal theory denies the law to be a 
closed system which expresses a consistent and logical body of rules, whereas this idea 
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lies at the heart of the continental conception. '270 This difference in attitude and tradition 
has a profound affect on the way in which individual member states interpret the rule of 
law. This was illustrated earlier with the overview of historical traditions and 
developments, of the rule of law, in Britain, France and Germany. For instance, 
historically, the British legal system has been acceptable and has indeed supported the 
notion of judicial discretion and of judicial influence in policy-making. In France and 
Germany, the role accorded judges is one that is much more limited in concept (than 
their British counterparts). Although in practice, the German Constitutional Court has 
been known to 'influence policy-making by concrete judicial review' and through use of 
'constitutional complaint.'271 
The interpretation of the rule of law by individual member states, while affected 
by historical traditions, has also been affected by popular conceptions of the concept 
beyond merely the elite's understanding of it. Popular conceptions of the rule of law are 
significant as encompassed in these conceptions, are particular attitudes and 
understandings of the role of law and of government. 
According to Linz and Stepan, the formation of 'a legal culture with strong roots 
in civil society, respected by political society and the state apparatus', is necessary for the 
development of the rule of law in a state. 272 It is because of the importance of the 
formation of a legal culture for the development and support of the rule of law, that it is 
necessary to also focus on member states' legal cultures. In focusing upon the legal 
cultures of states, it is people's attitudes and understanding ofthe role oflaws and ofthe 
role of the government, which greatly influences the perceptions and interpretations of 
the rule of law. This is because the 'extent to which citizens believe that they ought to 
adhere rigidly to law is one aspect of legal values, and it is quite likely that nations differ 
significantly on this dimension. '273 Much is dependent on whether laws are perceived as 
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protecting the interests of those in the society or whether the law is perceived as a 
repressive force that is used for coercive or arbitrary reasons of the government. At the 
very core of most legal systems is the struggle or problem between government 
interference and of individual freedom. 
The statements above illustrate the influence conceptions and perceptions of law, 
state, and the restraint of or interference of government authority, have had an effect on 
the attitudes of individuals in member states, of the rule of law~ which also has the 
circular effect of influencing their compliance with laws. An example of the affect 
conceptual differences have had, is illustrated in a survey completed on support for the 
rule of law, individuals were asked to rate their level of support for each of the three 
statements noted in the endnote. 274 The results from Gibson and Calderia's surveys of 
these statements, show that member states could be clustered into three different groups. 
In the first group made up of Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, and East 
Germany, there was not strong support and regard for the rule of law. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, showing strong support for the rule of law and other connected 
values of law and individual liberty, are the countries of Denmark, The Netherlands, 
West Germany, and Great Britain. The last group of member states have shown mixed 
views on the various statements overall, with neither a strong or weak regard for the rule 
of law. This group consisted of Spain, Italy, France, and Ireland. 275 These results 
support the assessment that the lack of uniformity in ideas about law, have directly 
influenced the existence of variations in the conception of the rule of law, providing 
further evidence of the lack of uniformity of this principle across EU member states. 
All of the differing ideas have assisted in understanding of the development of 
various conceptions of the rule of law. This in turn has assisted in defining the 
institutions and structures of government, and the roles in which different institutions 
85 
play in the implementation and operation of the rule of law. The manner which 
individual governments view ideas of individual freedom and government restraint has 
had an effect not only on how they have chosen to interpret the rule of law. This has 
also affected how they have chosen to implement measures to ensure the proper 
operation of the rule of law by government institutions and structures. For example, 
these ideas (of restraining government actions and promotion of individual freedom) are 
evident in both the English and German ideas of the rule oflaw. The German idea of this 
principle can be separated into two, the Rechtssicherheit (legal certainty or security), and 
Rechtsstaat (legally regulated state); while the English conception of the rule of law, in 
turn, combines both of these German elements. 276 
states, 
The French and British understandings can also be contrasted. As Laborde 
in contrast to the French, British state institutions were not a product 
of institutionalisation and differentiation from civil society. The state 
developed along pluralistic lines, favouring the representation of local 
and functional authorities in parliament, allowing the control of 
government by social elites, and thus precluding the autonomization 
ofthe state?77 
In comparing the Continental and English conceptions, it has been stated that 'in 
strong contrast to France and Germany, the dual nature of law (parliament - and judge-
made) in Britain has meant that law was not the dominant idiom in which theories of the 
state were couched. 278 Another comparison, according to both Dyson and Laborde, is 
that Britain did not share this focus on the concept of the state that was prevalent on the 
Continent. With reference to Britain, Laborde comments (based on Dyson's thesis) that, 
'while the concept of the state was commonly used to refer to an independent political 
unit acting in the field of international relations, it never figured as a central organising 
concept in national discourse about political authority.'279 
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The evolution of the three main understandings of the rule of law as discussed 
previously in this chapter, 'reflects a different conception of the legal system' in each of 
these countries. 280 It does not merely indicate a difference in legal techniques, but instead 
represents or illustrates that a difference in legal approaches has been developed from the 
differences in culture.281 For example, Gibson and Caldeira point to the example of 
common law versus civil law practices. They believe that it is 'quite likely that the 
cultural values underpinning these systems [common law in Britain and Ireland; civil law 
systems in France and most of the Continent] differ as well.'282 
Despite these differences between English and Continental understandings 
described earlier by Dyson, there is some common ground between the three main 
understandings in Europe. The terms used refer to 'partly similar assumptions and legal 
prescriptions found in various traditions referring to the state's structure, organisation, 
and operations.'283 Saj6 also considers the main idea the various conceptions share to be 
that the 'state's bodies act according to the prescriptions of law, and law is structured 
according to principles restricting arbitrariness. '284 He believes that in all models or 
understandings, the rule of law 'makes sense of legislative activity' and that it provides for 
legal redress when the state's activities violate the law. '285 
A recent challenge to Dyson's thesis has been formulated by Meadowcroft. 
Laborde refers to Meadowcroft, and suggests that with such a 'variety of indigenous 
understandings of it [the state] that it has become difficult to endorse Dyson's suggestion 
that the state concept was a mere continental import to Britain.'286 She (Laborde) 
elaborates on this, stating that 'one major fallacy of Dyson's reasoning is that it conflates 
the institutions of the state and the idea of the state into a single idea. '287 Although 
Laborde is not proposing that there is necessarily commonality between continental and 
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English understandings of the state, she believes that there may be some overlap between 
'indigenous understandings' that have not been considered by Dyson's arguments. 
There seems to be some general similarities in understandings, but the differences 
between these three main understandings and conceptions of the 'rule of law', provide 
some possibility for future discrepancies. This is to be examined in the last two sections 
ofthis chapter, with regard to potential discrepancies at the Community level, especially 
with the future enlargement of the EU to include countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe who lack strong and imbedded democratic values and principles. 
Discussion in the next section will focus on the impact of different legal cultures. 
This will be illustrated and reflected in approaches to key issues: a) potential challenges 
to the Community legal order; b) different attitudes to judicial discretion; and c) 
citizenship, taken at the three different levels of decision-making. The significance of this 
next section is that it will illustrate how differentiation in understandings of the rule of 
law (as presented in this section), can affect the various levels within the governing 
system. This is especially useful, as it will provide a basis for examining the development 
and understanding of the rule of law in Central and Eastern European countries in 
negotiation with the EU for future membership. 
Section Two - Impact of Different Legal Cultures 
The impact of different legal cultures on the implementation and application of the rule 
of law can be better illustrated by examining specific issues. These three issues were 
chosen, as they will illustrate the impact different conceptions of the rule of law have had 
in the Community to date. 
While the first section of this chapter was comprised of different understandings 
of the rule of law, in particular, the conceptions ofBritain, France, and Germany.288 This 
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section provides the foundations for further investigation into the potential challenges to 
the legal order of the Community from internal (through its institutions) and external 
(from individual member states) sources. 
Lastly, the issue of citizenship will be surveyed to further illustrate the impact of 
different legal cultures. It will also illustrate how divergence in the interpretation of the 
rule of law, has created variation in the structure of legal orders, which in turn have 
created differences in the handling ofthe same issue across member states. Citizenship is 
an interesting topic because aside from differences between countries within the 
Community (EU), there are also differences between levels of the Community order. 
These points will be covered in more detail in this sub-section. 
A Community Understanding of the Rule of Law? 
The European Union as a whole, 289 has repeatedly stated its belief in the importance of 
the principle of the rule of law. Although numerous documents clearly include the term 
'rule of law' suggesting a distinct emphasis by the EU, none of these documents have put 
forward a clear definition of the term. 290 Despite such emphasis, the Commission and the 
Parliament have both avoided committing themselves to a formal definition of the rule of 
law, focusing their conceptions of the rule of law, in more general terms, whereas the 
Court of Justice has proposed and shaped a 'Community rule-of-law principle' through its 
judgements. 
Across the EU institutions, one of the first instances in which the term 'rule of 
law' was mentioned in documentation from any of the European Union institutions291, 
was in the European Parliament's Proceedings of the Round Table on 'Special rights 
and a charter of the rights of the citizens of the European Community' and related 
documents, in Florence, October 1978. It is in one of the related documents from the 
89 
Parliament's proceedings, entitled Declaration on Democracy (Copenhagen, 8 April 
1978), which refers to the rule oflaw. It states: 
The Heads of Government confirm their will, as expressed in the 
Copenhagen Declaration on the European identity, to ensure that the 
cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected 
and to safeguard the principles of representative democracy, of the 
rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights. 292 
This reference to the rule of law emphasises its use as a principle, which should be 
observed in the same manner as the principle of representative democracy. It does not 
explicitly define or attempt to define the rule of law or how it is to be used, the 
Declaration on Democracy merely stresses that the rule of law principle is important and 
should be protected. 
Another document referring to the rule of law, goes further to describe it as one 
of the 'fundamental principles' that are necessary and is a prerequisite 'for any 
sustainable, socially fair and environmentally sound econonuc development. '293 This 
provides some evidence that the rule of law concept has become increasingly more 
important to the European Union as a whole and that it deems it to be important for 
economic and political/democratic development. Other documents provide further 
evidence of the how EU institutions are using the rule of law. In the official journal of 
the European Communities, the European Parliament: 
Stresses that, while it is true that the Community is a community 
based on the rule of law, with a full set of means of appeal and 
procedures, in which the Court of Justice exercises supervisory 
powers in respect of the compliance of the acts of the Member States 
and the institutions with the 'Constitutional Charter', i.e. the Treaty, 
there will be gaps in the system for protecting fundamental rights until 
such time as the Community is subject to the monitoring procedures 
provided for under the ECHR (European Convention on Human 
Rights) in the same way as its Member States. 294 
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The quote above is illustrative of the Parliament's use of the term in its documentation. 
From this passage, the Parliament is showing an eclectic understanding of the term -
mixing both positivist and non-positivist notions of the rule oflaw. 
There are other documents presented by the Commission and Council of 
Ministers that state their purpose as being an initiative 'to achieve the Treaty objectives 
of developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. ' 295 This statement once again emphasises the rule of law as a 
principle to be protected and further developed. It does make reference to the 'support 
for the democratic transition process that is a new theme within the general framework 
of co-operation action to strengthen the rule of law and democratic freedoms. '296 And in 
section 1.2 Promoting and Strengthening the rule of law of this document by the 
Commission, it describes ways of establishing and consolidating the rule of law for the 
successful transition to a democratic governing system. The Commission has stated that 
the establishment of the rule of law is a process that requires major legislative and 
political reforms in order to guarantee respect for individual rights by governments, to 
ensure judicial independence and that it is operational, and guarantee that there is 
transparency of the decision-making processes. 297 
In June of 1997, there was a conference held jointly by the Dutch Presidency, the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe, on the rule of law. In the opening 
speech of the conference, the Minister of Justice for The Netherlands - Mrs. Winnie 
Sorgdrager, stated that 'prior to 1992, the term "the Rule of Law" hardly appears in 
European Community documents or declarations. It was not referred to explicitly until 
the conclusions adopted by the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. "298 
Esteban similarly mentions that 'the principle of the rule of law in official documents and 
legislation is practically non-existent' with regard to the 'relevant case law of the Court of 
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Justice. '299 The reason for the conference had been to assist in establishing the rule of 
law as a basic principle and to ensure that proper attention is given to this principle with 
regard to further enlargement of the EU. Because there are many aspects encompassed 
by the term 'rule of law', it was decided by the organisers of the conference300, that it 
would focus specifically on the rule of law as it is relates to the administration of justice. 
The main conclusion that The Netherlands Minister of Justice had hoped would be 
reached by the end of the conference, was the identification of 'technical obstacles and 
shortcomings that impede a state in its application of the Rule ofLaw'301 . This action, as 
well as a commitment to continuing discussions focusing on different aspects of the rule 
oflaw and how to make it a permanent part of the European Union's activities, had been 
the desired outcomes of the conference. 
Throughout the Conference on the Rule of Law, delegates, including European 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek gave various speeches. The conference was 
organised with the primary intention of securing 'permanent attention for the fundamental 
principles of the constitutional state in the Member States of the European Union and the 
ten applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. ' 302 The key issues which were 
discussed and examined during the conference in relation to the rule of law, included 
independence of the judiciary, the implementation of court decisions, the role and 
position of public prosecution departments, and the ability to lodge appeals against the 
government and access to the courts by individuals. 
Speeches and press releases from the Conference on the Rule ofLaw suggest that 
the European Union as a whole is in the process of identifying key issues and conditions 
that it feels is necessary for the establishment and consolidation of the rule of law by 
current member states, as well as associated countries. In his speech to the conference, 
the then European Commissioner Hans van den Broek stated that 'it is only natural that 
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the European Union should make the rule of law and democracy a central part of its 
enlargement strategy. It cannot and will not accept as a member, any country which is 
not fully committed to these principles. ' 303 He also concludes that 'the rule of law is the 
foundation of civil and democratic society. There can be no democracy and no human 
and minority rights without it.' 'The rule of law is also the foundation of economic 
development. ' 304 
This conclusion made by Commissioner V an den Broek is a significant one. It 
provides some evidence that the European Union has begun to make moves towards 
outlining some form of definition and conception of what the rule of law means to it and 
how it proposes to use the rule of law concept within the Union and by both member 
states and prospective members. Despite these efforts on the part of the European 
Union, a clear definition of the rule of law was not agreed upon. Without some clearly 
formed conception or definition of the rule of law, the European Union will potentially 
have difficulties in ensuring that the conclusions and opinions on the development of 
prospective member states, are balanced, fair, and uniform. 
In more recent documentation from the Community, the Commission submitted 
its proposal for a Council regulation on the development and consolidation of democracy 
and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Council 
of the European Union, in this document, made references to the rule of law stated in 
Article 130u (2) of the EC Treaty, as well as having stated that 'Community action on 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law requires a stronger identity. ' 305 The 
Commission adopted the regulation, and in chapter 1, article 2c on the 'Objectives and 
general principles of action to promote human rights and democratic principles', stated 
that the Community shall in particular support operations aimed at: 
promoting or strengthening the rule of law, notably through measures 
to uphold the independence of the judiciary and strengthen it (the 
administration of justice, treatment of offenders, crime prevention) 
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and for the activities of parliaments and other democratically elected 
institutions; supporting institutional and legislative reform;306 
This particular passage of the Council regulation adopted by the Commission, provides 
further evidence that the Commission, if not the other institutions of the European 
Union, are progressing towards identifying particular conditions and institutions related 
to the establishment, development, and consolidation of the rule of law principle. The 
identification of particular necessary conditions and institutions is significant in regard to 
the enlargement of the European Union to include countries from central and eastern 
Europe who are in the process of transition from Communism to a democratic form of 
government and governing system. Such identification is significant and useful for 
applicant countries in transition, as it is on these and other conditions identified by the 
European Union (as necessary for the development and promotion of a democratic 
system), that applicant countries are to be judged and the EU to make its judgements, as 
outlined in such lengthy documents as its Agenda 2000 Opinions and the Accession 
Partnership Agreements. 
There is a clear discrepancy between the Commission, Parliament, and Council of 
Ministers' intentions to avoid defining the rule of law and the Court of Justice- in its 
pursuit of setting a framework for defining its use and references made to the principle. 
While within the majority of the EU institutions there is a lack of desire but growing 
acknowledgement that the rule of law needs to be defined, only the Court of Justice has 
made efforts to define the concept. 'The Court of Justice has shaped a Community rule-
of-law principle that, whilst drawing on Member States' traditions, also differs from 
them', in the way that it does not allow for 'the same deference to national executives 
and legislatures as traditionally accorded by the national orders. ' 307 This seems to 
support the notion that within the European Union there is a working definition of the 
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term 'rule of law', despite claims to the contrary. However, the Court's efforts do not 
detail exactly how it has defined the rule of law. Nor is it clear as to whether other EU 
institutions are referring to the Court's definition in their use of the term. 
Where the Court of Justice has proposed a 'Community rule-of-law principle', 
the Commission and Parliament have focused their conceptions of the rule of law, in 
more general terms, using the term to make references to both the economic and 
political spheres. 308 Such a definition of the rule of law places the principle in areas that 
many writers and theorists believe to be too expansive, and is seen to have weakened 
what is meant by use of the term. This broad definition goes beyond the EU' s 
interpretation and use of the rule of law. Much of the EU documentation that have 
included the term, have usually linked it with other well-used, broad terms held to be 
fundamental to the European Union, such as democracy and human rights. 
There is a second problem concerning the EU's approach to the rule of law. 
There is a clear discrepancy between the EU's intention to avoid defining the rule oflaw, 
and its action, in regard to this principle. For example, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
Article F, paragraph 1, it states, 'The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.' Article F, paragraph 1 of the 
Treaty on European Union, also reaffirms that, 'the Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the 
principles of democracy. '309 
In this treaty article, the EU has shown that it holds the rule of law to be one of 
the fundamental principles upon which the Community is based. However, at the same 
time, it illustrates the EU' s desire to shy away from defining exactly what it means by its 
use of this term on which it is founded. EU Commissioner V an den Broek has gone as 
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far as to state clearly during a conference on the rule of law/ 10 that 'the rule of law is a 
vast concept which defied precise definitions and delimitation. ' 311 This statement 
communicates the general perspective of the EU institutions, regarding the rule of law. 
It emphasised the way in which the EU as a whole, regards defining the term 'rule of 
law' as of secondary importance when compared to the actual implementation and 
application of the concept.312 There seems to be an assumed knowledge or 
understanding of what is meant by the use of the term, in its documentation; this 
assumed understanding could be what the Court of Justice was trying to give substance 
to in its attempt to define the term. 
Other comments that were made during the Rule of Law conference in 
Noordwijk, have explained not only the EUs desire to not define this concept, but also 
some thoughts on its application, by conference participants. This in turn has an impact 
on the way in which applicant countries are interpreting, developing, implementing, and 
choosing to ensure the proper operation of the rule of law principle internally, despite 
the lack of any formal definition provided from the EU. 
The various member states within the Community, with differences in legal 
cultures, have a direct impact on the manner in which EU institutions conceive of the 
rule of law. This has been illustrated by the varying ideas of the rule of law that helped 
shape the conclusions and concerns brought out at the conference in Noordwijk. The 
conference illustrated not only the differences in conceptions of the rule of law upon 
which countries then develop their strategies for improving particular governmental 
institutions. It also illustrated the differences between understanding and usage of the 
rule of law by the EU institutions, which reflects variation in member states' 
conceptions. This will be further examined in the next sub-section, focused on potential 
challenges to the Community legal order. 
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Potential Conflicts Between Community and National Legal Orders 
As was stated earlier in this chapter, despite differences between countries and regions, 
between cultures, traditions and histories, it has been emphasised that the rule of law is 
of great importance and value, and that its position as 'a basis for the development of the 
individual and of society, is universal. ' 313 Although this has been emphasised by some 
individuals within the European Union, others working within the Commission and the 
Parliament, have stated that although the 'idea' of the rule of law principle is universal, 
its interpretation and development will differ across applicant countries as it does across 
member states. The development of different conceptions of the rule of law has been 
due to the differences in their cultures, traditions, histories and experiences. For 
example, there are differences in the interpretation and development of the rule of law 
principle between member states such as Germany and the United Kingdom, because 
each represents different legal approaches based on different experiences and 
conceptions of what role the individual, the state, and laws have within their country.314 
For many EU member states, the impact of their conception of the rule of law on 
the development of their legal cultures, can be best illustrated by examining the 
constitutions. Many member states have chosen either to include articles which 
specifically refer to the rule of law, or have instead, included articles about the structure 
of and procedures for various government bodies, such as the judiciary, which make 
references to the rule of law principle, within their individual constitutions. These 
references provide examples of how member states' implementation of specific 
government institutions and procedures, emphasise and illustrate their individual 
interpretations of the term 'rule of law'. However, examination of member states' 
constitutions also provides examples of an area where potential challenges to the 
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Community legal order, can occur. The main area of contention and potential challenge 
to the Community legal order, is the primacy of Community law over national law. 
The issue of primacy continues to be problematic for both the Community as a 
whole, and for individual member states. It centres on the conflict between the need to 
have community law interpreted and applied in a uniform manner across all member 
states of the EU, and the sovereignty of national constitutions on matters they consider 
to be of 'national interest', and outside the scope of the Community. This problem can 
be illustrated with examples from Britain, France and Germany. For these countries, 
submission of its sovereign powers to the European Union, is influenced by definitions of 
their national powers and structures according to their individual legal cultures. This has 
been and remains to be, one of the main sources of the conflicts between community and 
national law. This is a problem because 'respect for principles such as human rights, the 
rule of law and democracy is mandated and controlled at the national level, sometimes 
by constitutional courts', and has the potential of producing divergence in the 
interpretation of these principles across the EU.315 Inter-linked with this problem of 
supremacy ofCommunity law, is the issue of judicial discretion, (which will be discussed 
further on in this sub-section). 
The German Constitutional Court and its 'Maastricht judgement' provide 
examples of the problems involved with the issue of supremacy of Community law. In 
its decision in this judgement, the German Constitutional Court held that 'transfers of 
sovereign powers by Germany to the European Union' were 'compatible with the 
German Constitution only to the extent that democracy is not impaired as a consequence 
thereof ' 316 This example of the German Constitutional Court illustrates the concerns 
raised, regarding the basis for the EU's 'constitution-making powers'. Many German 
authors do not consider the European Union treaties to be a constitution 'because the 
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power of the Community was not derived from the people, but mediated by states, and 
therefore was not the expression of a society's self-determination'. Additionally, they do 
not consider the treaties to be a constitution as they consider the EU to be 'an 
international organisation and not a state', thereby it is incapable of having a 
constitution.317 The conclusions drawn here go beyond the issue of primacy of 
Community law, and actually questions the legitimacy of the Community to interfere 
with legislation passed by national governments, in order to ensure that there is 
uniformity in the interpretation and especially the application of Community law across 
all member states. 
The British government also finds the issue of primacy of Community law to be 
. problematic, as in the case of the German Constitutional Court, but for slightly different 
reasons. Whereas the German Court was arguing that power and sovereignty emanates 
from the people and that Community law lacks participation of the German people, the 
British government argues that sovereignty emanates from Parliament. For the British 
government, the idea of supremacy of Community law is in direct opposition to its 
'doctrine of the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament'. 318 This doctrine invests in 
the Parliament, 'unlimited authority, recognised by the courts, to make any law or amend 
any law already made. '319 Therefore, the idea of British sovereignty and its sovereign 
powers, contradicts the idea of implementation of national laws in accordance to 
Community law, when there is a conflict between the two. Conflicts and differences in 
the interpretation of where sovereignty and sovereign powers ultimately lay, makes it 
difficult to ensure that all Community laws are interpreted and applied in a uniform 
manner across the European Union. 
The conflict between national and Community law has also been an issue in 
France. This was illustrated by the Conseil d'Etat, in the case of Syndicat General Des 
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Farbricants De Semoules De France (CE 1 March 1968). As described by Brown and 
Bell, this case demonstrated a 'clear conflict between a French statute and a Community 
regulation. ' 320 However, rather than rule on this case itself, the Conseil d'Etat referred 
the matter to the Constitutional Council, as it 'declared itself unable to ignore the 
statute: if the text was unconstitutional by reason of its conflict with Community law', 
therefore it 'was a matter for the Constitutional Council, not the Conseil d 'Etat. ' 321 This 
case illustrates the attitude of the Conseil d 'Etat towards primacy of Community law 
over national law. It believed (in 1968) that it 'could not challenge the legality of a 
statute, as being in conflict with a prior treaty obligation. '322 This view changed in 1989 
with the Compagnie Alitalia case and the Nicolo case. 323 
With the Nicolo case324, the Conseil d'Etat departed from its usual attitude 
towards dealing with conflicts between national and Community law. According to 
Brown and Bell, the interesting part of this case is not the decision itself, but the 
conclusions drawn by the Commissaire du Gouvemement, M. Frydman. He concluded 
'that the times of the absolute supremacy of a statute were past and that Article 55 of the 
Constitution authorised the courts to review conformity of a statute with a treaty. ' 325 
What this example illustrates, is the ongoing problem with primacy of Community law 
over national law, in France. And that despite instances by the Conseil d'Etat to 'come 
to terms with the supremacy of Community law', it is still a potential or on-gomg 
problem for France and other member states within the Community. 326 
This conflict between Community primacy and national sovereignty causes 
further problems as it results in national courts, not always applying or implementing 
Community law when it conflicts with national laws. It means that countries like 
Germany, Britain and France could be interpreting and applying laws and principles in a 
manner that may be consistent with their own national constitutions and legislation, but 
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applying these in a manner that is inconsistent with the rest of the Community. This will 
be further discussed now, with examination of the issue of judicial discretion. 
Judicial Discretion 
Judicial discretion is another potential problem area for the Community's legal order. 
Within the EU, this problem is illustrated by the conflict between the so-called 'pick-and-
choose' technique through the third pillar of the Community, and Article 177 of the 
Treaty on European Union. The third pillar of the Community extends the competence 
of the Court of Justice and has been widely seen as 'an enhancement of the Rule of Law 
in the European Union'.327 However, the 'pick-and-choose' technique, which allows 
Member states to decide from one of four possibilities328 with regard to refening cases 
to the Court of Justice from national courts, 'contradicts the very essence of preliminary 
rulings as defined by the Court of Justice, namely its role in avoiding divergence in the 
interpretation of Community law. t329 Thereby rendering Article 177, to fall short of its 
role as 'essential [component] for the preservation of the Community character of the 
law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this 
law is the same in all states of the Community. '330 This raises the potential of-producing 
variations in the implementation and application of Community law across the EU. It is 
these issues of sovereignty and power, which produce conflicts between national and 
Community primacy. 
For individual perspectives ofthe issue of judicial discretion, the focus here shifts 
to examining the attitudes of three EU member states (Germany, France and Britain). 
Examination will compare the views towards judicial discretion of these three particular 
countries, as it will be consistent with the previous comparisons drawn. These countries 
highlight the differences both between Anglo-Saxon and Continental perspectives and 
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legal cultures (as defined earlier with reference to Dyson), but also illustrates the 
differences between Continental countries which are often times overlooked. 
The difference between British and Continental views on the issue of judicial 
discretion, is the scope of judicial discretion which can be utilised by judges within a 
country's legal culture and structure. For instance, in Britain, judges seem to have a 
wider scope for use of judicial discretion than on the Continent. This seems to be the 
result oftheir different approaches to the law (common law versus civil law). Britain, a 
common law country, is based on the development of case law and the use of 
precedents, in the decision-making process of the judiciary. The development of case 
law in the courts through the decisions of judges, is commonly known as judges 'making 
law'. This type of legal approach is closely linked to a perspective of the rule of law as a 
'way of life'. It has been stated, that this approach to law allows for the possible 
utilisation of discretion more often, as laws would change with developments in society, 
as the rule of law is based on the idea that laws and morals of the society are inter-
linked. In such a situation, reliant on interpretation in line with the morals and 
understandings held by the society, the 'process of interpretation necessarily involves an 
element of choice between alternative meanings, and choice gives scope for judicial 
creativity. ' 331 
This is different from the Continental approach to law (known as civil law) which 
entails decisions to be made based on the word of the law without much scope for 
judges to 'make law' as in the British system through passing of judgements on cases. 
In such a system, the rule of law is more commonly understood as a limitation on 
government agents and institutions. With the limitation on government agents and 
institutions, there is less scope (in theory, as compared to practice) for judges to 'make 
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law'. For example, this is illustrated in the differing perceptions of the kind of system 
Britain has, in comparison to Germany and France. Brown and Bell state that 
The Germans would say that in the United Kingdom, we have a 
Justizstaat [justice state], where conflicts between public authorities 
and the ordinary citizen are determined by the 'ordinary' courts; 
France, on the other hand, is a Rechtsstaat [law state], where a series 
of specially constituted administrative courts exercise control over the 
state. 332 
Within this perspective, there is an emphasis on the part of Continental countries, in this 
case France, on the courts exerting control over the state. The difference in 
understandings regarding judicial discretion, that divides Britain from Continental 
countries, seems to be based on ideas of what the prerogative of the courts are and what 
role they were established for. 
Despite the different perspectives of judicial discretion, these differences seem to 
become marginalised in the actual practice of judicial discretion in various countries. 
One area where judicial discretion seems to growing which challenges the theory and 
ideas long-held about judicial discretion both in Britain and the Continent, is the area of 
judicial review. 
Judicial review in Britain is considered to be 'an instrument of administrative law, 
encompassing a ,cluster of remedies available in the courts for challenging the legality or 
fairness of acts or omissions by public authorities . .333 In Britain, there has been much 
'written about the ebb and flow over the years, of judicial activism in the exercise of 
judicial review. '334 However, Drewry states that 'by its very nature, judicial review is 
concerned with the processes of the decision-making, rather than with the substance of 
policy. '335 In comparison, Germany like France, has seen a rise in the use of judicial 
review for the purposes of interpreting conformity with their constitutions. Christine 
Landfried describes this practice as 'policy-making'. She states that in Germany, the 
Constitutional Court can be seen to be participating more in the policy-making process 
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by its ability to invalidate laws. In addition to this ability, Landfried states that the Court 
has also 'developed some alternative sanctions to escape the simple choice between 
declaring a law constitutional or unconstitutional . .336 According to her, 'this is a 
declaration that one particular interpretation of law is the only constitutionally 
permissible one and often entails precise prescriptions for the implementation of a 
law. '337 Landfried considers this to be a clear indication that in Germany, as well as in 
France, there are interpretations being made with reference to conformity with the 
constitutions, which are policy-making in nature. 
Both in Britain · and on the Continent, there have been signs that judicial 
discretion is growing, as judicial review is further utilised. This does not mean that there 
has been a conscious change in attitudes or perspectives of the idea of judicial discretion. 
However, what it does seem to signify, is a discrepancy between theory (ideas held) and 
practice, in some member states across the European Union. There may be several 
reasons why perspectives on judicial discretion have not changed. One reason may be 
that they are a convenient method for limiting or clamping down on the over -use of 
judicial powers and gives governments a method of holding judges to a more narrow 
scope in passing judgements, if it is deemed necessary and in the government's interests 
to do so. 
This issue of judicial discretion was also recognised as another important area, 
and was hence covered at the Rule of Law conference held in Noordwijk. This theme 
referred to the topic of interference with judicial decisions. Particular emphasis was 
placed on the execution of judicial decisions without interference. It was stated in the 
conference conclusions, that procedures regarding exceptions to rules on interference 
should be kept to a minimum and laid down by law.338 So it seems that even on a larger 
scale within the European Union, despite moves towards further independence of the 
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judiciary, especially through judicial discretionary powers, there is a feeling that there 
should be some limitation. This perspective seems to be more in line with Continental 
perspectives than with British/ Anglo-Saxon ones. What these similarities and differences 
do demonstrate, is that the Community legal order, because it has been created by a 
number of countries who share some similar perspectives, but also some very diverse 
ones, could face potential challenges. The diverse interpretations could potentially have 
a serious effect on the process of European integration, through a lack of uniformity in 
the interpretation and application of such fundamental principles. 
Issues of Citizenship and Migration 
The issue of citizenship is a good example of how differences in the interpretation of 
foundation principles such as the rule of law, can produce national rules, regulations, and 
laws that may be based upon the right ideas, but in practice, run counter to Community 
law. Across the European Union, there are different applications of citizenship laws. For 
example, France maintains that 'all children born in France are entitled to citizenship 
regardless of the ancestry of their parents, with the sole caveat that children of foreign 
parents must live in the country for five years between the ages of 11 and 18 ', after 
which time they may apply for citizenship and are normally granted it if they are found to 
have a clean police record.339 At the opposite extreme from France's seemingly liberal 
citizenship regulations, is the Austrian citizenship law. Austrian citizenship is 'not 
automatically granted to resident aliens for a full 30 years after entry', although 
'application may be made after 10 years of residency and upon certification of a good 
knowledge of the German language. '340 
Despite similarities in some requirements, such as a rrnrumum residency 
requirement of 5 years and a minimum age of 18 years, to make an application for 
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citizenship in most member states, the extreme differences between countries such as 
France and Austria, illustrate a lack of uniformity in citizenship laws across the European 
Union. In fact, some member states like Britain, which leaves decisions made on 
granting citizenship, to the discretion of the Home Secretary or some other authorised 
government official. This individual or government body is allowed to decide whether 
an applicant has met the minimum requirements such as minimum residency and age, as 
well as other more subjective requirements such as whether the applicant is 'of sound 
mind, good character', and whether the applicant has 'a knowledge ofEnglish, Welsh or 
Scottish Gaelic. ' 341 Such discretionary powers which leaves the decision of whether or 
not to grant particular individuals citizenship, has the potential of being arbitrary and 
subjective, as well as open to abuse, corruption, and various interpretations on meeting 
such requirements about character and knowledge of language. This illustrates the lack 
of uniformity in citizenship regulations and laws, based on differences in the 
interpretation of what rights and benefits are associated with citizenship in a particular 
country. What is perceived to be associated with citizenship and what should be 
inherent as a part of citizenship, is a motivating factor for the differences evident in 
citizenship laws in place across the EU. These assumptions and ideas are based on 
countries' individual histories and legal cultures, their perceptions of national identity, 
their experiences with huge influxes of migrants and asylum seekers, and the perception 
of potential problems to arise from supporting and implementing more liberal citizenship 
laws. 
Closely connected to one another and to the issue of citizenship, are issues of 
migrants and the protection of minorities. According to the European Union treaties and 
Community law, citizens of any EU member state have the right to live and work in 
another EU member state if they so chose. However, in some member states, national 
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laws have been considered to be contrary to Community laws on the free movement. An 
example of this has been the establishment of national laws in some member states, such 
as laws on languages - 'aiming at protecting the plurality of languages within a multi-
lingual state', can be considered to be contrary to EU principles and laws on free 
movement of persons and goods (laws which support migrants). 342 
This produces a complicated situation that again brings the issue of primacy to 
the centre. Should states which have established laws to protect its minorities, be held 
liable for breach of EU principles and laws established with other objectives in mind? 
The fact is that the Treaty of Amsterdam may illustrate the EU's steps towards 
recognising minority issues (as a way of sorting this complication), but it does not 
recognise language as a minority issue that needs protection by law. In such a case, the 
primacy of Community law would lend support to the rights of migrants instead of 
protection of minorities, especially as the Community does not recognise language as a 
minority issue; but does an individual country have the right to protect its minorities 
through support of language which is deeply rooted in the cultures of groups of people, 
regardless of Community laws on the rights of migrants? It is a controversial issue, but 
it does illustrate that there is a lack of uniformity and consensus on minority issues. This 
example of conflicts between minority rights and migrant rights, also illustrates the 
problems of enforcing Community law and policies in this area, thereby bequeathing to 
member states, the duty and responsibility to make decisions and laws for the protection 
of both migrants and minorities. By bequeathing responsibility to member states, the 
Community has allowed for the possibility that it will generate variances in the 
implementation and application of Community laws, but also the implementation of 
national laws on issues dealing with minorities and migrants, in accordance with 
Community regulations. 
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Another example of discrepancies over the application of Community law, is the 
case of Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari. 343 In this case, a public authority in 
Italy 'refused to take into account periods of service in the public service in another 
member states when determining whether the candidates for a post had the requisite 
experience. ' 344 This caused indirect discrimination against migrants seeking public 
service posts in Italy. This case illustrates how some member states may be interpreting 
Community regulations and laws in a way that affects its implementation and application. 
The Italian public authority was applying the Community's regulations regarding migrant 
workers, but it was also creating regulations not covered by the Community's, in its 
implementation and practice of these Community regulations. 
It is the national applications of Community laws and principles that illustrate the 
potential challenges that differences in legal cultures and a lack of uniformity in 
conception of the rule of law, can have within the Community. The differing perspectives 
and interpretations applications of such issues as citizenship or judicial discretion, or the 
issue of primacy of Community law further illustrates the potential and existent problems 
and difficulties, a lack of uniformity can produce. 
Section Three- A Lack of Uniformity and Its Implications 
This last section of chapter two examines the lack uniformity and the implications of such 
a situation, within the European Union. In addition, this section will identity the effects 
this situation potentially has on further enlargement of the European Union to encompass 
associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 345 
The fundamental problem is made clear by Amaryllis Verhoeven, who states that, 
Divergent national interpretations of such values as democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law- and especially national courts' 
"activism" in applying these notions to matters that affect the Union 
at large - require the Court of Justice to step into the democracy 
debate. If the Court does not take a stance on what respect for 
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democratic principles are required in the Union context, national 
courts will have final say on the matter, even where the Union and 
Union citizens are involved. National views and applications of key 
values for European integration will then prevail, at the expense of a 
loss of uniformity and, worse, of the very supranational dynamics of 
the integration project. 346 
What V erhoeven is stating here, is that the lack of a uniform definition across member 
states on a principle like the rule of law, which has been identified as a fundamental basis 
for the creation of the European Union, by the European Union, has serious implications 
for its existence. Such a lack of uniformity leaves interpretation of the rule of law to 
member states, thereby affecting the application of this principle through particular areas 
and overall, directly affecting the idea of primacy of Community law and the foundations 
on which the European Union stands. It affects primacy of Community law by allowing 
for differentiation in interpretations across the EU, giving member states the possibility of 
finding ways of moulding interpretations to suit their needs or allowing member states to 
put-off implementation within the national framework, until forced to do so by threat of 
penalty, (which has been previously utilised by several member states for different 
reasons). 
The significance of this, is that there is the possibility that a lack of a uniform 
conception of the rule of law will affect how and the way in which applicant countries 
reform their governmental structures according to their interpretation of the concept. 
This has the potential of influencing and disrupting the further expansion of the EU to 
include countries from Central and Eastern Europe.347 
Another significant issue that needs to be pointed out is that there is the 
possibility that the non-existence or lack of a formalised uniform conception of the rule 
of law means that assessment of an applicant country's transformation may be biased. 
There are questions about how uniform and fair assessment can be made of countries 
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that have different ideas and histories that affect their interpretation of the rule of law 
concept, if there are no formal 'rules', for the lack of a better word, in which to base 
assessment on. It seems that if the rule of law is as important as has been reiterated time 
and again by the European Union, then steps should be made towards providing some 
'type' of uniform conception that would be adaptable to the differences in culture, history 
and legal order of the various member states and associated countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
In assessing the potential reasons for this current situation in the Community, it 
seems that at some point (in the Community), when it was decided that the rule of law 
was an important principle with regard to the development of democracy, bureaucrats 
and officials across the Union felt some pressure or need to set-up some criterion for 
measuring the rule of law. In the process of doing so, they came to realise that the 
criterion which they would set, would need to be vague and encompassing, to ensure 
that current member states in the Community would meet its own requirements. This 
has proved to be too problematic a commitment, so the Community as a whole, has 
instead turned to use of the term (rule oflaw) without a Community-wide definition for 
it. This has then allowed for variations - large or small, to be acceptable throughout the 
EU. However, this has also left judgement of whether the rule of law exists and 
functions properly in member states and prospective member states, open to subjective 
decisions, as it is open to variation in interpretations based on any number of valid and 
biased reasons. In many ways, it seems on reflection that the Community may have put 
the 'apple cart before the horse', which has left it in the difficult position of reiterating the 
values and necessity of the principle of the rule of law, without confining itself to 
defining this revered principle, so as to minimise the potential problems and 
disagreements that would crop up otherwise. 
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Conclusion 
The influence of differences in views on ideas such as the role of the state and of laws, 
have had an impact on the interpretations and understanding of the term- rule of law. A 
divergence of conceptions has in turn, caused problems in the uniform application of this 
principle through laws and policies, across the European Union member states. Another 
important implication of a lack of uniformity in the conception of the rule of law across 
member states and EU institutions, is the potential that this problem will cause more of a 
strain on the entire integration process, as the EU enlarges to include Central and Eastern 
European countries who lack a history, the development and practice of democratic 
values and institutions, that current member states are purported to have and share in 
common. These applicants for EU membership, from Central and Eastern Europe, will 
be looking to current member states as examples and for guidance, in interpreting, 
applying, and ensuring the proper operation of the rule of law, in order to meet 
requirements for membership. 
The problem of the lack of uniformity presents for potential EU member states, 
will be discussed in further detail, in the next chapter. This chapter which will focus 
specifically on applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, reviewing the 
interpretations made by these associated countries, of the rule of law. Aside from 
covering this important principle for EU membership, the chapter will also examine how 
they are applying this principle through specific issues, like those issues covered in this 
chapter with reference to member states. 
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Chapter Three - Interpretation and Application of the Rule of Law Within 
Prospective Member Countries 
At the start, it should also be noted that this chapter will cover only a few associated 
countries and will not include discussion of all of those Central and Eastern European 
countries in negotiations, regarding European Union membership, individuatly.348 This is 
because the purpose of this chapter is to provide an illustration of how prospective 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe are interpreting the rule of law. It will 
examine their definitions of the term 'rule of law', as well as identifying influences and 
motives behind their particular conceptions, including past abuses and the resulting 
suspicion of the rule of law and the prevailing weakness of indigenous rule of law 
traditions in these countries. Identification of these influences provides a framework for 
understanding difficulties the regimes in these countries have in dealing with the 
problems that have been identified in chapter one. Some examples to illustrate this are 
how positivist conceptions of the rule of law clash with considerations of justice (i.e. 
dealing with past 'injustices'), and of how judicial review clashes with notion of the 
sovereignty ofthe people. These conflicts often appear highly acute because of problems 
of countries in transition face. They may also be attributed to the fact that these 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe have not had the experience and time to work 
out the compromises, or perhaps one should say evasions, which have characterised the 
rule of law in more stable western states. 
To illustrate the conflicts prospective member states are facing in respect to the 
rule of law, the following will be considered: the rule of law and economic development; 
judges and judicial discretion; and the rule of law and democratic institutions. This is of 
interest because as will be covered in chapter four on EU Enlargement, the European 
Union seems to be imposing a particular understanding of the rule of law on prospective 
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member states. The European Union has done this through its emphasis in associated 
countries, on the reform and creation of particular institutions, processes, and 
procedures, despite current differentiation amongst its own member states. 
The significance of the chapter's focus on developing an understanding and 
insight into how the rule of law is conceived and utilised, is that it will clearly illustrate 
some of the discrepancies and problems that become prevalent when differences in 
understandings of the rule of law exists. It also provides a framework for further 
examination of how, within the context of enlargement of the European Union, a lack of 
uniformity in conceptualisation of the term 'rule of law', can be detrimental to the EU as 
a whole, but has also been beneficial for EU member states individually. This matter was 
briefly covered in chapter two and will be further examined in chapter four. 
Section One- Understanding of the Term 'Rule of Law' 
A General Understanding of the Rule of Law in the CEECs? 
As discussed in chapter one of this thesis, the rule of law has been defined generally as 
'law that protects the citizens rather than controls them, that regulates their relations 
with each other and with the authorities they elect. ' 349 This type of general conception 
of the rule of law is utilised and readily accepted by many CEE countries, as it has 
popular appeal because it provides protection for citizens which did not exist or was 
unavailable to them under their previous regimes, or governing systems. Although many 
of these countries have acknowledged and stated their desire to have a state based on the 
rule oflaw, what exactly do they mean by 'founding a state based on the rule oflaw'?350 
In Central and Eastern European countries, there seems to be a general 
understanding of the rule of law conceived narrowly, as restricting arbitrariness in the 
exercise of governmental power and authority, thereby providing 'safeguards against the 
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abuse of power.'351 Writers such as Krygier and Czamota believe that 'there is a 
tendency among devotees of the rule of law, particularly and understandably in countries 
where it has so long been ignored and abused, to favour the negative conception [of the 
rule of law] and be suspicious of any larger ambitions for law.'352 
Selznick also discusses the rule of law in negative terms. He states that the 
negative conception of the rule of law is based on 'autonomous law'. This, he believes, 
'demands the separation of law and politics; insists on a corollary distinction between 
lawmaking and adjudication; and accepts the principle that the rule of law is a "law of 
rules" - rules that sharply limit [things such as] judicial discretion. '353 Selznick considers 
this to be 'closely connected to the "model of rules" of legal positivism, where law stricto 
sensu is conceived of as limited to authoritatively posited rules of a legally autonomous 
system of rules.'354 Both he and Lech Morawski consider this 'positivistically conceived 
rule of law inadequate to the tasks they consider important, and both argue that law can 
properly incorporate considerations of value.'355 However, the feeling of these writers 
are, that because of past experience under the Soviet regime, many people in Central and 
Eastern Europe are weary of anything looking vaguely to be above the law or which 
allows for arbitrariness. Therefore they would prefer a negative conception of the rule of 
law to limit such possibilities from occurring once again. 
This view of pervasive weariness in Central and Eastern Europe, is shared by 
other writers such as Elster, Offe, and Ulrich, who have attributed conceptions of the 
rule of law to similar reasons. They go a bit further than Selznick and Morawski's 
summary above. Elster, Offe, and Ulrich state that 'due to their experiences under 
communist rule, citizens [in Central and Eastern Europe] do not believe in the rule of 
law, tend to distrust political elites, and they are rather sceptical that political and 
economic reforms will bring about the desired outcomes.'356 They also believe that many 
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of these citizens developed their beliefs and desires, values and frames, roles and routines 
in past periods of life'. Because of the manner is which their beliefs and values have 
developed, changing this and the ways of thinking, especially with regard to the rule of 
law, will not be easy or quick to accomplish.357 Saj6 and Losonci made a similar 
assessment of the rule of law, to the one presented earlier by Elster, Offe, and Presse, 
stating that the legal system was abused and distorted within the Communist system, and 
that 'law was understood as instrumental to social and economic planning. '358 Distortion 
of legal systems across the Central and East European region under the Communist 
regime are illustrated by the roles assigned to judges, the courts, and to lawyers. It is 
also through the legal education and training systems which are 'subject to party control', 
that abuses of the legal systems are most evident. Saj6 and Losonci also reveal that 
examination of the 'contents of laws and regulations' under the Communist regime 
illustrate how the law was 'understood and used to control and supervise people who 
would have been otherwise unmotivated to comply . .359 These factors have left a 
distorted and narrowed perspective of what the rule oflaw stands for, and in many cases, 
this is the reason for a lack ofbeliefin it by citizens. 
Despite the perspective of the rule of law in Central and Eastern European 
countries as presented above, the precise meaning of this principle remains open to 
interpretation and 'no single model' exists. 360 Another reason Selznick gives for the 
diversity in Central and East European countries, is the fact that he believes 'the rule of 
law is often identified with that [western] legal culture, and especially with the 
institutions of autonomous law. Yet that is by no means a unanimous view.'361 He 
believes that the principle of the rule of law is based within a western legal culture 
framework that differs from the legal cultures of non-western countries. Selznick does 
state that although it is useful to understand how the rule of law is understood in western 
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countries, the way in which it is understood in non-western countries will differ because 
of differences in legal cultures. 
This is where conceptions developed and held by western countries come into 
consideration. Because in the development of their individual understandings of the rule 
of law, most Central and East European countries are looking to their histories and 
cultures, but also towards countries in the west with whom they have historical and 
cultural ties with. One conception in particular that these countries are examining is the 
conception held by Germany. 
They look towards the understanding of the rule of law held by Germany based 
on historical connections. For example, it has been stated by some writers like Saj6 and 
Lasonci, that the 'German Rechtsstaat tradition played a considerable role in the pre-
Communist legal and political culture of the [East Central European] region. '362 (This 
will be further elaborated on later in this section.) 
However, it is useful to note here, that different versions of the rule of law have 
developed based on the 'conceptual culture' of a country, which in turn rests upon 
'certain historical presuppositions'. These conceptualisations are based on ideas of how 
law and the legal system developed. 363 Each version of the rule of law is the product of 
different sets of experiences, goals, conceptions of how the legal system, is conceived.364 
The next sub-section will examine these claims of historical and goal-oriented reasons, 
and illustrate how individual countries conceptualise the rule of law. 
Individual Perspectives of the Rule of Law 
In evaluating these countries, it has been generally concluded that many of them 
acknowledge the rule of law, but do not actually possess a clear understanding of the 
principle or of its complexity. It is also evident that some countries in the CEE region 
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will conflate the rule of law and ideas of democracy. This point is important as it 
provides a basis for understanding the reasons why some regimes have difficulty in 
dealing with some of the problems that were identified earlier in chapter one. 
Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, there has been acknowledgement by those in government positions, of the 
importance of the rule of law. In fact, like many other countries in the region, Bulgaria 
has shown great interest in reviving historical ideas and ideals. This is because in 
Bulgaria, the 'German judicial system, with its concept of a constitutional state 
(Rechtsstaat), served as a model' for the development of 'Western-style legal institutions 
that were created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries'.365 During this 
period, under the legal system that developed, 'impartiality and equal treatment before 
the law were fundamental ideas'. 366 These ideas and traditions however, were nearly 
erased by the forty-five to fifty years of Communism that came to replace it. 
Because of abuses of the legal system and the judiciary during the Communist 
reign, inevitably there has been 'a serious loss of confidence in both legal institutions and 
the legal system as a whole' in Bulgaria.367 This is clearly illustrated by the lack of 
understanding of the rule of law and the new changes in the legal system, by the average 
Bulgarian citizen. For the average person on the street in Bulgaria, the rule oflaw is not 
something that is really understood, much less something that is felt. 368 One of the 
reasons given for this lack of understanding or belief in the rule oflaw, is the lack of trust 
and faith in the government. A commonly held assumption is that the government and its 
ministries are serving their own interests or the interests of the government, above those 
of the citizens, as it had under the Communist regime. This is founded on the view that 
'those in government were trained by the old system - where the law served their own 
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interests or those of the government.' 369 What this has resulted in, is a lack of respect 
for rules in the country, and this is an important area which needs to be developed if 
Bulgaria is to truly become a country based on the rule oflaw.370 
Other factors which may have considerable influence on the development of a 
better understanding of the rule of law in Bulgaria, is its contacts with and observations 
of other countries. 'Bulgaria is [currently] adopting different aspects from various 
countries, in its development of its legal system. ,:m It has been commented that 
'Bulgarians do not understand the complexity of the rule of law', nor would they separate 
the idea of the rule of law from the idea of democracy. 372 It has been noted also, that 
Bulgaria 'does not understand the complexity of the whole issue [of the rule of law and 
democracy] . . . so sometimes this understanding of the rule of law is narrowed down to 
very simplistic actions.'373 The two ideas (democracy and the rule of law) seem to be 
understood as one and the same in Bulgaria by those in government. The eclectic 
approach the government has undertaken to reform itself, can be attributed to its 
confused understanding of the rule of law, and these reforms will likely also have an 
impact on the development of its further understanding of this important principle. 
Latvia 
Like Bulgaria, the Latvians do not seem to differentiate between the rule of law and 
democracy. 'This may be due to historical or cultural reasons.' It has also been 
attributed to 'the fact that Soviet rule was strong, making the rule of law idea difficult 
especially for Baltic countries, but also has had an influence on the other countries in the 
region.'374 There seems to be, as in Bulgaria, an underdeveloped conception of what this 
principle means and entails, illustrating only a superficial understanding of the rule of law 
to be utilised in reforming institutions and the legal culture in Latvia. Some of this may 
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be attributed to the fact that 'they [Latvians] do not seem to attach great attention to the 
rule of law as they should. '375 They also lack experience with the institutions and 
practices associated with the rule of law, so that attempts to transition to the rule of law 
are impeded by weaknesses in transposing conceptions of the rule of law that may not be 
suited to Latvian culture and the country's current development. 
Estonia 
In contrast to the previous two countries discussed, Estonia seems to exhibit some 
understanding of the differentiation between the rule of law and democracy, in its 
conception of the rule of law principle. This is reflected by the fact that in theory, people 
in Estonia seem 'aware of the rule of law and that it implies democracy - democracy 
implies free elections, which in turn implies freedom of speech and other rights and 
freedoms. '376 The country has also been developing its legal system using Germany as a 
model and participating in a number ofbilateral projects with Germany, in the reform and 
transformation of its governing and legal institutions and practices. Whether these 
connections will prove to be very influential in further developing the Estonian 
understanding of the rule oflaw, remains to be seen. 
Despite general claims that there exists an understanding the rule of law in 
Estonia, there seems to be a lack of connection between the big ideas (linked with the 
Estonian conception of this principle) and the role the rule of law has in the reform and 
development of the country. One of the reasons given for this, has been that 'the average 
citizens' awareness of issues and problems with the rule of law, law and government, are 
low. This is due to their preoccupation with everyday things such as money, jobs, and 
problems with crime (organised crime is high).'377 As will be seen later in the case of 
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Hungary, people seem to recognise the rule of law as important and have an idea of what 
it means and entails, but there is a lack of connection of this principle to their daily lives. 
The Former Czechoslovakia- Present Czech and Slovak Republics 
In the former Czechoslovakia, 'there has been a large degree of consensus among the 
country's politicians, lawmakers, and legal theoreticians as to what constitutes the rule of 
law and what steps should be taken to establish it. '378 According to Pehe, 'the most 
important achievement of the efforts to build a state based on the rule of law', have been 
the conception of a 'clear definition of the proper relationship between the individual and 
the state'. 379 It defines the relationship between the government and individuals, 
whereby the state is no longer superior to the individual, as it once was during the 
communist regime, but stands for equality under the law, generally understood as 'no one 
should be above the law (everyone is subject to it).' 380 The relationship between the 
state and individuals should also be understood as one that assures individuals of 
protection and respect for their rights, and that they shall also be treated fairly in 
accordance to the law. This is illustrated by Czechoslovakia's [prior to its separation] 
emphasis that a state based on the rule of law 'must respect the political will of the 
majority; but it must also ensure that the rights of its minorities are respected. '381 
Czechoslovakian legal theoreticians have stated that beyond this understanding of 
state and individual relations, the 'basic pillars of the state based on the rule of law 
include not merely laws but also an independent judiciary or a system of checks and 
balances between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. t382 Despite such 
statements, and reform efforts to build the country into a state based on the rule of law, 
the concept of the rule of law is still quite fragile. This can be illustrated with examples 
of the reform of the legal system. For instance, Pehe has commented that in the process 
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of "decommunizing" the country's political and economic institutions', 'many leading 
politicians appear willing to sacrifice some basic principles of the rule of law to politically 
motivated retribution. '383 This bending and sacrificing of basic principles has been 
characterised as illustrating Czechoslovakia's 'slightly schizophrenic attitude towards the 
~le of law. '384 
An example of this 'schizophrenic attitude towards the rule of law is reflected in 
the controversy surrounding the screening laws [lustration laws] in Czechoslovakia. The 
screening laws provide for the 'systematic screening of officials in certain government 
agencies and offices and for the subsequent dismissal of those found to have worked for 
the communist secret police or to have been high-ranking communist officials. '385 Pehe 
states that the 'controversy surrounding the screening law shows that in post-communist 
Czechoslovakia, the concepts of justice and the rule of law are still rather fragile. '386 This 
serves to both illustrate and emphasise some of the difficulties Central and Eastern 
European countries are facing, in reconciling attempts to become based on the rule of 
law, with efforts to come to term with their pasts. 
As Vaclav Klaus (then Minister of Finance of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic) explains, it is much easier to 'dismantle explicit socialism' then it is to 
dismantle the 'implicit socialism'.387 This is because the changing and reforming of 
institutions and the governing system is much easier and a quicker than changing the 
patterns of thinking of those who were a part of the society under communist rule.388 
The habits, traditions, values, and beliefs are very different in a communist society as 
compared to a democratic one. It takes time and much support to transform a way of 
life and thinking, that has been ingrained over decades and it will not be an easy or quick 
transformation. This has also been acknowledged by many legal theorists in 
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Czechoslovakia, who state 'that the political system and the political culture of the 
country play crucial roles in introducing and maintaining the rule oflaw."89 
Another point emphasised by Minister Klaus was that for [the then] 
Czechoslovakia, 'one of the main obstacles to our development now is ideological 
infiltration from the West. ' 390 By this comment, Klaus meant that what his country 
needed was not a blueprint from the West with which to replicate, but that it 
[Czechoslovakia] should develop into a democratic state founded on ideas such as the 
rule of law. He emphasised that the country needed to develop and integrate such ideas 
in a manner that is unique, and reflects the unique situation internal to both the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak: Federal Republic. 
Reconciling the internal differences between the two Republics proved to be a 
source of constant conflict until the separation of the country into two separate 
countries. With the separation, differences in perceptions held by each republic have 
become more evident. For instance, in the Czech Republic, there is the 'feeling that [the] 
Czechs are more German than Slav, with its view of laws similar to the Germans. "91 It 
has been acknowledged that it is 'difficult to quantify something like perceptions of the 
rule of law and democracy [in the Czech Republic] because it has to do with changing 
attitudes and culture of the people.' In spite of comments like these, the 'cultural and 
historical links' between the Czech Republic and Germany have probably had some 
impact on how the Czech Republic is conceptualising the rule of law. There has also 
been evidence of the Czech Republic using Germany as one of its models in the reform 
and development of its legal system through EU twinning programmes developed 
between the two countries. However, the Czech Republic has also participated in 
twinning projects with Britain and France, illustrating that it has an interest in some of 
the institutions and procedures used in countries other than Germany.392 Although this 
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does not conclusively illustrate how the Czech Republic is conceptualising of the rule of 
law, it does illustrate that with the reform of its legal system and institutions, it has not 
settled on a single model. In fact, it seems to be taking parts from various systems that 
are compatible to it's own values, legal culture and historical development. 
Slovakia is said to lack an understanding of the differences between the ideas of 
the rule of law and democracy. Its understanding of the rule of law includes 'thinking 
about the judiciary and its proper functioning, as well as respect for the law itself' While 
it understands democracy in terms of 'basis rights and freedom' a democratic system' 
institutional set-up; and checks and balances.'393 One of the reasons behind Slovakia's 
lack of differentiation between the rule of law and democracy has been attributed to its 
experiences of the Communist understanding of the 'rule of law'. Under the former 
regime, the rule of law was manipulated and used to serve the interests of the state and 
governing party. Because of this, as is the case in many other Central and East European 
countries, understanding of the rule of law is vague and confused. There are many 
worries and a lack of understanding of what the concept itself means, by the general 
public.394 
Hungary 
Hungary, like Czechoslovakia, has made great efforts toward establishing itself as a state 
based on the rule oflaw. Whereas [the former] Czechoslovakia considered defining the 
relationship between individuals and the state, as well as the role each has, to be 
important for the rule of law, the Hungarians have taken this a step further. The 
Hungarian government has emphasised the relationship between state and individual by 
stating the importance of civic initiatives and participation in the political process, as well 
as identifying the protection of the individual from the arbitrariness of the state, as a 
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necessity. Discussions of the rule of law have focused on 'protecting the individual 
against the arbitrariness of the state' and statements that "there is a continuing need for 
self-defence against the excessive power of the state. "395 Often mentioned in these 
discussions, are references to "continental law". With these references, Hungarians have 
referred to Germany as an 'example of a state that successfully rebuilt its legal and 
economic system by observing the rules of parliamentary democracy . .3% 
The Hungarian conception of the rule of law has its foundations in the German 
concept of the Rechtsstaat.391 Hungary has taken 'basically a positivist view' of the rule 
of law in that 'the validity of a law is determined by its pedigree . .398 What this view 
implies, is that the validity of a law is not determined by whether it is good or bad, or 
whether it discriminates or not, its validity is based on how it has been enacted. 
Therefore, it does not matter what the laws under the former regime were like, as this 
conception of the rule of law has led the Constitutional Court to argue that 'there was no 
basis for treating the laws of the prior regime any differently than laws of the present 
one. '399 It ruled on this matter in the manner it had, because it believed that 'the certainty 
of the law based on formal and objective principles is more important than necessarily 
partial or subjective justice.' It further stated that 'a state under the rule of law cannot be 
created by undermining the rule of law. '400 The Court made it clear in these statements 
that it felt laws passed were still laws no matter what their effect, and to take the road 
towards disregarding laws that were deemed 'bad', was not only subjective in nature, but 
would undermine the very notion of the rule oflaw. Halmai and Scheppele reiterate this 
when they quote a source from the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The source states 
that, 
[I]n a constitutional state, the violation of rights can only be remedied 
by upholding the rule of law. The legal system of a Rechtsstaat 
cannot deprive anyone of legal guarantees. These guarantees are 
basic rights appertaining to all. Wherever the value of the rule of law 
is entrenched, not even a just demand can justify the disregard of the 
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Rechtsstaat's legal guarantees. Justice and moral argument may, of 
course, motive penal sanction, but its legal foundation must be 
constitutional. 401 
Similar remarks have been made by such writers as Franz Neumann, who 
described the rule of law as " ... law that is not only reliably enforced but also general in 
application, applied uniformly to all cases within its terms. It is, therefore, predictable 
and calculable in its consequences, permitting a sphere of freedom to the citizen. The 
Rule of Law is thus the enemy of particularistic regulation and administrative 
discretion. "402 This is reflected by statements made by sources from Hungarian 
Ministries about the Hungarian conception of the rule of law, where the 'law is not 
judge-made like it is in Britain' where law is based on precedent, because the role of 
judges are to 'apply the law only'. 403 
The understanding of the rule of law by the government and the courts are very 
different from the understanding of the rule of law held by the ordinary citizen. There 
are conflicting reports about what ordinary Hungarian citizens understand of the rule of 
law. For instance, one comment made during an interview with sources from the 
Ministries of Justice and Interior, was that to ordinary citizens, the rule of law meant that 
'their rights are protected by the authorities (administrative authorities, judicial 
authorities, and law enforcement o:fficers).'404 This however, was contradicted by a 
source from the Hungarian National Secretariat, who felt that there was a 'lack of 
understanding ofthe rule of law [amongst the citizenry], reflected in the general public's 
perception of laws and in its use of the judicial system. '405 This perception of laws by 
citizens was reflected in a survey conducted in 1992. In a survey conducted in 1992, 
Hungarian citizens were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following 
statement: 'It is not necessary to obey a law that is unjust.' The results of the survey 
showed that in response to this question, 38% of those surveyed stated complete or 
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somewhat agreement with what the statement said, while 62% surveyed stated some or 
strong disagreement with the statement. 406 As another source in Hungary states, 'there is 
not a culture of following legal rules here [in Hungary]' because 'law has not always 
represented the true reality under the old regime. '407 It can be stated that the legal 
culture in Hungary needs further development if it the rule of law is to take a deep hold 
within the country. 
Poland 
In Poland, the understanding of the rule of law is complex. Its conception of this 
complex principle reflects a 'mix of legal systems of various other countries', foremost, 
but not exclusively, the German and French systems. The Poles in general, have been 
characterised as 'legalistic ... that they like their laws. '408 This is illustrated by the 
country's transformation of its legal system and institutions. 
The transformation and reform of its government institutions and legal 
procedures are representative of some of its positivist inclinations. Some legal positivists 
in Poland believe that 'law cannot be applied retroactively and that the right of 
derogation belongs exclusively to the law-making body and cannot be appropriated 
either by the executive or by the judiciary.'409 It was further illustrated in the decision 
taken by Taseusz Mazowiecki (the first Prime Minister), when Solidarity took control of 
the governing of Poland in September 1989. 'Mazowiecki's government rejected a 
revolutionary approach to systemic change by setting the precedent that the existing 
body of laws, however unjust or imperfect, should be binding in its entirety, pending 
relevant amendments or new legislation.'410 These examples illustrate Poland's positivist 
tendencies with respect to its understanding of the rule oflaw. 
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This tendency is further exhibited in comments about Poland's legal system. It 
has been commented, that Poland subscribes to a 'Continental - European [legal] 
tradition', with respect to issues such as judicial discretion, and that the Polish [legal] 
tradition is not like the American or English traditions, where a judge may create law' 
and where judges have more scope for discretion. 411 
Despite these efforts to understand what the rule of law entails and to transform 
Poland into a state based on the rule of law, one of the main problems with defining and 
understanding this principle here, has been the communist regime's manipulation of the 
concept. The manipulation of the rule of law by the communist regime, in its attempts to 
legitimise itself and appear democratic in the early 1980s, has left a lasting influence on 
perceptions of the rule of law. Its influence was still evident in a survey conducted in 
1992, where individuals in Poland were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statement: 'It is not necessary to obey a law that is unjust.' The responses to 
this question seem to suggest that at the time of the survey, Polish citizens were still 
responding to perceptions of the law, influenced by their understanding of it under the 
Communist regime. Of the respondents, only 57% stated some or strong disagreement 
with the statement, while 43% stated some or complete agreement with the statement 
made. 412 Many citizens remember what the rule of law meant under the communist 
regime, and have a very 'anti-government attitude'. 413 
Section Two - The Establishment and Practice of the Rule of Law 
This section aims to connect the conceptualisations (or weak conceptualisations) 
discussed in the previous section, with the practice and realities of individual countries, 
further illustrating the differences associated with the variation of rule of law conceptions 
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across associated countries from the CEE region. It will survey the situation in a few of 
the Central and European countries, in detail in this section. 
As was mentioned in the previous section, there is no single model of the rule of 
law. This outcome is not surprising, when one considers that among western states 
based upon the rule of law, there are not only differences but also 'much debate as to 
whether specific practices, rules, and institutions further the ideals, or undermine it. '414 
Despite these debates, it is believed that there exist particular 'baselines . . . such as an 
independent judiciary and respect for precedent'. 415 However, debates also exist over 
whether these particular practices and institutions are necessary for the rule of law and 
whether they would be the best method for ensuring the rule of law. This seems to 
illustrate that there is tension and scope for misunderstanding, especially with regard to 
so-called 'baselines'. 
One of the reasons given for these tensions is that 'it is not easy to say which 
practices and institutions are best, from the standpoint of the rule of law.'416 The 
discrepancies identified, over the necessity of particular institutions or practices, and 
whether they assist or undermine the rule of law, have also led to variations in 
understanding what these institutions and practices entail, thereby also causing variation 
in the implementation of such practices, rules, and institutions.417 It is believed that 
'these differences in judgement as to what the rule oflaw requires', 'stem from distinctive 
histories. '418 These discrepancies, to be illustrated here, reflect the lack of awareness or 
understanding of the complex nature of the rule oflaw. 
Hungary 
For example, in Hungary, many legal commentators and experts agree that there exist, 
'the basic conditions necessary for building a state based on the rule of law. o419 One such 
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condition was the separation of powers. The separation of the executive, the legislative, 
and the judicial branches are laid down as a part of the constitutional framework of the 
country and protected by law. Hungary has also emphasised and observes the ideas of 
parliamentary democracy and popular sovereignty, which places emphasis on power of 
the people through elected representatives to limit government power from arbitrary and 
improper use. 420 Another element of the rule of law it considers to be of importance, is 
"the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law", and that law be "predictable 
and calculable in its general consequences" .421 
Some writers such as Pogany have stated that some of the elements of a state 
based on the rule of law existed in Hungary prior to its Communist legal order. Elements 
such as the separation of powers, "predominance of regular law", and the predictability 
of law, were said to have existed in Hungary 'in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and throughout much of the first half of this century' [the twentieth century].422 
However, despite the existence of some of these important elements, the 
Democratic Charter (a civic movement in support of the rule of law in Hungary) 
expressed concern that 'democratic transformation is stagnating in Hungary. ' 423 The 
remedy, they stated 'was to satisfy several major requirements for establishing the rule of 
law. ' 424 One major requirement identified by the Democratic Charter was that 'the 
citizen must not fear the authorities in power. ' 425 Another element important for the 
establishment of the rule of law was to ensure that the independence of the judiciary was 
protected and that the government and political groups should refrain from trying to 
influence it. Other examples of the requirements put forth by the Democratic Charter 
included the rejection of arbitrary laws, and refraining from taking political revenge. 
These requirements were partially covered by the Hungarian government's 
establishment of a Constitutional Court vested with the powers to resolve difficulties and 
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adjudicate over the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislative branch. The 
Hungarian government sees the creation of the Constitutional Court and the powers 
vested in it, evidence of its commitment towards 'contributing to the creation of a state 
build on the rule oflaw'.426 The Hungarian Constitutional Court in turn, has been key to 
the development of building Hungary into a state based on the rule of law. 427 The 
Constitutional Court declared that the state 'does not and cannot have an unrestricted 
right of punishment' in a state based on the rule of law. To do so, would be to go 
against the fundamental ideas of the rule of law, which is to ensure a proper and 
democratic relationship is upheld, between the state and individuals, thereby protecting 
individuals from any coercive and arbitrary actions by the state. 428 This comment was 
made in connection with the need to balance the necessity for a functioning parliamentary 
democracy in Hungary, and the need to come to terms with the injustices of its past. In 
this matter, the Constitutional Court believes that the 'principles of a state founded on the 
rule of law' should take precedence over feelings and demands for 'political justice' to 
right the injustices and wrongs that occurred under the Communist regime. 429 
An example illustrating the Constitutional Court's contribution to defining and 
reinforcing the rule of law and a functioning parliamentary democracy in Hungary, was 
its ruling on the Zetenyi-Takacs law. 430 In the preamble of its decision, the Court 
'defined the principles of a law-based state more thoroughly than ever before, making a 
significant contribution to Hungarian legal thought.'431 The Constitutional Court decided 
that the law 'had violated the principle of legal security, one of the basic tenets of a state 
built on the rule of law.' It decided against the Zetenyi-Takacs law because it believed, 
'that every citizen was entitled to legal protection and that the rule of law could not be 
sacrificed in the interest of political justice.' Because to do so, by 'extending the statute 
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of limitations retroactively', would 'violate the principle of predictability of the state's 
actions. '432 
In its ruling, the court reasoned that a state based on the rule of law 
could be realised only if legislation and the functioning of state 
institutions were in harmony with the constitution and if the culture 
and value system embodied in the constitution permeated the entire 
society. It said that the 'basic guarantees of a state based on the rule 
of law .cannot be put aside on the grounds that a [special] historical 
situation exists.433 
Another example, illustrating the complexity and conflicts between the 
conceptualisation and practice of the rule of law, is in the context of the Hungarian 
Constitution. The Hungarian Constitution itself, in Article 2(1), 'refers to the Hungarian 
Republic as a constitutional Rule-of-Law State'. 434 It has also been stated by writers 
such as Halmai and Scheppele, 'that Hungary is a Rechtsstaat in both statement of fact 
and a statement of policy.' What this meant was that, 
Rechtsstaat becomes a reality when the constitution is truly and 
unconditionally given effect. For the legal system, the "change of 
system" [rends'zervaltas] means . . . that the constitution of the 
Rechtsstaat must be brought into harmony . . . with the whole system 
of laws. Not only must the regulations and the operation of the state 
institutions comport strictly with the constitution, but also the 
constitution's values and its "conceptual culture" must imbue the 
whole of society. This is the rule of law and this is how the 
constitution becomes a reality . . . For the organs of the State, 
participation in this process is a constitutional duty. 435 
Therefore, legislation formed that contradicts any part of the constitution is problematic 
because it undermines the rule of law in Hungary. When this occurs, it is left to the 
Constitutional Court to ensure that a decision is made that does not undermine the 
country's constitution or its basis on the rule oflaw. 
For instance, when the Parliament attempted to enact legislation supporting 
retroactive justice, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in an unanimous decision struck 
it down because 'section one of the law violated the principles of a constitutional rule-of-
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law state Uogallam ]', namely Article 2(1 ). 436 The law regarding retroactive justice in 
Hungary also contradicted Article 57( 4) of the constitution, which states: 'No one shall 
be declared guilty and sentenced for an act which was not a criminal offence under 
Hungarian law at the time when it was committed. '437 This action was in-line with ideas 
and concerns about ensuring the rule of law. The Court decided that it was the correct 
decision to take on the matter, as its job is to ensure laws enacted do not contradict the 
constitution. Because 'from the point of view of a rule of law system . . . utilising the 
constitution to rewrite political agreements is counterproductive to the goal of creating 
respect and belief in constitutionalism' and it undermines the rule of law.438 These 
conflicts within Hungary seem to demonstrate that it is developing and reforming based 
upon an understanding of the rule of law that is unique to it, reflecting its past as well as 
its future goals. 
Poland 
After the collapse of communism in Poland, the country's new leaders accepted the 
principle that the Polish State and all its institutions should be based on the rule of law. 
They enshrined the rule of law principle within Article 1 of the amended Polish 
Constitution of December 1989. In this article it states, 'The Republic of Poland is a 
democratic state based on the rule of law and implementing the principles of social 
justice. ' 439 
Despite this, there exists m Poland contradictions between the ideas behind 
making Poland into a state based on the rule oflaw, and the shape that reforms and laws 
are taking and being used in the name of 'justice'. The discussion of 'lustration laws' or 
accounting for past violations and wrongs, is one of the areas where these contradictions 
are most evident. Poland, like other transition countries, have faced the difficulty in 
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reconciling its understanding and efforts to instil the rule of law principle in the country, 
with its attempts to come to terms with the violations of law and individuals under the 
previous regime. 
On this matter, Poland has 'proceeded in an evolutionary fashion, on the basis of 
the existing legal system, to bring to account only those members of the communist party 
and the former establishment who had violated the laws of the day. '440 This approach 
was undertaken as a way to 'smooth the passage to democratic government. '441 
Unfortunately, this has not been the only method under consideration, as the government 
has also considered 'the possibility of extending the statute of limitations on Stalinist 
crimes, which have already expired. '442 Other ways of coming to terms with the past 
considered in Poland, include the idea of purging governmental institutions and other 
important posts, of Communists or those whom were suspected of having strong links 
with the previous regime. There is the feeling amongst some writers that the 
government's desire to hold former leaders of the communist regime responsible for 
crimes committed under the previous regime, is contradictory to the basic idea of the rule 
oflaw. They consider these types of retaliation to be 'only the violence of the victorious 
against the defeated' and a recycle of the type of methods that were utilised under the 
previous governing system. It goes against the fundamental idea of the rule of law 
concept, as it exhibits once again, the tendency of government to consider itself to be 
above 'valid positive law'. Actions such as these have led to the continued underlying 
feeling that those in power feel that they are exempt from the law and its provisions.443 
However, what these types of ideas for redress have shown is a lack of understanding, 
but more worrying, it illustrates a lack of respect for the law within the country. 
One of the explanations given for these contradictions between conceptions of 
the rule of law and the actions by the Polish government is the one offered by Winicjusz 
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Narojek. Narojek, who writes on the transition of Poland into a democracy, believes that 
the rule of law is important, but that 'the relationship between law and democracy 
extends beyond the concept of the rule of law to legal culture.' 444 He believes that 
without a legal culture based and developed from the rule of law, democracy is difficult 
to achieve. There is a lack of understanding of the laws and regulations that are being 
passed in Poland and of the effects these laws have on the living conditions and changes 
occurring in society. Thus illustrating Narojek's point about the need for the 
development of a legal culture in Poland, in order for the rule of law to become ingrained 
and for democracy to flourish. 
Another area that has been seen as an impediment to the establishment and 
grounding of the rule of law in Poland has been in the reform of the legal structure itself 
It has been alleged that 'the legal infrastructure is not always equal to the demands of 
democratic practice' and that the 'chaotic domestic politics impede legal and institutional 
reform.'445 For example, 'the state's restricted financial, personnel, and administrative 
potential makes it harder still for the rule of law to take permanent root in Polish daily 
life. ' 446 This is partly due to the fact that several institutions for the controlling the state 
administration and for protecting the rule of law were created under communist rule in 
the 1980's to give the government the appearance of having in place democratic 
safeguards. Such problems illustrate and raise questions regarding the concept of the 
rule of law and how this concept is being used in the restructuring of former communist-
run countries. Although having particular structures associated with the former 
communist government does present problems for the newly established government and 
for the rule of law concept taking permanent root in Poland, more problematic has been 
the change of laws created under the communists. The problems here have the potential 
for undermining 'perceptions of justice and the rule of law' in Poland. 447 
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However, the government has taken steps to further become a state based on the 
rule of law, through the creation of a special commission within the Legislative Council. 
The special commission has identified three criteria for the evaluation of legislation, so to 
ensure that it supports a state based on the rule of law. The three criteria are: 'a) 
provisions that served to strengthen the foundations of the democratic state based on the 
rule of law; b) provisions essential to the functioning of a free market economy; and c) 
provisions that brought Poland's legislation in line with European standards and 
conventions and treaties already ratified by Poland. '448 
Other groups internal to the country have also made moves to assist Poland in 
realising its goal of becoming a state based on the rule of law. One such group is the 
press in Poland. Poland's uncensored press have contributed to public awareness of the 
rule of law concept through discussions and articles describing both what the rule of law 
entails and how the previous communist government had violated both Polish and 
international laws related to the concept ofthe rule oflaw. 
Despite these efforts and the reforms taking place to establish Poland as a state 
based on the rule of law, there are still many criticisms of Poland's ability to establish a 
democratic system that is based on the rule of law. Many of these criticisms have been 
based on the fact that there are differences in the ways and means of implementing the 
rule oflaw concept on a day-to-day basis that seem to defy what the principle stands for. 
For Poland, this illustrates the inconsistencies in its understanding of the rule of law 
(which is by Western standards, underdeveloped). These inconsistencies also remain one 
of its main challenges in developing into a state based on the rule oflaw. 
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The Slovak Republic 
The transformations taking place in Slovakia, 'has been characterised by many signs of 
open and conspicuous irregularities'. This is because the 'distinction of political struggles 
under constitutional rules and disputes about such rules - is not safely guaranteed where, 
as has been claimed with respect to Slovakia, "the evaluation of almost any political 
proposal for 'constitutionality' or 'unconstitutionality' has become part and parcel of 
everyday public discourse" .'449 An example illustrating this in Slovakia, has been 
described by some writers such Miroslav Kusy, as the main struggle in the country. This 
struggle is 'between supporters of an authoritarian and a democratic regime', represented 
by the government coalition's 'repression and abandonment of democratic principles, and 
the opposition, who are struggling for the 'maintenance and development' of democratic 
principles in Slovakia. 450 
The struggle between the two opposing groups was evident in many of the 
actions taken to resolve disputes. Kusy describes the coalition as using 'all means at its 
disposal to achieve its interests', using and abusing 'institutional means at its disposal and 
gradually transformed [this] political battle onto the level of an institutional crisis.'451 
This institutional crisis in Slovakia has triggered worries within and outside of the 
country, about whether the rule of law existed in the country. There are examples that 
Slovakia is suffering from institutional difficulties, but these examples also illustrate the 
lack of respect for the rule of law by the government coalition. An example of lack of 
respect for the rule oflaw is illustrated by 'the Government's refusal to make nominations 
for the appointment of certain judges, in spite the fact that it is its constitutional duty'. 452 
This illustrated the government's lack of respect for the country's constitution and 
constitutional provisions, causing difficulties within the judicial system, but more 
generally, showing that respect for and upholding the rule oflaw was not a priority. 
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It was further exemplified by an action taken by the Slovakian Ministry of 
Education, with regard to the Hungarian minority within the country. The Ministry of 
Education decided to reverse a practice in place since 1921, which provided bilingual 
school records in Slovakia, for Hungarian pupils, ordering all school records in Slovak 
only.453 This decision shows a disregard for the minority population of the country, 
along with providing an example of arbitrary changes to legislation and practices in 
Slovakia. It showed not only that the government's action went against the will of the 
people (illustrated in the number of petitions and protests that occurred), but also how it 
has gone against the rule of law. The government's actions in these two examples 
demonstrated its disregard for the rule of law and the 'erosion of constitutionalism' and 
'the disregard of public interest in favour of political and personal interests'. 454 
Another example that further depicted its lack of regard and support for 
developing the country to be based on the rule of law, was the dispute about the 
referendum in May 1997. This referendum contained questions concerning integration of 
the country into NATO and about 'the possibility ofthe deployment of nuclear weapons 
and military bases on Slovak territory', and the 'direct popular election of the 
president'. 455 What occurred during the referendum has been referred to by journalists 
inside and outside the country as the end of democracy for Slovakia; 'Slovakia crossed 
the border dividing democratic and undemocratic countries'. These remarks were made 
in response to the fact that the 'government intervened unconstitutionally in to the 
organisation of the referendum and ordered the Minster of Interior . . . to withdraw the 
fourth questions from the ballot. '456 Amidst the confusion and accusations about 
unconstitutional intervention into the process by the government, only ten percent of 
eligible voters participated in the referendum, which the Supreme Referendum 
Commission then declared void. 457 The entire referendum was viewed by many both 
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inside Slovakia and in the international community, as a shamble and concern was 
expressed about the events that had taken place. The European Union expressed its 
concern about the incident and 'asked the Slovak government to respect the rule of law 
and principles fundamental for the stability of democratic society. '458 
These events and incidents that occurred in Slovakia since 1997 have sparked 
worries about whether the rule of law exists in Slovakia. However, what must also be 
contemplated, is not only the functioning and support for the rule of law within the 
country, but also whether Slovakia's current practices perhaps reflects its understanding 
or incomplete understanding of what the rule of law means and entails. The events may 
be a flaunting of the practices associated and necessary for the establishment of this 
important principle. At the same time, the Slovakian government's actions seem to also 
reflect its confused understanding of what is important regarding the rule of law and 
illustrates that "the rule of law and democracy do not seem to be deeply rooted enough 
in Slovakia. "459 
This has also been illustrated in the conflict between the courts and the 
government's idea of democracy. The courts and especially Constitutional Courts in the 
region are seen as the protectors of individual rights, and as establishers of the rule of 
law. In Slovakia, the courts, especially the Constitutional Court, have been making 
efforts to develop the process of judicial review to ensure that legislation created is in 
accordance with the country's constitution, and that the various branches of government 
do not overstep their jurisdictions and powers. However, judicial review is something 
not previously a part of the governing systems in the region, and there is wide criticism 
of and scepticism about the process. Judicial review is considered by many to be 
undemocratic along classical understandings, where democracy is understood as 
representation through parliaments of the 'popular interests' of the people. So many 
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politicians in the region, including Slovakia, have made 'frequent attempts to attack 
uncooperative judges and to limit the courts' authority'. 460 This is relevant, as it was one 
of the unresolved issues that was identified in Chapter One's discussion of judicial 
independence and authority461 . One example ofthis power struggle has been the conflict 
between then Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the Slovakian Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court 'frequently stymied Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's efforts to 
run roughshod over the country's constitution in his campaign to enhance his control 
over the government. '462 In retaliation, Meciar attempted to frequently discredit the 
Constitutional Court by calling it the 'ailing element' of the country's political system. 
Meciar went as far as proposing a change in the procedures for the Court to be able to 
void an act of Parliament. This was not passed, but had it been, it would have greatly 
reduced and limited the powers of the Court to 'curtail parliamentary infringement of the 
Constitution. '463 
What the examples above have illustrated clearly, is that the establishment and 
nurturing of the rule of law in Slovakia needs much work. The difficulties identified 
above reflect the problems regimes face in their transition to the rule of law. Problems 
have been attributed to the country's lack of direction and are impeded by the weakness 
or lack of a rule of law tradition. This need for more development of a rule of law 
tradition is one identified by the European Union. In a statement made by the then 
European Union commissioner for external relations, Hans van den Broek, stated that 
'The Union expects: " ... clear signals from the Slovak Government about its intentions to 
support the rule of law and democratic process in this country, after which necessary 
practical steps will follow ... " '464 
In more recent reviews, Slovakia has made changes and democracy is considered 
to have been consolidated within the country, according to the European Union 
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Commission. However, it was also commented that the country has been 'slow on 
reform of [the] judiciary'. 465 This gradual reform of the judiciary hinders the further 
establishment of the rule of law in Slovakia, as the judiciary has been identified by many 
writers and commentators on the region, as one of the most important institutions for 
establishing a state based on the rule of law in action. 
All of the conflicts cited above have demonstrated that Slovakia seems to have an 
underdeveloped understanding of the rule of law and what is important for ensuring that 
the country is based upon it. It looks to be attempting to develop a conceptualisation of 
the rule of law that reflects its national differences and its past. However, this looks to 
be in conflict with other ideas infiltrating the country, of what is necessary for the rule of 
law to become developed and established in Slovakia. 
Bulgaria 
It has been stated the previously that Bulgaria seems to understand that the rule of law is 
an important part of a democratic state, although it does not necessarily understand what 
the rule of law or democracy really are. This has therefore led to a tendency in Bulgaria, 
to conflate the two concepts into one idea. This has been especially prevalent amongst 
the citizenry ofthe country, who have had 'no experience that another system may work' 
and much of their worries are focused not on whether Bulgaria is based on the rule of 
law, but on their survival and support for their families. 466 However, this tendency to 
conflate the two ideas is not limited only to the citizenry, as government officials and 
those within the judicial system have also exhibited this tendency. 
Much of the Bulgarian strategy for reforming institutions, especially within its 
legal system, as previously discussed, has consisted of transposing certain institutions and 
procedures from various countries. At the beginning, the Bulgarians were more 
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concerned with the adoption of democratic institutions and practices without deep 
understanding of how to use them or its compatibility with Bulgarian ideas. This has 
begun to change, with Bulgaria now comparing the 'actual advantages of various 
systems', so as to determine which institutions and practices from different countries 
would be best suited to its own development. This may have the affect of producing a 
complex and confused understanding of what the rule of law means, as different 
countries have developed particular institutions based upon their own conceptualisations 
of different values and ideals, such as the rule oflaw. 
For instance, in its legal reform efforts, Bulgaria has copied ideas about the 
'organisation of the police from Germany', its penal code has taken particular ideas from 
the French system, and this has been mixed with ideas on constitutional courts and 
procedures taken from Britain. Bulgaria has also borrowed ideas about its judicial 
system from the French and Belgians, 'models to human rights and social minority 
questions' from Northern Europe/Scandinavia, it has looked to Portugal, based on the 
'size of the country' in relation to itsel£467 
However, the practice of transposing institutions and structures from other 
countries, has also caused it some difficulties, especially in the judicial system. It has 
some of the institutions and procedures of a proper judicial system based upon the rule of 
law in place, but it does not have the legal culture or the values important for instilling 
and establishing the principle into the country's culture. There have been a number of 
reports about the Bulgarian judicial system and how it is weak and emphasis on the fact 
that it needs strengthening. 468 It has also been commented that in Bulgaria, 'continued 
attention also needs to be paid to respect for the rule of law at all levels of the 
administration and by the law enforcement bodies. '469 
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These practices and comments illustrate that for Bulgaria, the rule of law has 
been associated with particular institutions, structures and practices. Whilst it has also 
reflected Bulgaria's desire to develop in a manner that is consistent with and takes into 
account its culture, history and goals. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated both the variation in understandings held, and variation in the 
application of these understandings of the rule of law in practice, by Central and East 
European countries applying for European Union membership. Many of the countries in 
the region have in general, taken on a German Rechtsstaat understanding of the rule of 
law, but one that is open to variation and slight discrepancies as there is a lack of 
understanding of the complex nature ofthe rule oflaw. 
There is the speculation that in the rush to become based on the rule oflaw, many 
Central and Eastern European countries have taken actions that undermine and impede, 
rather than establish and ensure the rule of law is instilled. This seems to reflect the 
challenges and difficulties these countries are facing as they come to term with this 
complex principle. Their understanding of the rule of law diverge from western 
conceptualisations based on individual circumstances and attempts to balance the clash of 
interests it brings to surface. 470 Many writers and policy-makers believe the transitions 
are happening too quickly and that the 'historically best, yet no longer available, path to 
democracy has been both gradual and linked to the emergence of fitting socio-economic 
and cultural conditions. '471 They believe that the rates of the transformations are 
potentially harmful for the development and establishment important principles like the 
rule of law in these countries. It has also been stated that it is 'difficult for an outsider to 
understand the history, culture, system which these people in Central and Eastern 
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European countries, lived in [under authoritarian rule]. '472 However, these are important 
areas to understand, as they affect the conceptualisation and establishment of the rule of 
law in these countries. 
The development of CEE conceptualisations of the rule of law can be attributed 
to several things. Firstly, it has been ascribed to the mixture of a desire to return to the 
'Golden Age' before Communism in some of these countries, and the influence of its 
historical connections to particular EU member states. Another reason give by writers 
such as Alexander Smolar, has been the problem of balancing the need for a strong 
leader to push the transition process along and ideas of a limited role for government 
under the rule of law. He states that there are 'contradictions between the limited role 
that states will have and should have in the future and the kinds of tasks and obligations 
states are forced to take on now. ' 473 This is especially emphasised within countries in 
transition. Because transition and reforms means that new governments are placed in the 
position where there are wielding enormous powers in order to make substantial changes 
in a shortened time period, this is not the role that is envisioned for them in the future. 
The expectation is that in a country based on the rule of law, the state will have a much 
more limited role than the one it currently has, in order to develop and support an active 
civil society. 
Another factor to be considered, is how different countries are dealing with their 
pasts, especially with the recent past under Communism. One of the major problems 
cited in the CEE countries has been the contradiction between the countries' desire to 
become based on the rule of law, and its handling of those who were apart of the former 
regime. The passing of lustration laws in the region has been seen as a 'major blow to 
the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] principle'. 474 This factor combined with the 'lack of [a] 
constitutional legal culture', and the influences of having lived under Communist rule for 
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so many years, have made understanding, much less establishing the rule of law a 
difficulty for the majority of the countries. 475 
What this chapter has identified is the existence of different conceptualisations of 
the rule of law, which have led to differentiation in establishing what is important or 
necessary for the rule of law. This variation is something that the European Union has 
expressed its encouragement for in Central and Eastern Europe, for several reasons, as 
discussed previously in chapter two. Most prominently, this perspective serves its [the 
EU's] own purpose of maintaining the status quo in the Community, as there are 
variations in conceptualisations of the rule of law, as well as differentiation in the 
establishment of this principle in practice. It has done so despite evidence that such 
variations have already caused some difficulties and problems within the Community of 
fifteen states, regarding integration and development of the Community. This lack of 
uniformity will have an impact on the effectiveness of the European Union in the future, 
and will dramatically effect its progress towards further integration of the Community. 
As will be further examined in the next chapter (chapter four), the rule of law is 
stated to be an important principle in the future enlargements of the European Union, as 
stated in the Copenhagen criteria. However, the lack of a uniform conception or 
definition of the rule of law by the Community, whilst preserving the status quo and 
necessitating little change by current member states, is problematic for future 
enlargements and further integration of the Community. There is the potential for further 
problems with regard to the legal and judicial spheres of both the Community and 
individual member states, as the boundaries between national and supranational 
competencies become more regularly in conflict. 
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Chapter Four: The Rule of Law and Enlargement of the EU 
Chapter Four brings together some of the points developed in the previous two chapters, 
to focus on the rule of law and identify its role in the enlargement of the European Union 
eastwards. The first section of this chapter reviews previous enlargements, identifying 
the legal basis and the role of the rule of law, if any, in these enlargements of the 
European Union. The second section examines the role of the rule of law within the 
current enlargement process, as a requirement for accession into the Union. It will 
identify some of the reasons for the EU's emphasis of this particular principle, as well as 
how commitment to it is measured and assessed. Lastly, the chapter reviews the 
importance of the rule of law and some of the problems associated with this principle, 
with regard to enlarging the EU. It returns to the issue of uniformity (previously 
discussed in Chapter Two, Section Three). This last section examines how the lack of a 
uniform conception of the rule of law across the Community and prospective member 
states, conflicts with the Community's emphasis on the rule oflaw. 
As previously discussed in Chapter Two, there exists across the European Union, 
a variety ofunderstandings ofthe rule of In Chapter Two, a comparison of the variation 
of understandings based on historical and cultural differences were made. This chapter 
also reviewed various documents that were identified as containing the term 'rule of law', 
proclaiming it to be a principle to be 'safeguarded'476, and upon which the Community is 
based. 477 The rule of law has been identified by the various EU institutions (The Council 
of Europe, the European Parliament, and the Commission), as a fundamental principle 
for 'any sustainable, socially fair and environmentally sound economic development. t478 
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Section One - Rule of Law and Previous Enlargements 
The rule of law is a prominent criterion of the current enlargement process, but what role 
has this principle played in previous enlargements of the European Union? In previous 
enlargements of the Community (prior to the current enlargement to include Central and 
Eastern European countries), the 'legal basis for the process of enlargement was 
originally Article 237 of the Treaty ofRome (1957).'479 It stated that, 
Any European State may apply to become a member of the 
Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which 
shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty 
necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the 
Member States and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be 
submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements. 480 
This legal basis provided the Community with a structure for applications for 
membership, but it provided no definition for the term 'European' upon which a state 
applying for membership was judged eligible or not. 
The original legal basis for enlarging the Community was superseded in 1992 by 
Article 0 of the Treaty on European Union 481 and paragraph one of Article 23 7 of the 
EEC Treaty482 was replaced by Article 8 of the Single European Act (SEA). This 
replacement stated that: 
Any European State may apply to become a member of the 
Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the 
assent of the European Parliament, which shall act as by an absolute 
. . f" b 483 maJonty o Its component mem ers. 
Despite the changes in these articles, much of it 'has remained virtually unchanged over 
the years'484, making no mention of the rule of law with regard to enlargement and the 
• 485 
accessiOn process. 
163 
The documentation on enlargement to include Greece, Portugal and Spain486 
illustrates the beginnings of discussions on formalising the enlargement process beyond 
the generalised criteria and steps developed through common practice and various 
treaties over the past decades. However, there was no mention of the rule of law during 
these accession negotiations. With the most recent enlargement of the EU, Austria, 
Sweden and Finland acceded into the Community. Conditions and criteria for 
membership met by these three countries included Article 23 7 of the Rome Treaty and 
Article 0 of the Maastricht Treaty, which stated that 'any European state may apply to 
become a member'. 487 The European Union does not specifically or officially define what 
it means by the term 'European', but it does combine 'geographical, historical and cultural 
elements which all contribute to the European identity' in its assessments. It determines 
eligibility by reviewing applicants on these three areas, taking into account 'shared 
experience of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction'.488 Because of the 
difficulty in devising a 'simple formula' based on these criteria, the Commission has stated 
that 'it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European 
Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come.'489 Other essential 
conditions are outlined in Article F of the Maastricht Treaty. Here it states that 
membership into the Union will be based on exhibiting establishment for 'principles of 
democracy and respect of fundamental human rights', thereby satisfying the 'three basic 
conditions ofEuropean Identity, democratic status, and respect of human rights.'490 
Therefore, the Community, whilst working towards a more formalised strategy of 
enlarging itself, has steered away from further defining parameters of eligibility and 
listing an detailed set of procedures for meeting cited conditions and criteria for 
membership. It was not until the 1993 Copenhagen European Council meeting that the 
Community began to further outline conditions and criteria necessary for accession into 
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the Union. But with these developments, the Community has still maintained its stance 
of providing guidance without detailing all procedures for membership. Instead, it 
provides criteria for which prospective member states are to develop or transform 
themselves to meet, with prospective member states determining how to implement and 
meet the set of criteria. 
With each enlargement, the evolution of Community ideas about enlargement and 
membership become more defined, although still vague. For example, the Commission 
stated in its opinion of the Portuguese application for membership, that the 'Treaties of 
Rome and Paris signify the clear intention that other European States sharing the 
democratic ideal of the European Community's member states should be able to accede 
to the Community.'491 Within the growing number of documents and treaty articles 
governing the enlargement of the European Union, there were vague terms used to 
narrow acceptance or rejection for membership, but the rule of law was not cited as a 
criteria or required as a part of this process. 
Section Two - Current Enlargement Plans and the Rule of Law 
Within the current enlargement, the rule of law has become a prominent part of the 
process. The rule of law was mentioned in earlier EU documentation as a principle to be 
safeguarded along with principles of representative democracy. 492 It was then with 
Article F.2 ofthe EU Treaty493 (entered into force on 1 November 1993) that respect for 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law were for the very first time, made 
'essential elements for EU membership and guiding principles of its activities. o494 
Subsequently, at the European Council meeting in 1993 at Copenhagen, the Council 
stipulated that countries seeking membership must meet a range of criteria, including: 
'stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
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and protection of minorities. '495 It was with this European Council meeting m 
Copenhagen that the rule of law principle was explicitly cited as a requirement for EU 
membership.496 This was a significant change for the Community, as it is with the 
Copenhagen criteria that the 'first clear rules for membership of the EU are cited. 497 The 
Copenhagen criteria makes explicit the 'economic and political preconditions for 
membership, but fall short of setting out a detailed check list or objective yardstick. o498 
As a criteria for membership, the rule of law has been explicitly quoted in Community 
documentation, under the political aspects which focused on: 'the stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities'. 499 It was also included in a more recent document, the Council's resolution on 
human rights, democracy and development, which 'underlined its [the Community's] 
attachment' to particular principles, including the rule oflaw.500 
One of the main reasons for inclusion of the rule of law as a requirement for 
membership with the current enlargement plans, is because it is considered important and 
necessary for the formation and support of an 'autonomous civil and political society' in 
transition countries, especially those who were formerly governed by an authoritarian 
government. 501 This is based upon the notion that only when a government and its 
institutions are effectively held accountable to the rule of law that protects individual 
:freedoms and rights, and the necessary conditions for the development of a free and 
active civil society exists, that democracy can become a possibility.502 The decision to 
include the rule of law in documentation covering enlargement and respect for 
democratic principles and human rights was 'aimed at giving the EU a more uniform and 
coherent approach to human rights and democratic principles. '503 The rule of law was 
also included because it was expected that 'the foundations for a broader Community' 
including current member states and prospective member states, would be based upon 
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this important principle. 504 The Community and the European Parliament explicitly stated 
that 'an efficient and trustworthy public administration is a vital element in preparations 
for EU membership to strengthen the rule oflaw and economic and social cohesion.'505 
These above ideas illustrate that the rule of law has been held to be of great 
importance and has been identified by the various EU institutions as a fundamental 
principle for 'any sustainable, socially fair and environmentally sound economic 
development. '506 It has been mentioned within EU documents, in the same breath as 
development of 'a pluralist and democratic civil society', as a principle that 'aids in the 
set-up of guidelines, procedures, and practical measures aimed at promoting civil and 
political freedoms alongside economic and social rights, by means of a representative 
political system based on respect for human rights. ' 507 With this in mind, the 
establishment of the rule of law in transition countries helps to ensure the establishment 
of the 'supremacy of the law, judicial independence, the transparency of decision-making 
processes and the adoption of a legal order offering adequate legal guarantees for the 
respect of citizens' rights. ' 508 These features are important not only for the development 
of democracy, but together with a representative democratic government, the 'most 
secure framework for economic efficiency and political power. ' 509 Because of this 
perception of the rule of law, it has been identified as a fundamental principle for those 
countries in transition who are applying for EU membership in the future. 
The importance of the rule of law to the EU is evident in various Community 
documents. The European Union institutions have given their views and opinions on the 
role the rule of law principle is to play in consideration of new member states, through 
treaties, regulations, and Community communications and documents relating to the 
topic of enlargement eastwards. The rule of law has also played a role in the assessment 
of individual applicants, taking account of their institutional structures and operations. 
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Evaluation and determination of whether a country supports and is based upon the rule 
of law is made by the Commission with consultation of the Council and the Parliament, 
because this principle has been explicitly cited in what has become known as the 
'Copenhagen criteria'. 510 The criteria state particular conditions that prospective member 
state countries need to meet, if they are to be considered for membership to the 
European Union. These conditions include: 
- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
- the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability 
to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Union; 
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 511 
These criteria and conditions developed at the European Council meeting formed part of 
the European Parliament's resolution on enlargement. During consultation on the 
enlargement strategy from the Commission, the Parliament identified and stated that it 
expects that an enlarged Union will be based on the rule of law and democracy, because 
this principle was important for the protection of individual rights and freedoms. All 
three institutions have maintained that this has been and should continue to be, the 
overall goal of the Union and one which needs to be made clear to applicant countries, 
because the Community would be unwilling to let any country who was not committed 
to these ideas, to become a member state of the EU. This resolution and other 
conditions have been detailed in documents such as, a) the European Parliament's 
Resolutions on Enlargement (9.12.1997), b) in the Accession Partnerships (27.3.1998) as 
decided by the Commission after consultation with the European Council, c) the Regular 
Reports From the Commission on Associated Countries' Progress Towards Accession 
(1998, 1999, 2000), and d) the Agenda 2000 documents (the Commission's opinions of 
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individual applicants). These documents have identified 'priority areas' and medium and 
short-range goals for each individual applicant for EU membership. 
For example, in the Agenda 2000 documents, the Commission gave its opinions 
on individual applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Within its opinions, 
under the section on membership criteria, the Commission analysed the then current 
situation in each applicant country, reviewing the reform of institutions and the 
governing system, as a gauge of the country's commitment to ideas of the rule of law and 
democracy. This reflected the EU's entire enlargement strategy and its belief 'that the 
length of, and rate of progress in, negotiations could vary from country to country in 
terms of the ability to adopt the acquis communautaire, ... and equip themselves with 
stable institutions which respect the rule of law'.512 The Commission was looking for 
changes to political institutions, as well as looking for signs of commitment by officials in 
the applicant countries towards continuing and furthering political, as well as economic 
reforms. This investigated whether institutions (such as the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches) were functioning correctly and were 'mindful of the limits of their 
competence and willing to co-operate with each other. '513 For example, the 
Community's enlargement strategy and the Commission's assessment take into account 
judicial independence. This is one area examined with regard to membership criteria, 
because as has been noted by the European Parliament, 'the independence of the judiciary 
is one of the pillars upholding the rule of law and [is] fundamental to the effective 
protection of rights and civil liberties of all'. 514 In assessing whether the rule of law is 
operational in a country, the Commission has taken into account and examined, the 'main 
ways in which public authorities in each of the candidate countries are organised and 
operate, and the steps they have taken to protect fundamental rights. ' 515 In its 
assessment and examination of a country, the Commission and other EU institutions have 
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taken into account how countries are governed at the time of assessment, although any 
stated intentions to reform particular areas are also taken into consideration. 
However, reviews of prospective member states by the Commission went deeper 
than just investigating 'surface' observable changes.516 The Commission was more 
interested in determining how the rule of law was operating in practice.517 For example, 
in its opinions on Bulgaria, it stated that Bulgaria had adopted 'democratic institutions 
whose security seemed secure'. 518 Bulgaria believed it demonstrated its democratic 
stability through its holding of free elections in both 1994 and 1997. Despite this and 
other examples ofBulgaria's commitment to reforming itself to become more democratic 
and based on the rule of law, the Commission still felt that the stability of Bulgaria's 
democratic institutions 'need to be reinforced by fuller respect in practice for the rule of 
law'. 519 What this alludes to is the fact that on paper and as government policy, the 
country believes in the importance of the rule of law. However, what the EU is looking 
for with regard to the rule of law, is the actual practice and operation of institutions 
showing respect and support for this principle in everyday life. The EU feels that this is 
important for Bulgaria, but also for other countries in the region, because within the 
developing system of government, there are problems (founded and unfounded) with 
those associated with or trained under the previous regime, who once used law to serve 
their own interests or those of the governing regime. 520 
Another example cited in an interview with a source from the Commission, 
focused on corruption in Bulgaria. This source believed that the country needed to 
continue to work towards stamping out the wide-spread corruption within its system. 
There needed to be the creation of an 'atmosphere where people believe and understand 
the meaning of contractual agreements'. The creation of an atmosphere which respects 
the rule of law, would counter the way in which 'corruption undermines civil society' and 
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would encourage wider respect for rules by the people, thereby reinforcing fuller respect 
for the rule of law. 521 This reiterates the point made by the Commission in its November 
1998 report on Bulgaria, where it concluded that while Bulgaria has met the Copenhagen 
political criteria, 'continuing efforts were needed in the fight against corruption and to 
reform the judiciary. '522 It further added that 'progress in the fight against corruption' had 
been made and needed to be continued. The Commission, in its Report on Bulgaria, re-
emphasised that 'continued attention also needs to be paid to respect for the rule of law 
at all levels of the administration and by the law enforcement bodies. '523 
Another example focused on Bulgaria's administrative capacity. It was reiterated 
that although Bulgaria has democratic institutions in place, it must move towards the 
next level and it needs a well-functioning public administration for economic and political 
structural reasons, and development of civil society. 524 For instance, Bulgaria has 
adopted a new legal framework, but this needs proper implementation and further reform 
of the judicial system. 525 This and numerous other examples could be called upon to 
further illustrate that although Bulgaria (like other Central and East European countries) 
have made much progress in adopting democratic institutions and practices, the much 
more difficult task of reforming existing institutions, procedures and societal values, still 
remrun. 
Bulgaria is not alone in its need to improve upon the efforts it has already made 
towards ensuring the rule of law becomes a fundamental basis of the country. What 
Bulgaria's situation illustrates, is that while the rule of law has been identified as an 
important principle for EU membership, many CEEC governments and especially their 
citizens, do not wholly understand or fully comprehend the complexity of this principle 
and how it affects them. The lack of democratic values and practices whilst under the 
Soviet Union, have made it a challenge for such as fundamental principle like the rule of 
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law to become quickly instilled within the cultures and societies of these prospective EU 
member states. 526 
The Commission's fundamental concern has been with the operation and use of 
the rule of law in prospective member countries. Throughout its investigation and 
assessment of prospective member states, the Commission has not concerned itself with a 
'formal description' of the rule of law, but rather has chosen to focus on assessing the 
extent to which the rule of law is supported, implemented and aiding in the proper 
functioning of institutions and procedures within prospective member countries. 527 It is 
the actual operation of the rule of law in prospective member states that is of major 
concern and focus to the European Union, rather than observance of a particular 
conception of this principle or a formal declaration to be based on the concept. 
An examination of the Commission's opinion of Estonia, illustrates its concern 
with the actual functioning of institutions based on the rule of law and not only with the 
manner in which Estonia is conceiving or understanding the rule of law. In its opinion of 
Estonia in meeting the political criteria for membership, the Commission stated that there 
existed respect by Estonia's political institutions, for the limits of each institution's 
sphere of responsibilities and duties. There also existed co-operation between the 
political institutions, especially in the fight against corruption, which the Commission has 
acknowledged as being at an acceptable level, but which needs to be intensified and 
sustained. 528 It is important to the EU that in addition to correctly functioning 
institutions co-operating and working within their sufficient means, these institutions in 
supporting and being based on the rule of law should be protecting the interests and 
freedoms of individuals from coercive and discriminatory actions. 
The point raised above regarding the Commission, and those to follow regarding 
the European Parliament's stance on defining the rule of law, although a common point 
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between the two institutions illustrates the lack of uniformity in implementation and 
application of the rule of law within the European Union. More importantly, it 
exemplifies the reason why concern and focus on implementation only, itself lacks 
uniformity. This is because the scope for understanding what the rule of law means is 
unlimited, thereby allowing for variation in implementation and application of this 
principle as a criterion of the enlargement process. 
The European Parliament, much like the Commission, has concerned itself more 
with the use and implementation of the rule of law rather than with defining the rule of 
law as a concept. The Parliament has chosen to use the term 'the rule of law' without 
subscribing to or attaching a particular meaning to the term. It has instead chosen to use 
the term loosely, as a founding principle upon which institutions and the political 
infrastructure of an applicant country must not only rest upon, but also support and 
further develop. Despite use of the term without a formal or explicit definition, the 
manner in which the term is used implies particular features identifying it as a 
'fundamental principle of any democratic system seeking to foster and promote rights, 
whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural. '529 This implies that there is a 
'means of recourse enabling individual citizens to defend their rights'; that there are 
'limitations on the power of the State' through 'a representative government drawing its 
authority from the sovereignty ofthe people'; and that it 'shapes the structure of the State 
and the prerogatives of the various powers. '530 The rule of law, as envisaged by the 
European Commission, revolves around the implementation and actual use of the 
principle in practice, rather than with defining this principle and producing detailed 
prescriptions for it. 
An example of this was the European Parliament's utilisation of the term 'rule of 
law', when it stated that it 'believes that an efficient and trustworthy public 
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administration is a vital element in preparations for EU membership to strengthen the 
rule of law and economic and social cohesion'. 531 It has also noted that 'the 
independence of the judiciary is one of the pillars upholding the rule of law and 
fundamental to the effective protection of the rights and civil liberties of all'. 532 While it 
has made remarks in relation to the rule of law, these remarks have not described what 
the European Parliament means by the term, but rather it has declared that it is necessary 
for applicant countries to develop stable institutions that respect and strengthen the rule 
of law concept. The Parliament's reference to the term 'rule of law', reflects its 
understanding of this concept, as relating to the development and support for an 
independent judiciary, the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals, and a 
trustworthy and transparent public administration. Like the Commission, the European 
Parliament, through its EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary Committee, has also cited 
amongst other areas for continued improvements: 'efforts to fight corruption, and 
improving institutional capacity, particularly by strengthening the judiciary.'533 
Similarly, the Council has concerned itself with operation and implementation of 
the rule of law, in its proposal 'on the development and consolidation of democracy and 
the rule of law and respect for human rights' stated that the 'Community shall in 
particular support operations aimed at: 
c) promoting or strengthening the rule of law, notably through 
measures to uphold the independence of the judiciary and strengthen 
it (the administration of justice, treatment of offenders, crime 
prevention) and for the activities of parliaments and other 
democratically elected institutions; supporting institutional and 
legislative reform534 
What this section has illustrated is that the European Union institutions have stated that 
the rule of law is a necessary and fundamental principle for the development of 
democracy and ensuring protection for individual rights. Whilst citing the rule of law as 
a requirement for EU membership, it has at the same time, side-stepped and seems to 
174 
have decided that it is unnecessary to define what it actually means by its use of the term 
'rule of law'. This has problematic implications, as there are, as seen in Chapter Two, 
different conceptions of the rule of law in use across the current Community of fifteen 
member states, and this Community will possibly increasing its size by another twelve in 
the future. These developing and potential problems and disturbances to an enlarged 
Community without a common conception of a founding principle will be explored in the 
next section. 
Section Three- Discrepancies and a Return to the Idea of a Uniform Conception 
This section will be reviewing two main points with regard to development of a uniform 
conception of the rule of law, (or lack there of). The two points discussed here are, 
firstly, it identifies and discusses the discrepancy between the Community's decision to 
make the rule of law a requirement for membership in the current enlargement 
proceedings and its decision to support differentiation in understandings across the 
Community and in prospective member states. Secondly, how the EU is assessing 
prospective member states on meeting the requirement of being based on the rule of law 
without a standard conception upon which to make such judgements, will be discussed. 
As has been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, the rule of law has 
gained eminence in the current enlargement proceedings and has been raised to the status 
of 'founding principle' upon which all states of the European Union must be based upon, 
as this principle is important for democracy and protecting individual rights. At the same 
time, one of the main problems with utilising the term 'rule of law' with regard to the 
current enlargement proceedings is that there is no uniform or standard conception that 
has been agreed upon. The discrepancy here is between the importance of the rule of 
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law to the Community, and at the same time, the lack of a shared understanding or 
conception of this fundamental principle. 
This raises the question that if this principle is so vital to democracy in the 
Community, why has the Community shied away from developing a universal conception 
to be utilised by all member states? Some argue that there is in fact a general and shared 
conception utilised by the Community. One source from the European Parliament makes 
this point when asked about whether there was a uniform conception of the rule of law in 
use by the Community. The source stated that there is a consensus about a common 
experience of democracy, government, etc., within and across the EU member states. 535 
If so, why has the EU not put this in writing, especially for the benefit of prospective 
member states who lack understanding and practice of democracy and the rule of law? 
As stated earlier, the European Union supports differentiation m 
conceptualisation of the rule oflaw, based on historical and cultural differences. This has 
been reiterated with respect to prospective member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe. It was also previously noted, in an interview with a source from the European 
Parliament, who believed that countries from Central and Eastern Europe would not 
develop conceptions of the rule of law that are exactly the same as in Western countries, 
'as Western countries themselves do not have the exact same conceptions.'536 What is 
needed, stated this source, is to 'encourage other countries in the development of their 
conceptions of the rule of law' to 'build on practices [specific] to individual countries', 
taking 'into account each individual country's traditions and cultures. '537 However, the 
problem with this situation is that prospective member states are developing their own 
understanding of the rule of law based on historical and cultural experiences that lack the 
values necessary to develop an understanding and practice of democracy and the rule of 
law. 
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This in turn raises the question, previously identified in chapter two, of how the 
Community is determining whether prospective member states are meeting the 
requirement of the rule of law. It also questions how assessment can be made fairly and 
uniformly, if the Community accepts that variations in conceptualisations of the rule of 
law exist due to historical and cultural factors that influence the interpretation of the 
principle, by those conducting the assessment and those being assessed. For example, 
assessment of the rule of law in prospective member states have entailed looking at 
institutions like the judiciary, and determining whether the rule of law had been 
implemented within a country. The assessment of such institutions is problematic as 
government institutions have developed in accordance to and influenced by historical and 
cultural experiences of a particular country. Therefore, these influences also have a role 
in the understanding, development and support of the rule of law, producing divergence 
in the conceptualisations held. This is problematic because the lack of standard leaves 
assessment of this principle open to potential allegations of subjectivity and bias. 
Another point is that despite such claims to support differentiation among 
prospective members, there seems to be a trend of steering these countries towards 
particular institutions and procedures associated with supporting and implementing the 
rule of law in a manner that is consistent with a particular conceptualisation of this 
principle. Such a discrepancy between accepted practice and actions by the European 
Union seems to illustrate how the absence of an accepted uniform standard of the rule of 
law is causing confusion and leading towards potential conflicts within the EU. Potential 
conflicts have been cited by some sources, that the EU, whilst stating one thing and 
demanding another, is setting a dangerous precedent for itself, in that it is requiring of 
new members, standards that current members have not met and in many cases, have no 
intention of meeting, as it would require a major overhaul of their own institutions. As 
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one source from the Commission stated, prospective member states are 'being asked to 
make systemic changes that not all [current] member states have made themselves'. 538 
Therefore, the support for differentiation of understandings seem to reflect in some ways, 
the desire of current member states of the EU to uphold the status quo and avoid 
changes that would be necessary if there were a set standard. This is because the 
development and utilisation of a uniform conception of the rule of law for use across the 
EU would entail the difficult job of defining this conception. This definition would entail 
some countries to make changes to their current systems, in some cases, potentially 
going against developments according to their particular histories, cultures, ideas, and 
values. How would a uniform understanding be determined in this situation, balancing 
these different traditions and understandings? Perhaps this has been one of the reasons a 
uniform conceptualisation of the rule of law has not been a priority amongst the 
Community and its member states. Such a move would cause tensions within the 
Community, as there will those countries who must make drastic changes to conform, 
whilst others have little or not changes to make. 
Another reason for the lack of a uniform rule of law conception within the 
Community has been alluded to by some sources in both the Commission and Parliament. 
Sentiments and understandings held by those within the Commission and Parliament 
seem to indicate that there is no clear idea of what the rule of law really means as a 
concept. It also reflects the feeling that with regard to prospective member states and 
the enlargement proceedings taking place, it is not necessary to define the term. To 
many, what is important is that the principle is operational and functioning within 
countries. Sources within the Community seem to have various ideas about what the 
concept entails. For instance, one source defined the rule of law 'as where a state has 
institutions such as courts and individuals such as judges that are functioning properly 
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and according to laws. '539 Another source defined the rule of law as 'important for a 
body of legislation that incorporates human rights as codified internationally, [and] 
should be applied and observed. '540 What this difference reflects are variations in 
traditions, the former places emphasis upon judges and underlines a more institution-
based rule of law conception, while the latter definition emphasises a rights-based 
conception of the rule of law, as discussed earlier in chapter one. These illustrate that 
understanding of the rule of law within Community institutions reflects the differentiation 
existent between various member states as illustrated and discussed earlier in chapter 
two. And it is these differences that make it difficult and very challenging, with regard to 
developing a uniform conception of the rule oflaw for the entire Community. 
These differences not only illustrate the existent differences between EU 
institutions and make development of a uniform conception of the rule of law for the 
Community difficult and challenging, but they also influence assessment of prospective 
member states. Differentiation in understandings of the rule of law has focused different 
EU institutions on different aspects with regard to how prospective member states are 
assessed and on what areas assessment seems to be concentrated. One such example is 
the different emphasis exhibited in opinions of the Commission and the European 
Parliament, on their assessment of candidate countries' progress in reinforcing and 
strengthening their judicial systems. In its Strategy Paper 2001, the Commission 
concluded that, 
Further progress was made in reforming and strengthening the judicial 
system, as a vital element in ensuring respect for the rule of law and in the 
effective enforcement of the acquis. Several countries advanced in 
adopting basic legislation, strengthening human resources and improving 
working conditions. Efforts in this area need to be further stepped up, with 
particular attention to ensuring the independence of the judiciary .... 
However, while efforts to reform or strengthen the judiciary are slowly 
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starting to bear fiuit, these should be further accelerated and reinforced, in 
particular to ensure effective enforcement of the acquis. The fight against 
corruption should be further stepped up. Tangible results in this domain 
are needed to respond to public concern and help ensure a transparent 
business environment. 541 
On the other hand, the European Parliament's optruon notes that, 'the candidate 
countries have much ground to make up in guaranteeing legal certainty' and 'considers 
an efficient judicial system with independent courts, a sufficient number of trained 
judges, judgments given in a reasonable time and enforceability of judgments as one of 
the essential preconditions for the candidate countries' entry into the internal market, 
because the equitable protection of the rights of economic operators is essential in the 
interest of fair trade'. 542 It goes on to note that, 
... despite progress in the reform of the courts and the police forces in the 
candidate countries, significant improvements are still needed in terms of 
the way in which democracy operates, the independence of the judiciary, 
coordination between departments and the qualifications of officials, for 
example in the fight against economic and financial crime543 . 
Although this example reflects similar ideas with regard to judicial system 
improvements in candidate countries, what it also suggests is that there is a lack of eo-
ordination in assessment and differences in emphasis upon which different individual EU 
institutions base their assessments and opinions of candidate countries' accession 
progress. It is illustrative of a trend in the EU to develop approaches and implement 
them, despite unclear definitions or ideas upon which these are based. Therefore, the 
EU' s decision to leave the rule of law undefined is not an isolated case, but merely one 
of several instances. 
Aside from disagreements between the various institutions on the extent and 
content of proposals for enlargement strategies to include countries from Central and 
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Eastern Europe into the Union, there is also the problem of differentiation in assessing 
individual applicants' preparedness for membership and its obligations, as briefly touched 
upon above. These differences are due to a number of factors- such as, differences in 
strategies by prospective member states towards fulfilling membership criteria and the 
EU's own enlargement strategy. 
Conclusion 
Transition of countries in Central and Eastern Europe will be a long and complex process 
in their bids for European Union membership. This is because it will take more than 
creating democratic institutions, a democratic governing system, or a market-oriented 
economy, to make these countries become more democratic and based on the rule of law 
concept. It will also necessitate reforms in the habits and the way of thinking, of the 
individuals in these countries. The changing of a country's infrastructure is difficult 
enough, but the necessity of changing society to support and further develop what 
changes have been made, is the next step, and in many ways, the more important step to 
building the country into one that is founded on democratic ideas, good governance and 
most importantly, the rule of law. This is where the absence of a uniform conception of 
the rule of law, combined with the European Union's support for differentiation in 
conceptualisation, could prove problematic for prospective member states attempting to 
meet the requirement of the rule of law for membership. 
Currently, many citizens of countries in transition lack an understanding of how 
the reforms made to institutions and the governing system can be 'effectively used to 
voice grievances.' 544 They lack an understanding ofthe rule oflaw in everyday life. The 
fundamental problem here is that citizens do not fully understand nor are they fully aware 
of their rights, freedoms, and what the relationship between individuals and the state 
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should now be, within such a new governing system based on the rule of law concept 
As Ognian Pishev commented, it is 'easy to proclaim a belief in democratic ideals and 
values', but much ofthe previous governing system and its practices still remain. 545 It is 
also important to acknowledge the fact that the histories of Central and Eastern 
European countries differ from those of western countries, and this will also have an 
effect on the development oftheir conceptualisation ofthe rule oflaw. Because without 
taking into account and without proper understanding of their histories and cultures, it is 
difficult to understand the conditions these countries are facing as they struggle to 
transform their countries. These conditions will have a direct effect on the development 
and implementation of the new political structures and institutions that support individual 
autonomy and rights according to the concept of the rule of law. Because of the 
differences in histories, culture, and their current developments, it is likely that these 
countries will have a general understanding of the rule of law, but the ways in which this 
concept is utilised and made a part of the new governing system and structures, will 
differ. While this is something that the EU is supporting and encouraging, it does not 
account for the fact that these prospective member states have little recent experience, if 
any, with democracy and the rule oflaw, to enable them to ensure that the rule of law is 
a fundamental basis for the reforms and restructuring taking place. 
The other concern that has been brought out in this chapter, has been the fact that 
an absence of a uniform conception leaves the EU and candidate countries without a 
standard against which to measure candidates' progress. Thereby leaving assessment 
open to potential bias and non-uniformity itself Podkaminer reiterates this, stating that 
'on many specific questions the judgement on the maturity of individual candidate 
countries will have to be rather arbitrary.'546 Since there is a lack of a shared rule oflaw 
conception, any progress made by candidate countries, would be determined according 
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to 'policy makers' own preferences and beliefs... and not necessarily the distinct 'EU 
guidelines' .'547 Podkarniner believes that this may 'reflect an ongoing change in views on 
further enlargement (and on internal reform) ofthe Union.'548 
The European Union has chosen not to define the rule of law, but has instead 
concerned itself with the application and operation of this important principle in practice 
in candidate countries. In addition, the Community has insisted and stressed the need to 
make allowance for candidate countries to develop their own 'brand' of rule of law and 
democracy that reflects their individual situations, histories, and cultures. While this 
move has been looked upon favourably by the institutions and member states of the EU 
and candidate countries, it could prove to be more problematic than helpful to candidates 
and an enlarged EU. The problem with this strategy is the fact that candidate countries 
have little if any, experience with democracy, much less a principle the EU considers 
fundamental for the development of democracy and necessary for membership. The 
importance of this principle combined with the absence of historical understanding or 
experience of it in the CEE region, suggests that leaving it to candidates to determine 
and define the rule of law in accordance to individual circumstances is risky and 
potentially short-sighted on the EU's part. It raises the fundamental question of how 
candidate countries are expected to ensure the rule of law is operating properly, in order 
to build a democratic system of government upon it, when they lack knowledge, 
understanding, or guidance of this principle. 
The EU has 'steered' candidates towards the reform or creation of particular 
practices and institutions that imply understanding of the rule oflaw, such as ensuring 'an 
independent judiciary, effective and accessible means of legal recourse, and a legal 
system guaranteeing equity before the law. '549 This steering of candidate countries seems 
to imply two things - firstly, that the EU seems to utilise a particular conception of the 
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rule with regard to assisting candidate countries. However, the EU is also contradicting 
itself by encouraging the development of certain institutions, when the development of 
these institutions are dependent upon particular conceptions of the rule of law, as 
determined by a country in accordance to its experiences, history, culture, and values. 
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Chapter Five- Other Understandings of the Rule of Law 
The intention of this chapter is to provide an overview of other conceptualisations of the 
rule of law, as defined by other international organisations both in Europe and world-
wide. This is of interest at the end of this thesis, as it underlines some of the deficiencies 
existent in the European Union's understanding and utilisation of what many writers and 
theorists consider a fundamental principle for the development and maintenance of 
democracy and democratic institutions or practices. 
This chapter is split into two sections. The first section will provide a brief 
summary of three international organisation's understandings of the rule of law - the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). It will include some comparison and 
contrast of these three perspectives with that ofthe European Union- its institutions as a 
whole, as well as with the larger Community including the member states- illustrating 
some of the deficiencies of with the EU's current approach to this principle. 
Following this the section delves deeper into the reasons for the development of 
the diverse conceptualisations held in the wider community (world-wide). It will briefly 
underscore some of the factors that affect the successfulness- partial or whole, or lack of 
thereof, with regard to the development of international organisations' understandings of 
the rule oflaw. 
In the latter half of this chapter examines whether the differences and similarities 
in understandings and factors, as demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, 
has a bearing on the co-ordination between various organisations- on assistance projects 
and programmes to support and maintain the rule of law in Central and East European 
countries. It will identify some of the factors that may have a direct effect on the 
development of the rule of law and democratic institutions and practices in this region, 
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and how international organisations are working through these in their efforts to assist in 
the promotion of this fundamental principle_ 
Section One- An International-Wide Understanding of the Rule of Law? 
The organisations reviewed, include the Council ofEurope, the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 
The former two organisations were reviewed because of their connections and work on 
democracy projects and programmes with and for Central and East European countries 
whom are currently prospective EU member states. The ICJ is also considered here, 
because its understanding of the rule of law provides a useful illustration and contrast to 
the EU's understanding of the rule of law. It is especially relevant with regard to the 
current EU enlargement eastwards, with the development and co-ordination of 
democratic assistance programmes and training to prospective member states. 
The Council ofEurope and Its Semi-Defined Understanding of the Rule ofLaw 
The Council of Europe, whilst having placed more emphasis on the promotion and 
strengthening of the rule of law, seems to have done so through the development of its 
own understanding of the rule of law. Its understanding of the rule of law has provided 
it with a framework for supporting the rule of law, as illustrated in its official 
documentation. This is illustrated for example, in Article 2, section (c) of its proposal 
for a Council regulation_ In this article, the Council states that, 
... promoting or strengthening the rule of law, notably through 
measures to uphold the independence of the judiciary and strengthen 
it (the administration of justice, treatment of offenders, crime 
prevention) and for the activities of parliaments and other 
democratically elected institutions; supporting institutional and 
legislative reform. 550 
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Within the same document (Proposal for a Council Regulation), the Council of Europe 
outlined priority areas with regard to the rule of law. The priority areas identified by the 
Council's inter-departmental Human Rights Co-ordination Group are as follows: 551 
(a) parliamentary business 
(b) judicial procedures 
(c) legal protection of civil and political liberties 
(d) government human rights institutions 
(e) institutional reform 
(f) training armed and security forces 
(g) administrative accountability 
Through these seven priority areas, the Council of Europe provides an understanding of 
what it associates with the rule of law principle. The Council clearly illustrates that like 
the European Union, it has not necessarily been concerned with defining this important 
principle, but rather with how the principle is to be and is utilised in the transformation 
of countries developing democratic foundations. 
However, in the case of the Council, unlike that of the European Union, the 
priorities it set out seem to illustrate a more defined and focused approach towards the 
rule of law, as compared to the approach taken by the European Union. What the 
Council's priorities demonstrates is that its conception of the rule oflaw can be identified 
in terms of both Shklar's approach to the rule of law as 'institutional restraints'552, and 
Walker's 'institutional approach'. This institutional approach focuses on the 'principles of 
legal organisation of the society'553 . More specifically, this institutional approach554 
focuses upon the structure of the legal system and the institutions which support it, in 
order to better ensure the protection of individual rights from coercion and abuse, 
especially from the government itself As explained in chapter one, this is significant, as 
the focus specifically on the judiciary and legal system are regularly associated with 
particular conceptualisations of the rule of law. The Council's utilisation of the rule of 
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law has traditionally been associated with both an institutional approach and what is 
known as the 'rights' conception of the rule oflaw. 
The Council of Europe has 'identified particular legal instruments which have 
served to give concrete form to the principle of the rule oflaw. ' 555 In fact, this emphasis 
was also reiterated by the Council of Europe during a Round Table meeting attended by 
a number of participants, including the ministers of justice from several Central and 
Eastern Europe countries. At this meeting, the Council stated and emphasised that the 
main aim of the round table was 'to reassert these new European democracies' 
commitment to judicial independence as a key element of the rule of law'. 556 What this 
does not explicitly state, but does allude to, is the influence of both the institutional and 
rights-based conceptions of the rule of law on the Council's own understanding, to 
support a more active role for the judiciary. 
Examples such as those mentioned above, allude to the Council of Europe's 
understanding of this important principle, despite the lack of any formal definition. It 
also provides reasons for its emphasis on the judicial and legal systems (traditionally 
linked to conceptions of the rule of law) with regard to its assistance towards developing 
the rule of law in prospective member states. In its emphasis on the development of 
independent judiciaries and legal systems to 'give a more concrete form to the principle', 
it has provided a framework to assist efforts of Central and Eastern European countries 
in transition. 
Examples to further illustrate how differences in understanding of the rule of law 
affect assistance programmes, will be covered in the next chapter section focusing on 
what bearing similarities or differences of understandings have on co-ordination of 
programmes between the various international organisations. The next sub-section will 
193 
reVIew the Organisation for Security and Co-operation m Europe (OSCE) and its 
understanding and utilisation of the rule of law. 
The OSCE (Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe) and the Rule ofLaw 
Having reviewed the Council ofEurope's understanding ofthe rule oflaw and how it has 
chosen to define the rule oflaw, the OSCE's understanding seems to be well-grounded 
in comparison. Despite this comparison however, there are some contradictions with the 
OSCE's understanding of the term, which will be further elaborated upon throughout this 
section. One such contradiction is that the idea of the rule of law is said to consist of 
values and not institutions, while at the same time, the OSCE has focused on the 
'defining' the rule of law as a restraint on discretionary powers bestowed upon particular 
governmental institutions. This is not so much a contradiction as it is a melding of two 
distinct understandings of the rule of law. Hayek himself alluded to similar conclusions 
when he concludes that despite the rule of law forming a restraint on government, there 
needed also to be order to ensure the proper use of power by institutions and creation of 
procedures to support these institutions. However, what is left unsaid here is that there 
also seems to be values at the foundation of these institutions and procedures. This 
leads to a second conflict in the OSCE's understanding of the rule of law- the need to 
balance restraint of discretionary powers as a check on power, with statements that the 
State should be the principle custodian of the rule oflaw. 
It was acknowledged at an OSCE seminar, that 'at a popular level, it is generally 
agreed, even if somewhat hazily, that the rule of law is concerned with what government 
can do and how government can do it. ' 557 This statement leads one to conclude that the 
OSCE's understanding of the rule of law centres on the restraint of governmental 
discretion. This, as described in chapter one, is a perspective of the rule of law that is 
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shared by both Montesquieu and Hayek. Both of these writers have similarly 
characterised and defined the rule of law, although Hayek has stressed that although 
restraint on government is necessary to ensure legal certainty, this restriction should be 
'only in its [government's] coercive actions'. More importantly, Hayek points out that 
although this is important, it is not enough, as he believes that there still needs to be a 
'moral tradition' upon which such procedures are founded, because without such 
foundations, there is always the possibility that society would 'relapse into a state of 
arbitrary tyranny.'558 
The OSCE has also acknowledged that 'the principle of political pluralism is an 
essential element of the rule of law. ' 559 By political pluralism, the OSCE is referring to 
the idea that governments should be 'representative of the diversity of public opinion. ' 560 
This corresponds to earlier discussions regarding the relationship between the rule of law 
and various forms of democracy. Here, the OSCE has emphasised and seems to imply, 
whether intentionally or not, a connection between an understanding of the rule oflaw as 
it relates to a 'representative' form of democracy. Discussion of this relationship was 
detailed in the first chapter of this thesis, making the point that while the rule of law is 
seen by many writers as necessary for democracy, this principle can also be viewed as a 
check on representative democracy's overpowering of the 'minority voice' and of 
individuals. It is these connections that have served as the basis for the development of 
the OSCE's definition ofthe rule oflaw. 
During the past decade, the OSCE has 'strove to give more meaning to the rule 
of law concept both with respect to national institutions as well as a means of conflict 
prevention. ' 561 Its commitment to the rule oflaw and giving meaning to it is illustrated 
by both its Copenhagen Document of 29 June 1990, and in the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe. 562 The former of these documents reinforced the idea that political 
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pluralism was essential to the rule of law. It is essential, as it acts as a safeguard against 
abuses of discretionary powers granted to the government by law. 563 The latter 
document (the Charter of Paris), reiterated the basic norm held by the OSCE with 
regard to the rule oflaw, 'that no one is above the law. ' 564 
In its commitment to the rule of law, the OSCE has also prompted many 
discussions focused on defining some of the basic elements of the rule oflaw, and threats 
to this very concept. The identification of some basic elements and threats to the rule of 
law, have enabled the OSCE to focus current and future projects to better support and 
further the rule of law in practice. What these discussions highlighted were that 
participating OSCE countries and the OSCE itself, believed that some of the basic 
elements of the rule oflaw were: 
a clear and transparent judicial system, an independent judiciary, 
equality before the law as well as equal and unimpeded access to the 
institutions of the system, civilian control of the police and army, and 
safeguards against the abuse of discretionary powers. 565 
Besides these basic elements, the OSCE also identified what it considered to be problem 
areas that 'attempt to curb the basic value inherent in the rule of law'. A few of the 
areas indicated were 'violation of human rights; threats to independent media; electoral 
fraud; and xenophobia'. 566 
At the recent OSCE Mediterranean Seminar567, Justice Filletti stated that the rule 
oflaw 'might have started as a legal rule', and that some people consider the rule oflaw 
to 'represent a symbolic ideal against which proponents of widely divergent political 
persuasions measure and criticise the shortcomings of contemporary state practice. ' 568 
In his statement, Filletti reiterates that the rule of law is a way of restraining 
discretionary powers of the government, and he illustrates this by citing De Smith and 
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Brazier's description of the rule of law. De Smith and Brazier describe the rule of law 
The concept is one of open texture, it lends itself to an extremely 
wide range of interpretations. One can at least say that the concept is 
usually intended to imply: 
(i) that the powers exercised by politicians and officials must have a 
legitimate foundation; they must be based on authority conferred by 
law; and 
(ii) that the law should conform to certain minimum standards of 
justice, both substantive and procedural. 
However, Filletti also states that 'the difficulty with the rule of law is that 
essentially it consists of values and not institutions. ' 570 The idea of the rule of law 
consisting of values rather than institutions, creates difficulties in trying the concept to a 
'precise core definition that allows divergent views from the extreme or opposite poles 
of the political spectrum in the pursuit of their partisan political goals. ' 571 It also 
illustrates awareness of the contested nature of the concept by the OSCE. Earlier, 
Filletti commented that the rule of law was designed as a safeguard for restricting 
discretionary powers. Yet, it was later commented that the difficulty with the idea of the 
rule of law is that it consists of values, not institutions. These two 
understandings/conceptions of the rule of law are tackling the concept from two distinct 
but connected, angles. The former conception defines it in terms of institutions and 
institutional powers, and allows room for little discretion, while the latter conception 
encourages differences, and with these differences, a certain degree of discretion. 
There is another contradiction in the OSCE's understanding of the rule of law, 
from what Justice Filletti has stated in his address. Earlier it was commented that Filletti 
stated that the rule of law was designed to hold in check, the powers of the state and 
those in positions of power. He then later states in his address, that 'It is the State that 
should be the principal custodian of the rule of law. ' 572 Does not making the state the 
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principal custodian of the rule of law, leave it open to possible abuse by the state and 
those in positions of power, for their own self-benefit? Does it not defeat the purpose of 
having a check on state powers, if the state is to be the overseer of this check to its own 
powers? There seems to be a contradiction between the proposed theory and practice of 
the rule of law here. In theory, the rule of law holds the state's powers in check. In 
practice however, as the application and implementation of the rule of law should begin 
at the national level, with state institutions overseeing this, how can a state hold its own 
powers in check, as it would, according to Justice Filletti. 
The OSCE has made attempts to overcome some of the difficulties of formally 
describing the rule of law and the application of it in practice. Reconciling the two 
requires taking an in-depth look at the structure of state institutions, the basis for them, 
and ensuring that everyone understands that no one is above the law. The assistance 
programmes, projects, and seminars developed and instigated by the OSCE, for ensuring 
support for and the application of the rule of law, illustrates their commitment to the 
principle, and how it is developed in practice, from description and theory. Despite 
illustrating their commitment to the rule of law, the projects developed only reinforce a 
part of their total understanding of what the concept is. Projects such as those to create 
and develop non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and grassroots organisations 
reinforce the rule of law as a restriction on discretionary powers, but it does not 
reinforce the OSCE's depiction of the rule of law as based on values instead of 
institutions. It is again illustrated, this time by the OSCE, that there are inherent flaws 
with the understanding of the rule of law throughout the international community. 
Section two of this chapter will elaborate further upon and illustrate how these flaws and 
inadequacies are not acknowledged, and are in fact ignored by those creating and 
developing assistance projects for and in, Central and Eastern Europe. 
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The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the Rule of Law 
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has taken a definition like the one 
developed by the OSCE, a step further. It shares a similar understanding of the rule of 
law with the OSCE, through defining the tenn as: 
The principles, institutions and procedures, not always identical, but 
broadly similar, which the experience and traditions of lawyers in 
different countries of the world, often having themselves varying 
political structures and economic backgrounds, have shown to be 
important to protect the individual from arbitrary government and to 
enable him to enjoy the dignity of man. 573 
However, the ICJ expanded further upon their definition presented above, 
encompassing areas beyond civil and political rights, in the pursuit of ensuring that 
'man's legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised.' 574 The ICJ advanced the 
concept of the rule of law beyond safeguarding individual rights, to include the 
'establishment by the State of social, economic, educational and cultural conditions' that 
it felt the rule of law was also concerned with. 575 Many of the jurists at the New Delhi 
Conference of the International Congress of Jurists in 1959, believed that the concept 
should be further enlarged to include social, economic, educational and cultural areas, 
because they believed that 'the basis of all law, ... comes from a respect of human 
personality. ' 576 As well as the fact that it was believed that, 
this social content of the rule of law and the recognition of the 
necessity to make law and find law with due regard to the ever-
changing conditions of human existence, expands the concept of the 
Rule of Law from the limited scope of static notions and 
approximates it with the Rule ofLife.577 
The ICJ has taken the rule oflaw from the realm of protector of individual rights, 
(as understood to be protection from the improper use of state powers), to protector of 
individual human rights. The difference between the two is the potential scope that the 
latter could include, that would not necessarily be included under the fonner. In fact, 
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one of the main purposes of the ICJ New Delhi Conference in 1959, 'was to clarify and 
formulate, in a manner acceptable to different legal systems, operating in varying 
political, economic and social environments, the basic elements of the Rule of Law. ' 578 
What the ICJ's understanding illustrates, is the expansion of Shklar's conception 
of the rule of law, as described in chapter one. For Shklar, the rule oflaw stands for a 
limited number of protective arrangements for the 'benefit of every member of society'. 579 
The International Commission of Jurists has merely expanded the 'limited number of 
protective arrangements', having expanded the scope and range of these arrangements in 
its belief that this is a part of the rule of law. It defines the rule of law in terms of both 
institutions and values, as well as alluding to a substantive 'rights' conception of the 
principle, an eclectic conception that contlates and melds the distinctions outlined 
previously in the first chapter of this thesis. 
Summary 
The various understandings of the rule of law briefly covered above, demonstrate both 
the existence of diverse conceptions, whilst also illustrating some of the deficiencies with 
the European Union's conception of this important principle. From examination of these 
three international organisations/bodies (the OSCE, the Council ofEurope, and the ICJ), 
some of the differences and similarities in understanding the rule of law have become 
clearer. In comparison to the EUs understanding of the term, other international 
organisations seem to have developed a more concrete conception which has played a 
major role in the development of assistance projects and programmes to support the rule 
of law. However, these organisations, despite their attempts to develop more concrete 
and defined understandings of the rule oflaw in comparison to the EU, seem also to lack 
coherence, as they conflate distinctions between various conceptions, as identified earlier 
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in chapter one. While some organisations may have been striving to understand the rule 
of law through a more narrowed scope, others, like the ICJ, have enlarged its scope and 
define the term beyond the politic and civic realm, to embrace an understanding and 
definition that attempts to provide a way of life definition for the rule of law, against a 
background of cultural diversity. This accounts for the abstractness of its rule of law 
definition. 
In comparison to the conceptions outlined earlier in this section, the European 
Union also seems to lack a cohesive and uniform conception of the rule of law, which 
can be attributed to historical and cultural differences, and differences in traditions across 
the EU. This is because, as described in chapter two, the EU favours variations in the 
development of the rule of law, taking into account differences in understanding, based 
on cultural and historical differences, which have an effect on individual member states' 
understanding of the rule of law. This is their view with regard to both current member 
states and applicant states from Central and Eastern Europe. During interviews 
conducted with contacts in both the European Commission and Parliament, this idea 
regarding the differences in development of the rule of law was reiterated. One contact 
stated that, "There is consensus about a common experience of democracy, government, 
etc. across member states", but that there existed "differences, nuances" that seem to run 
along North/South differences or Anglo-Saxon/Continental differences due to "different 
attitudes and traditions. "580 It was also observed, that there is a "need to encourage 
other countries in the development of their conceptions of the rule of law ... that builds on 
practices of individual countries and develops particular aspects, taking into account 
each individual country's traditions and cultures. "581 This can be illustrated by comparing 
the differences in understanding of the rule of law between EU member states such as 
Britain and Germany. Their individual understandings are based on the idea each has of 
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the role of the state (government), individuals in the state, and the role of those in 
positions of authority, such as judges. For example, in Britain there is practice of judges 
as more than mere applicators of the law. Judges in Britain have in practice, more 
discretion than their counterparts in Germany. 582 
The European Union readily uses the term 'rule of law' throughout their official 
and internal documents and correspondence. In its documentation, the rule of law is 
usually linked to ideas of democracy and/or human rights. Therefore, it does appear that 
the European Union institutions itself, have a similar understanding of what the rule of 
law should encompass. This can be illustrated through extracts from interviews 
conducted in Brussels will be utilised. In one interview with a contact in the European 
Parliament, the interviewee stated that, "My understanding of this concept [the rule of 
law] is that it is important for a body of legislation that incorporates human rights as 
codified internationally; it should be applied and observed. "583 In another interview, a 
contact in the European Commission commented in response to the question 'How 
would you define the concept of the rule of law?' in following way: that "The rule of law 
is seen as where a state has institutions such as courts and individuals such as judges that 
are functioning properly and according to laws. "584 
However, it has shied away from attaching a particular 'formal description' to the 
term, or even from identifying boundaries on the use of the term to assist in developing a 
uniform understanding across the entire EU. This is the case because as was reiterated 
by a member in the European Parliament, " ... Western countries themselves do not have 
the exact same conceptions [of the rule of law], but they do share common ideas" with 
regard to the term. 585 There is not a single, shared understanding of the rule of law 
across member states that allow for an official definition. Attempting to co-ordinate the 
various understandings of the rule of law across current member states would probably 
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include a 'watering-down' of the conception in order to ensure inclusion of all member 
states under this 'EU definition' of the term. So rather than having an elastic definition, 
the European Union has chosen not to define what the rule of law is, and has instead, 
chosen to focus on implementation through institutional means, by emphasising the need 
for particular institutions in both current and potential member states. 
The emphasis on specifying a need for particular institutions, 'pushes' states 
towards uniform implementation and application of the rule of law. In practice, there 
appears to be more uniformity in the creation of certain institutional structures for 
supporting the rule of law. This can be illustrated by the EU's emphasis on the 
development and creation of certain institutions, like judicial review and procedures for 
appeals, which have been identified as institutions important for ensuring and supporting 
the rule of law. However, this emphasis presumes a shared basic understanding of what 
the term means and encompasses. The differences here, in theory and practice, in and 
between EU member states and institutions, seem to stress certain shortcomings of the 
European Union's understanding ofthe rule of law. The apparent differences across the 
EU illustrate the EU' s lack of an overall shared understanding of the rule of law. At the 
same time, it also emphasises the possible inadequacies inherent in its approach to 
assisting Central and Eastern European countries in supporting and ensuring the 
application of the rule of law. These inadequacies in approaches to assistance are based 
on the fact that the EU lacks a uniform, shared basic understanding of the concept, on 
which to focus its goals for assistance to Central and Eastern Europe upon. 
A shared understanding on a basic level will likely enable easier co-ordination 
between international organisations in the development of assistance programmes. The 
differences between them may be both a benefit and a deterrent to co-ordinated 
assistance. It may be a benefit, in that it allows for opportunities that none of the 
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organisations could have taken on individually, due to limited resources or expertise, or 
due to lack of foresight and experience to identify such a need. Differences in 
understandings could also be a deterrent, because most international organisations set 
their agendas in accordance to their individual understandings, alluding to potential 
clashes in perspectives and priorities. 
International organisations are under pressure to co-ordinate assistance 
programmes and projects, due to dwindling resources and unnecessary overlaps. 
However, careful considerations need to be taken to ensure that their understandings of 
particular factors are also aligned and compatible, in order to make co-ordination efforts 
successful, rather than a battle of wills. This will be the focus of the next section. 
Section Two - Do the Similarities and Differences in the Understanding of the Rule 
of Law Have a Bearing on Co-ordination Between the Organisations identified? 
There is, and has been, much co-ordination of programmes and resources between the 
European Union and other international organisations, for implementing and supporting 
the rule of law. The programmes which will be examined in this chapter, are those co-
ordinated between the European Union (EU), the Organisation on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE)/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODlliR), the Council of Europe and its European Commission for Democracy through 
Law, and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). Some of the areas in which co-
ordination has concentrated, include: judicial independence, training of the judiciary 
(judges, lawyers, judicial staff, ombudsmen, prosecutors), training of other supporting 
infrastructures (i.e. police forces, border patrol/guards, etc.), development of civil society 
through education of the public and creation/development ofNGOs and interest groups, 
constitution drafting and implementation, and the set-up of government institutions. 
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The aim of this section IS to examme and compare how differences in the 
conception and understanding of the rule of law, across the international spectrum, 
emphasises the inadequacies inherent in those conceptions. Particular understandings of 
what the rule of law is and represents, either ignores or does not take into consideration, 
problems and flaws inherent in that particular conception. To illustrate this, references 
will be made to projects and programmes developed by international organisations, 
emphasising the fact that these programmes ignore certain inadequacies because they are 
based on flawed understandings of the rule oflaw. 
Judicial Independence/Training of the Judiciary 
The various international organisations are working together to develop and extend 
assistance programmes in this particular area. If they are not working directly together, 
then efforts have been towards co-ordinating individual projects and programmes to 
ensure minimum repetition occurs, in order to maximise the limited resources of most 
organisations, while still ensuring good coverage of areas that are considered a necessity 
for the further development of Central and Eastern European countries. 
For instance, 'it was also broadly recognised that the independence and authority 
of the judiciary was a crucial element in safeguarding the rule of law and securing 
effective implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. '586 Judicial 
independence has been deemed as one of the most important supports for the rule of law. 
Therefore, many programmes that have been co-ordinated, emphasise the creation and 
support for an independent judiciary. This is something many in the field, working with 
countries in transition, realise will not be easy, nor will it occur overnight. It is the 
reason why the ODIHR, along with other international organisations, have focused their 
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programmes specifically on training programmes for judges, judicial staff, prosecutors, 
and lawyers, and the distribution or translation of relevant documents. 587 
Training programmes for judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and judicial staff, are 
implemented with the assistance of governmental offices of individual countries. For 
example, in Hungary, the training of judges and judicial staff fall under the control of the 
Ministry of Justice in co-ordination with international organisations such as the OSCE 
and the EU. Such training sessions provide judges with knowledge of EU laws and 
legislation, international treaties and conventions, but also the knowledge of how these 
various types of 'legal documents' are to be implemented and applied within their own 
home country. The training seminars provide judges with the opportunity to also visit 
other countries (EU member states, and other Western countries), to see how the judicial 
processes work and how the law is currently applied elsewhere in the world. 588 This 
should provide them with a better understanding of the workings of EU legislation in 
practice, and how other member states have implemented these legal documents into 
their national legislation and have carried out the application of such Community legal 
commitments. 
Through these training programmes, judges gain both knowledge of the text and 
mechanics of how judicial processes operate in other countries. The emphasis of these 
projects reflect an understanding of the rule of law in terms of development and reform 
of the procedures and structure of an institution- in this case, the judiciary. What these 
programmes do not acknowledge are the inadequacies of reforming or developing an 
institution, especially one with as important a role as the judiciary, without emphasising 
the need for changes in attitudes and values, along side changes in structure and 
procedures. These changes in attitudes are not just of those positions of authority like 
judges, but also those of the average person, the citizen. The need for such changes is 
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evident from comments about how citizens currently perceive law and the courts, in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This is illustrated by comments such as, the "laws and 
courts [of certain EU applicant states] are viewed as not accessible to citizens" and that 
there is a "perception of the courts as not being for citizens", from an EU Commission 
source.
589 
For example, in Hungary, 'judges, lawyers and judicial staff are learning new 
techniques in the judicial and legal spheres", the learning of law is implicit rather than 
explicit, as "programmes are not really focused on changing their thinking about what the 
law is or the role of law", but focuses on participants Gudges and judicial staff) acquiring 
both knowledge ofEU laws and the implementation/application of these into the national 
system. 590 Without changes to attitudes and values, especially in the way that judicial 
staff regard law and the protection of individual rights, changes to procedures and 
institutions are hollow. This was further illustrated by comments that "there is not a 
culture of following legal rules" and "there is no recognition at the moment in Hungary 
of or about the role oflaw. "591 
Despite this, the programmes co-ordinated and operated by the EU, in 
co-operation with governments in Central and Eastern European countries, reflect the 
EU' s focus with regard to its understanding of the rule of law. It also reflects the 
deficiencies inherent in the programmes developed, as a result of the EU' s understanding 
and commitment to the rule of law through development of particular institutions, 
without thought or effort for assisting with changes at a more fundamental level. The 
changing of attitudes towards the role of law and role judges are to have in protecting 
individuals from the potential abuses of governmental powers and authorities, ts 
important for ensuring that the rule oflaw is upheld, supported, and properly applied. 
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A major deficiency in the EU' s approach to assistance is due to its lack of a 
uniform conception. The lack of uniformity has had and continues to present, 
contradictions between how the rule of law should and is supported across the EU. 
However, its lack of a basic defined conception has also begun to present problems with 
support for the rule of law within Central and Eastern European countries applying for 
EU membership. This is readily illustrated in the contradictions the EU presents, in what 
the role of judges should be and what they are in practice. In many EU member states, 
judges are seen as applicators of the law, they lack discretionary powers that would 
allow them to act as 'law-makers', in their interpretation of the law and through the 
decisions passed on cases. This idea is also very prevalent and reinforced, in many 
Central and Eastern European countries. For example, the "law is not judge-made in 
Hungary like it is in Britain." Some see the "judges role as applying the law only". 592 
Despite this practice in most member states and many applicant states, the EU' s Court of 
Justice however, has been fighting for more discretionary powers over national courts, in 
order to lend strength and enforce their recommendations on national courts, who are at 
the moment not obliged to act upon the recommendations handed down to them by the 
Court of Justice. This dilemma illustrates some of the confusion of deciding how best to 
support the rule of law, due to the lack of uniformity across the European Union (both 
its institutions and member states), regarding the conception and understanding of the 
rule oflaw. 
However, this is not the only problem to have come about as a result of a 
lack of a uniform understanding of the rule oflaw. This lack ofuniformity has also acted 
as a deterrent to both the development of judicial review in many applicant countries, as 
well as a deterrent to the proper functioning of this institution in many current member 
states. At heart, there is a fundamental contradiction here. On the one hand, the EU 
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wants states to instil judicial review, as it has been identified as an important institution 
for ensuring that the rule of law is properly supported and applied. Yet, judicial review, 
by its very nature, demands a degree of discretionary power in order to perform its task 
independently, efficiently, and according to procedures set out in many constitutions. 
Despite the good intentions of assistance programmes by international organisations like 
the EU, to provide Central and Eastern European judges with knowledge and technical 
know-how, what they lack or do not provide, is the most important training needed for 
ensuring proper support and application of the rule oflaw in these countries. What these 
judges need, is to be taught a different way of 'looking' at the law, as well as to be given 
support, assistance, and powers that would enable them to interpret and review new 
legislation, to ensure that these new laws are not contradicting nor violating the rights of 
individuals, according to the constitution. 
One project that is currently in operation in Hungary and Slovenia, that provides 
an example of the inherent deficiencies, problems and contradictions due to a lack of 
uniformity, is the 'Asylum judges support project'. This project has been designed to 
transfer principles which have developed in the EU, to applicant Central and Eastern 
European countries. The asylum judges project aims to 'develop regional and Europe-
wide capacity building by creating an environment whereby judges can analyse the status 
of civil society, rule of law and the gaps necessary to fill in order to implement EU best 
practice. ' 593 It also looks to be encouraging a change in the role judges are to have, from 
only passively applying the law, to taking more initiative and to play a more prominent 
role in shaping the judicial system. There is the potential for clashes between these two 
very distinctive views and understandings of the role judges are to play in the judicial 
systems of countries. At a more fundamental level, these clashes are due to differences 
in the understanding of the rule oflaw. 
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The central rum of the project mentioned above, provides examples of 
contradictions in two areas. The first contradiction is about the development of Central 
and Eastern European countries. The EU has stated time and time again, that these 
countries should be allowed to develop with regard to their own cultural and historical 
background in mind, yet the asylum judges project has been designed to transfer 
principles and practices from current EU best practices, implying that if they are best 
practices in the EU, then Central and Eastern European countries should also take these 
practices on board. Secondly, what is 'EU best practice' and how has this been decided 
and identified? If it were EU best practice, then one would assume that it is a practice 
that is common among the majority of member states. However, the practice of judges 
'analysing the status of civil society and the rule of law' and to 'fill gaps' in the law, 
requires that they have discretionary powers conferred upon them, and this is not a 
common practice in many current member states of the EU. How then, can it be 
considered to be an EU best practice? 
This project illustrates how the understanding of the role of judges are to have in 
the judicial process, are affected by differentiation in conceptualisation of the rule of law 
across the European Union. The Asylum Judges Project seems to illustrate a desire for a 
shift in the role judges are to play, and demonstrates the confusion in practice of 
supporting the rule of law within the EU, without a uniform conception of the rule of 
law. This confusion has the potential to affect and cause damage to the further 
development of judicial systems in applicant states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
There are and will continue to be contradictions in the role judges are to play at the 
national and European levels, because of the European Union's refusal to define its 
conception and understanding of the rule oflaw in a uniform manner. 
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In contrast to the European Union's assistance programmes in tbis area, the ICJ 
provides a good contrasting example. The ICJ' s approach to assistance in the area of 
judicial independence and judicial training reflects its attitude toward, and understanding 
of the rule of law. It believes, as many other organisations and many countries, that 'an 
independent judiciary is an indispensable requisite of a free society under the Rule of 
Law', where 'independence does not mean that the judge is entitled to act in an arbitrary 
manner'. 
594 However, the ICJ does break from other organisations and some countries, 
in its belief that the judges duty is to 'interpret the law and the fundamental assumptions 
wbich underlie it to the best of bis abilities and in accordance with the dictates of bis own 
conscience. ' 595 Therefore, the legal technical assistance it provides, focuses upon 
providing seminars on topical issues relating to support and application of the rule of 
law, as well as a network for the exchange of ideas, and for countries to secure 
information on specific questions with regard to its pursuit of developing stable legal 
systems and efficient judicial systems.596 The ICJ's programmes reinforce its 
understanding ofthe rule oflaw and how it could be better supported through judges and 
judicial committees or panels, who have a degree of interpretative and discretionary 
powers to make reviews of the law, when necessary. One such project was established 
in Romania, where PHARE provided five million ECU for a programme for the Ministry 
of Justice in 1997. Tbis programme was developed to provide 'support for 
strengthening the training activities of the National Institute of Magistrates, improving 
the documentation-library facilities available to the judiciary and improving the case and 
documentation management system. ' 597 
These projects provided examples of co-ordination between the European Union, 
the OSCE, and national institutions witbin individual countries, despite differences in 
their understanding of the rule of law. However, they also illustrated the actual internal 
211 
problems and confusion evident within individual states and within the European Union 
as a whole, due to the different understandings of the rule of law being promoted 
through various assistance programmes developed. It also identified the potential for 
further problems unless discrepancies in understandings can be overcome to develop a 
basic uniform conception that will encourage support and application of the rule of law 
in a more uniform manner. This is especially true, in the case of the judiciary. It is 
important for the judiciary and therefore, the rule of law, as the judiciary is the primary 
institution for ensuring proper support and application of the rule of law in a state, that a 
uniform conception is developed. The significance of this would be that it would 
establish a framework for ensuring that the judiciary (i.e. the Court of Justice and 
national courts) functions independently, properly, and according to the powers vested in 
them to perform the tasks it has been given. The next sub-section will focus on 
programmes designed for encouraging the development of civil society and NGOs in 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It will examine whether there are 
any deficiencies in the focus of programmes developed in this area, which can be 
attributed to the conceptions international organisations have of the rule of law. 
Development of Civil Society and NGOs 
Other methods and programmes that have been developed in Central and Eastern Europe 
to support and foster the rule of law, have been through the building of civic education 
projects and the development ofNGOs and interests groups at all levels, (local, regional, 
and national levels). 
The development of civil society through NGOs has been the focus for many 
projects in this area, because NGOs were concluded to be of importance in 'advocating 
the interests and concerns of ordinary citizens in the social dialogue with the political 
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elite. '598 The purpose of NGOs is an important one and is also the reason why the 
OSCE, Council of Europe, and the EU, amongst other international bodies, have focused 
their projects and programmes around financing and providing technical assistance to 
NGOs. In examining the assistance for the creation and development ofNGOs, projects 
were designed with the need to show that these non-governmental organisations were 
transparent, in order to ensure their impartiality and credibility. For example, this was 
reaffirmed during the discussions, by a proposal put forth, for the development of a 
'Code of Conduct for NGOs', which would lend more credibility to their objectives and 
actions at all levels, (local, regional, national, and international). 599 
However, another reason why international organisations have chosen to focus 
on NGOs and interest group development in the projects they support, is because NGOs 
assist with the dissemination of information and the education of citizens. An example of 
projects co-ordinated between NGOs, (recognised by both the CSCE/ODlliR and the 
United Nations Development Programme), that have aimed at fostering civic education 
in Central and Eastern European countries, has been an initiative developed by the 
League of Women Voters Education Fund (USA) and the Foundation in Support of 
Local Democracy (Poland). This project was launched in 1992 and focused on building 
political participation in Poland. It was funded by the following organisations: Per 
Charitable Trusts, the United States Information Agency's Office of Citizen Exchanges, 
the National Endowment for Democracy, and the United States Institute of Peace. 
After the initial project, which saw twenty women from Poland, who 
'demonstrated active involvement in community or governmental affairs and strong 
leadership potential' and 'with particular interest in building grassroots institutions in 
Poland', participate in a four-week Fellowship to the United States.600 During the 
fellowship, the Polish women not only had workshops and training sessions about 
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building grassroots institutions, but also some expenence working with 'civic 
organisations in building citizen participation techniques', 'covering a variety of issues 
and concerns specific to their communities', and had the opportunity to take part in 
activities that covered a range of things such as: 'coalition building, networking, citizen 
education, voter registration, and lobbying'.601 This opportunity gave these Polish 
women not only the knowledge of how to build and organise grassroots institutions in 
Poland, but also gave them the practical experience of working with existing grassroots 
organisations to get a better understanding of the purposes and aims of these 
organisations, to take back to Poland with them and incorporate or apply. Other 
grassroots- civic education projects have also begun in other Central and Eastern 
European countries. For instance, the League of Women Voters Education Fund have 
been working closely with the Democracy After Communism Foundation' to co-ordinate 
civic participation programmes in Hungary. 602 
Other projects include a project developed in the Czech Republic in which 
PHARE allocated ECU 900,000.00, for strengthening of civil society organisations. The 
project was to expand on 'previous PHARE activities to strengthen civil society 
organisations, with focus on grant support to improve the regional presence and 
sustainability of civil society organisations. ' 603 The assistance from PHARE is to go 
towards support for information and training to: 'develop the infrastructure of civil 
society organisations at the national and regional levels; expand information activities 
and services, including information on EU accession issues; and to increase the capacity 
of civil society organisations and development of the quality of staff training courses. '604 
The major deficiency that has gone unacknowledged by international 
organisations with regard to civil society development is to look at the reasons behind 
low participation by citizens, beyond voting in elections. The projects covered, illustrate 
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international organisations' focus on the need to develop skills of individuals to organise 
interest groups in Central and Eastern European countries. It is a very good start, 
however, most of these projects and their organisers, only tangentially examine ways to 
sustain these interest groups once they have been founded. 
As was the case of prograrrunes created with the judiciary and its related 
institutions in mind, projects focused on assisting with the creation and founding of 
NGOs and interest groups do support some international conceptions ofthe rule oflaw. 
For instance, the creation and support for development of NGOs would support the 
OSCE's understanding of the rule of law as a restraint on government discretionary 
powers. This is because NGOs and interest groups provide a means for individuals to 
voice their opinions, especially if they feel the government or one of its institutions, is 
violating or abusing its discretionary powers for self-benefit. Despite this kind of 
connection and support for a particular understanding of the rule of law, projects and 
programmes such as these, still do not address a fundamental factor. They do not 
attempt to develop changes in citizens' attitudes towards the government or the role of 
governmental institutions in relation to their needs. And these programmes have not 
acknowledged the economic impact on levels of citizen participation and development of 
a civil society in countries across Central and Eastern Europe. The fact is that interest 
group and NGO development projects have not considered that "people have serious 
everyday material problems, ... they don't have time to deal with these problems of 
government/public life, even if it is closely related to their everyday lives. "605 This was 
reiterated in a comment made by one source in the European Commission who stated 
that, "if people have food and bread, they are not likely to riot or worry too much about 
[a] democratic deficit" in their country.606 
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Despite the programmes developed and implemented in Central and East 
European countries, with the expertise and aid assistance of several international 
organisations in co-operation with local and national governments, the majority of 
CEECs (Central and East European countries), still lack a developed civil society, a legal 
culture, and actual support for the rule of law. These three factors, (civil society, legal 
culture, and the rule oflaw) are directly linked to one another. The lack of a developed 
legal culture, where individuals know and understand what their rights are, and how the 
legal system functions in order to use it, weakens the rule of law in a country. The 
programmes developed reflect awareness of a need for further education and 
development of the rule of law, but does not necessarily show awareness by international 
organisations, of the complexity of the rule of law as a concept. The last sub-section on 
assistance programmes outlines some of the programmes in operation in the Central and 
Eastern European region to reform the organisation of government and its institutions. 
It also investigates whether deficiencies exist in these programmes. 
Organisation of Government and Its Institutions 
Some specific examples of collaboration in the area of organisation of government 
institutions, are the observations and reviews completed of both the Hungarian 
parliamentary elections in May 1998 and the Czech parliamentary elections in June 1998. 
Conclusions from these reviews stated that 'authorities had conducted efficient and 
transparent elections in line with OSCE standards' for parliamentary elections. 607 With 
other election reviews conducted, the OSCE/ODIHR made recommendations for further 
improvements and on areas where the observation team had concerns. For example, in a 
preliminary review conducted of the Slovak National Council Elections, the observation 
team voiced their concerns 'over amendments to the law' and 'suggested necessary 
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improvements' in response to clarifications that were made by the Slovak government 
regarding the potential problem areas in its preparation for the parliamentary elections.608 
Another activity that illustrates the kind of co-ordination that has been taking 
place in recent years between international organisations, has been the Human Dimension 
Ombudsman Seminar organised by the ODIHR, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the Council of Europe, the Polish Ombudsman's Office, with the 
participation of 43 OSCE states, international organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). At this seminar, participants and organisers discussed the 
various issues related to the creation of this position/institution, the pros and cons of 
such an institution, and they made recommendations 'both to nations considering creating 
ombudsmen, to the institutions themselves (current ombudsmen), and to the international 
organisations that assist such institutions. '609 The seminar provided a meeting ground for 
those countries who have experience with having an ombudsmen, those countries who 
are considering creating and implementing such an institution, and for those 
organisations and NGOs who work with ombudsmen, to ensure that it is fulfilling the 
objectives for which it has been created for. 
Many of the Central and East European countries have ombudsmen, or are 
considering the creation of this institution. This is not surprising, as was mentioned in 
the previous chapter, since many of these countries in transition are turning to current 
EU member states, especially to Germany and Austria, for ideas on the reform and 
development of their governmental institutions and the legal system. The reform and 
transition in this example illustrates the underlining trend of prospective member states to 
turn to current EU member states for advice and assistance. This in turn allows for the 
transfer of ideas across borders as prospective member states seek to emulate current 
members without the same experiences or understanding, in the hope of obtaining 
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membership themselves. Another reason for the interest in creating the institution of 
ombudsman in these countries has been based on the experience of many experts who 
have expressed that, 
... the institution of ombudsman has proved useful in dealing with 
administrative abuse. By examining the legality of administrative 
acts, it has a complementary function to the courts. In this way, 
confidence in the rule of law is strengthened. The supervisory 
functions of the Ombudsman institution promotes fair administrative 
practices and encourage confidence in government.610 
This institution assists in making clear the separation of powers between the different 
branches of government, but also making them accountable for their actions and 
decisions to one another without the threat of reprisals that would act as a deterrent to 
their individual independence. 
Aside from programmes it has collaborated on, and the discussions it has initiated 
on topics related to supporting the rule of law, the OSCE has, through a study of 
parliamentary transparency of twenty OSCE states, furthered the rule of law. It has 
accomplished this through its assessment of the openness of plenary sessions, record of 
publication of parliamentary records, access to draft laws, and transparency of 
committees. By assessing these areas in the twenty OSCE states across Western, Central 
and Eastern Europe, it provided a comparison and demonstrated the range in each area. 
There were 'common approaches' in a number of areas in the more consolidated 
democracies. 611 
This study has provided a beginning for re-assessment by national parliaments 
within EU member states, EU institutions, as well as other international bodies, with 
regard to transparency. From this, international bodies, and Central and Eastern Europe 
have 'been instituting reforms for greater openness. ' 612 The EU heralds greater 
transparency in applicant states, as paving the way to a process that will be "closer to the 
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citizen"613, as they themselves, have in recent years, come under increasing pressure to 
ensure greater transparency in the running of EU institutions. Greater transparency has 
been concluded by many international organisations, to further support the rule of law 
through openness by institutions, for further understanding and participation of citizens, 
and to protect citizens from arbitrary or coercive government actions. 
Another example of a project focusing on the organisation of institutions that 
support the government's structure was developed in Hungary. The emphasis of the 
project, 'Establishing the groundwork for the prevention of corruption in the Hungarian 
National Police', was on 'developing training and devising and monitoring prevention 
measures to provide defences against corruption at the individual and organisational 
levels. ' 614 This particular project involved the training of police trainees and practitioners 
on 'case study material and administrative measures and behavioural development 
necessary to control corruption.' The PHARE Democracy Programme invested 
189,540.00 ECU into this particular project to prevent and control corruption in 
Hungary.615 Another example to illustrate this focuses on the organisation of the 
judiciary to ensure judicial independence in the OSCE region. One of the most 
significant threats to the rule of law that has been identified, is corruption. Corruption is 
seen as a threat not only due to the very low salaries of judges, especially regular court 
judges, but also due to the poor working conditions, the lack of respect and status given 
to them as judges, and the fact that 'regular judges are often hostile or indifferent to new 
constitutional courts'. 616 This lack of cohesion and lack of respect for higher courts and 
the judgements they have made with regard to the law and its legality in general, 
weakens the judicial system, thereby making it nearly impossible for the rule of law to 
survive. The rule of law cannot survive if judges, or other individuals in a position of 
power, 'use their power to obstruct, evade or ignore the law.'617 
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A good example of this type of abuse of power is illustrated by a Czech case 
from 1995. In this case, two Czech judges used their powers to have a man arrested and 
prosecuted for alleged verbal abuse. This man (Jiri Wonka) is the brother of a 
Czechoslovakia political prisoner who died in police custody under suspicious 
circumstances, and the judges who made the allegations, were the presiding judge and 
prosecutor who had sent Jiri Wonka's brother to prison. Jiri Wonka's alleged crime was 
that he verbally abused the two judges who, 'in accordance with the special protections 
government officials in the Czech Republic reserve for them themselves', 'sought to have 
Wonka criminally prosecuted for his statements.t618 This particular case underscores the 
necessity of judicial independence and impartiality in order to ensure the proper 
protection of individual rights, especially in criminal trials. The case illustrated before, is 
one of the main reasons why international organisations have been working with 
countries in transition for the better part of the past ten years, through programmes that 
will encourage judicial independence and prevent abuses of power and corruption from 
those in power, as a method of reinforcing the rule of law principle from the 'top down', 
(government officials down to the general public.) 
However, even in these programmes operating to assist in the development and 
organisation of the governmental structure and supporting institution in applicant 
countries, there exists, deficiencies that are a result of the vclrying conceptions and 
understandings of the rule of law, held by the different international organisations, who 
are through assistance, thereby passing some of these deficiencies on to EU applicant 
countries. 
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Summary 
In this section, projects and programmes undertaken within Central and Eastern 
European countries, were examined. These programmes illustrated flaws and 
deficiencies with the projects in operation and those being considered for support in the 
CEECs. These programmes are flawed because they lack an understanding of the 
complexity of this principle and have not taken into account certain important factors. 
For example, programmes to assist in supporting and ensuring judicial independence and 
the development of judicial review, have been shown to illustrate some inherent 
contradictions between how these institutions should be developed and supported in 
theory, as compared to the reality of the situation. Judicial independence and judicial 
review are dependent on the development and change of attitudes and values, of both 
those in positions of authority and the average citizen. Yet, the majority of the 
programmes introduced and operational in the CEE region, do not emphasis, much less 
acknowledge that these changes are necessary. This is especially true as countries are in 
transition from a Soviet/Communist understanding of the role of law, judges, and the 
courts, to the idea that these three factors should operate independently and properly for 
ensuring the protection of individual rights a degree of restraint of governmental 
discretionary powers. 
Conclusion 
The main focus of this final chapter has been to gain a better understanding of how the 
rule of law is perceived by a few international organisations that are involved in the 
transition of Central and East European countries. This involves not only their 
definitions (if any) of the rule of law, but also the reasons and factors upon which these 
are based. 
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The second half of the chapter builds upon the findings from the previous section. 
It investigates whether assistance projects and programmes developed to support or 
maintain the rule of law, reflect an organisation's understanding of the rule of law and the 
complex nature of this important principle. 
What this chapter has demonstrated, is that the three international organisations 
covered (the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the ICJ) each have their own 
conceptions of the rule of law. In comparison to the EUs conception of the rule of law, 
these international organisations have shown more developed understandings of this 
principle. Despite the seemingly developed conceptions, the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE and the ICJ have also demonstrated a lack of coherence and weaknesses in their 
conceptions similar to those of the EU. The international organisations covered have 
like the EU, conflated distinctions between various understandings of the rule of law, (as 
identified previously in chapter one). This gives the impression that whilst they are 
aware of the importance and complexity of this principle, there are still deficiencies in 
their conceptions because of its complex nature. It is this complex nature that has 
allowed for the enlarged scope which the ICrs understanding of the rule of law takes, as 
well as the more narrowed scope of other organisations in setting the boundaries upon 
which this term is defined and utilised. 
The differences between the various organisations' conceptions of the rule oflaw 
outlined in this chapter, are important with regard to co-ordination of projects and 
programmes set-up in prospective EU member states. The understanding of the rule of 
law by an organisation will in many ways dictate the type of programmes and projects it 
develops and supports - i.e. the restructuring of the judicial system or the creation of 
particular procedures like judicial review. Projects associated with the transition to and 
support of the rule of law have been shown to reflect the priorities and conceptions of 
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the organisations involved. This has been a challenge to the co-ordination of limited 
resources towards transition of CEE countries to the rule of law. At the same time, it 
has also left these countries with an eclectic perspective of the rule of law that in some 
ways, prompts them to transpose rather than integrate the rule of law into the reform of 
their governmental structures, procedures, and more importantly, its integration into 
their societies. 
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CONCLUSION 
The intention ofthis thesis has been two-fold, firstly, to understand what the rule of law 
is and means to the European Union (both member states and institutions), since it has 
been repeatedly stated as an important principle to which countries within the 
Community and those proposing to join it, should be committed. Secondly, this thesis 
intended to demonstrate that the EUs commitment to the rule of law has not extended to 
actually defining this principle. This lack of definition is problematic for the EU, 
especially with regard to its further enlargement to include countries that have little 
recent experience of democratic values and ideas. 
The intention of this work has not been to develop yet another definition for the 
rule of law, (which should be utilised by the European Union), but to demonstrate that 
understandings of the rule of law are diverse. The diverse understandings reflect the fact 
that the rule of law is a contested concept619, as is evident from the work of other 
authors such as Habermas, Shklar, Craig, and Walker620. More importantly the thesis 
has illustrated and highlighted some of the ambiguities and deficiencies associated with 
various conceptualisations ofthe rule oflaw. 
For instance, a notable ambiguity covered in chapter one of this thesis, dealt with 
the conflation of the rule of law and democracy. The relationship between these two 
important concepts is a complex one. 621 Conflation of these concepts neglects the fact 
that there are three possible ways of looking at the relationship between the rule of law 
and democracy. The three ways in which one can contemplate this relationship are 1) 
democracy is important for the effectuation of the rule of law; 2) that the rule of law can 
alsp be judged as a retardant to the development of democracy; or 3) that democracy 
itself, can be used to justify suppressing the rule of law. 622 The importance of this 
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review was that the ambiguities alluded to and described earlier in this thesis, have not 
been dealt with sufficiently to-date, by current EU member states and institutions. 
Moreover, what was found in EU documentation and in interviews, was that the 
European Union currently lacks any formal universal understanding of the rule of law. 
Throughout EU documents there is mention of the term 'rule of law', but this term, 
usually connected with democracy and human rights, has not been defined in any of the 
Community's documentation. What is more interesting with regard to this term is the 
fact that the EU has stated that this principle (the rule of law) is a fundamental principle 
upon which member states and the European Union itself are based. However, in 
examining pre-requisites for previous enlargements, the term rule of law was not 
specifically mentioned. It is with the Copenhagen summit and the development of the 
Copenhagen criteria for the current enlargement discussions, that the rule of law is 
mentioned specifically, although again, without a definite sense of what is meant by use 
of the term. In previous enlargements, it was assumed that countries applying for 
membership shared similar ideas and conceptions of important values, so no formal set of 
procedures or criteria for enlargement existed. There were informal procedures and 
practices for enlarging the Community, without a formal or specific set of guidelines 
listing procedures, practices, and the criteria comparable to the Copenhagen criteria now 
established for future enlargements of the European Union. 623 
The finding was at first surprising, because of the EU's statements that the rule of 
law is a fundamental principle upon which the European Union and its member states are 
based. However, there are some significant reasons for the lack of development of a 
uniform conception within the European Union. The historical and cultural differences 
and experiences between various member states, has been one reason for national 
differences in the understanding and defining of the rule oflaw. For example, differences 
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between British, French and German notions of the rule of law624 have been shaped by 
each country's historical and cultural developments and experiences. These have shaped 
their understandings of law - its role and the basis of its legitimacy, as well as their 
understandings of the relationship between individuals and the government. In turn, 
these have been important factors in the development of democratic institutions, 
procedures, and values in these member state countries. These differences, which are a 
part of the entire culture and society ofindividual member states, makes it difficult to see 
member states developing a uniform definition of the rule of law that would satisfy all 
without anyone having to make specific changes to their political and legal systems. This 
is the underlying reason for the rule oflaw remaining vague in definition. 
However, problems are beginning to appear which can be attributed to variation 
in understandings of the rule of law. Differences in defining the rule of law have had an 
impact upon the various levels within the Community system. For example, three key 
issues examined with respect to this were a) potential challenges to the Community legal 
order; b) different attitudes to judicial discretion; and c) citizenship, taken at the three 
different levels of decision-making in the EU. 625 The variation in perspectives on such 
issues as citizenship or judicial discretion, or the issue of primacy of Community law, 
have served to illustrate the existent problems and difficulties a lack of uniformity 
produces. These problems exist even before compounding the problem with a further 
expansion of the Community to include countries with different legal systems, and some 
would say, less developed legal cultures. 
Understanding of the rule of law within countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe are in general, not as developed as in western European countries. This 
assessment was made by several contacts from the European Union and the associated 
countries. 626 The reasoning for the lack of a developed understanding of this principle by 
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citizens and government officials was attributed to several factors. Two of the main 
factors identified by interviewees, were the focus on improving economic conditions and 
situations, and the past abuse of the rule of law. With respect to the first factor, one 
interviewee commented, 'the most important problem, consists in the economy - people 
have serious everyday material problems; if people have such material problems, they 
don't have time to deal with these problems of government/public life, even if it is closely 
related to their everyday lives. '627 Another interviewee stated that 'if people have food 
and bread, they are not likely to riot or worry too much about democratic deficit, 
although political and administrative progress and development is also of importance. '628 
These comments illustrate the feeling of those working in institutions assisting with the 
democratic development and transition of associated countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe. It also reflects some of the common problems experienced by ordinary citizens, 
which impedes the development of understanding the rule of law. The prevalence of 
these problems is confirmed by the findings of opinion polls conducted in several Central 
d . 629 an East European countnes. 
In assessing the second factor mentioned above, (past abuse of the rule of law), 
one interviewee felt that associated countries may not be 'attaching great attention to the 
rule of law as they should.' This was attributed to 'historical and cultural reasons: Soviet 
rule [was] strong, making [the] rule of law idea difficult for Baltic states especially, but 
also has had [an] influence on other countries in [the] region. '630 What this alludes to, is 
the fact that the Soviet Union used and abused the law for its own purposes, making it 
difficult for individuals to now think of the law as something that exists to protect their 
rights and interests. Similarly, the practice of treating the rule of law in a purely 
instrumental fashion to further government policies has established a political culture 
which is a barrier to the subordination of rulers to the rule of law. This point is well 
230 
made by Carothers, when he states that 'the primary obstacles to such reform are not 
technical or financial, but political and human. Rule-of-law reform will succeed only if it 
gets at the fundamental problem ofleaders who refuse to be ruled by the law.'631 
The difficulties faced by these regimes are being compounded by the EUs 
inconsistency. One the one hand the EU has encouraged these states to develop their 
own 'brand' of the rule oflaw. 632 This fits in with the status quo within the current EU, 
which is characterised by diversity of approaches to the rule of law. Since, however, 
these states lack the experience and traditions of the existing member states, which are 
the source of diversity, the EU has encouraged them to model their approaches to the 
6~~ 
rule oflaw on 'partner' states of the existing EU. _,_, On the other hand the EU has been 
preoccupied with the reform or creation of particular institutions or procedures in the 
prospective member states. 634 Thus, they have insisted upon the creation or reform of 
particular institutions and procedures in prospective member states. 635 The 
inconsistency of the EU in its treatment of the prospective new members is not however 
the main problem. The main problem is the enlargement threatens to exacerbate the 
existing problem of diversity that the EU has refused to face up to. 
Differences in understandings have already led to differences in the 
implementation of the same law across the current Community of 15 states. Problems of 
differentiation in application of law and understanding of the relationship between 
Community and national domains are beginning to appear within the European Union. 
Discrepancies regarding laws in direct conflict with parts of national constitutions and 
laws have occurred in some member states. 636 The problems illustrated within a 
Community of fifteen states has the potential to become magnified with the further 
enlargement of the European Union to include countries as diverse as those from Central 
and Eastern Europe. This is of particular significance to this thesis, as it demonstrates 
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some of the real and potential problems the European Union face from its lack of a 
formal, shared understanding of the rule of law.637 The reluctance to respond to the 
problems of diversity the European Union desires is also at odds with the deeper 
integration plans it is seeking to implement 638 The issue of further integration is one 
that will not be easily solved. This is set to become worse with a larger number of 
diverse member states involved in the process. 
This thesis investigated merely one aspect - one principle (the rule of law) 
considered an important aspect and criterion for determining future European Union 
membership. Future investigation and research should take into account development 
and reform of specific institutions, such as the judiciary and quasi-judicial institutions. 
These institutions are very important, as they seem to have a direct impact on the 
development and maturation of democratic values within newly formed democracies. 
619 Chapter Two, Section One, best illustrates the diverse conceptions ofthe rule oflaw 
which exist across European Union member states. Here, it examined the understanding 
of the rule of law held by Britain, Germany and France. These three member states were 
focused upon two reasons. Firstly, they illustrated Dyson's Angle-Continental 
dichotomy of the rule of law (Britain and Germany); Germany and France were 
examined because although Dyson's dichotomy was useful, it was also limited in the fact 
that it did not account for differences in understandings of the rule of law held by 
different Continental countries. And secondly, these three were countries were chosen in 
particular, as they illustrate the differences in traditions and form a natural point of 
reference for smaller countries (especially those in Central and Eastern Europe seeking 
EU membership). 
620 This list of authors is not conclusive, but merely a short list of a few of the writers 
examined and whose work has been used within this thesis. 
621 See Chapter One, Section Two. This section outlines in detail, the ambiguities and 
concerns related to the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. Most 
problematic in this relationship is the fact that the two terms have at times been used 
interchangeably, whilst neglecting the contradictions that crop up between what the two 
ideas mean and the manner in which they have traditionally and contemporarily been 
understood. 
622 See Chapter One, Section Two, for further detailed discussion about the conflation of 
the rule of law and democracy. 
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623 The Copenhagen criteria, developed out of the European Council's meeting in 
Copenhagen in June 1993, was the 'first clear rules for membership ofthe EU, and 
continue to form the basis for all negotiations with applications.' The European 
Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, Guide to the 
Enlargement of the EU, The EU Committee, 1998, p. 7. Prior to this criteria, previous 
enlargement procedures were derived from ongoing practices, following Article 98 of the 
ECSC Treaty, Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, Article 205 of the EAEC Treaty, and 
Articles 0 and F of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). 
624 As commented on in Footnote 1 on the conclusion, Dyson's dichotomy was used with 
additional materials to compensate and explain differences that existed even within 
Dyson's dichotomy of Anglo-Continental differences in understanding of concepts like 
the rule oflaw. 
625 Chapter Two, Section Two discusses the impact of different legal cultures on three 
particular issues: 1) the potential challenges to the Community legal order; 2) 
examination of the different attitudes towards the idea of judicial discretion; and 3) 
looking at the issue of citizenship from the three different levels of decision-making 
existent in the European Union (Community level, national level, and individual level). 
626 Statements from interviewees from EU institutions and from a few of the associated 
countries (conducted between March 1998 and June 2000), indicated that there was 
some understanding of the rule of law amongst government officials, but even these 
people at times were likely to conflate understanding of the rule of law with ideas of 
democracy, seeing no differentiation between the two concepts. At the individual level 
of citizens at-large, there was little understanding or real desire to understand what this 
principle (indicated by the EU as important) meant - other than that it assisted in 
protecting their rights from abuse by the government. 
627 Interview P conducted in Budapest- Monday, 21 June 1999. 
628 Interview C conducted in Brussels- Wednesday, 6 May 1998. 
629 Surveys/Opinion Polls were presented in the New Democracies Barometer and in 
Richard Rose, Survey Measures of Democracy, Studies in Public Policy no.294, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK, 1996. Research and surveys were conducted 
by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK. 
630 Interview K conducted in Brussels- Thursday, 6 May 1999. 
631 Thomas Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival', Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.2, March-
April 1998, p.96. Comments that arose during various interviews suggested and stated 
that particular associated countries modelled their legal systems and laws on current EU 
member states, while taking into account differences between themselves and these 
member states. It was also acknowledged that it would take more than the mere transfer 
of institutions and ideas from western European countries, implanted into Central and 
East European countries for the rule of law to be developed and supported. This was 
also reiterated in the work of Thomas Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival', Foreign 
Affairs, voL77, no.2, March-April1998, pp.95-106. 
2.,.._ .).) 
632 Comments similar to this one, were made during Interviews A and C conducted in 
Brussels on the 5 and 6 May 1998. 
633 Chapter Three of this thesis emphasised the diversity of conceptualisations that exist 
across prospective member states in Central and Eastern Europe. What this provided 
was glimpse at the reasons behind particular developments regarding the rule of law in 
this region. For example, the chapter illustrated how the Czechs seem to be developing 
their own 'idea' of the rule of law, but are unsure of what it should do. While the 
Hungarians on the other had, have developed an understanding of the rule of law similar 
to the German conception discussed earlier in Chapter Two. Then there are the Poles, 
who have shown more positivist inclinations in their conceptualisation of the rule of law. 
All of these illustrate the differences in understandings which exist in the region. 
634 What this illustrates is the lack of uniformity and diversity that the Community is 
emphasising on the one hand, while at the same time, it is prescribing that prospective 
members include certain institutions or procedures that are connected with a more 
uniform understanding of the rule of law. This demonstrates the uncoordinated 
developments that have been taking place across the Community. It supports the 
conclusion, that while the Community is saying one thing, its actions are 'saying' the 
opposite. They want to encourage diversity and have stated that prospective countries 
will develop their own 'brand' of rule of law that is culturally sensitive. What this is 
supporting it seems, is the support of the status quo in the Community - that current 
member states can have variations in their understandings of the rule of law. This has 
potential implications on the integration process of the Community, that is only 
beginning to come to light. 
635 For example, the EU has encouraged associated countries to have written 
constitutions, a Constitutional or Supreme Court with judicial review powers, and have 
emphasised the importance of the separation of powers to ensure the independence of 
the judiciary. These are factors that define the rule oflaw as a set of institutions, thereby 
allowing for differentiation in the application of law, and understanding of the 
relationship between individuals, government, and law. 
636 Examples of this can be cited from France and Germany. This was covered in detail 
in Chapter Two- in examination of member states' understandings ofthe rule oflaw. 
637 In much of its documentation containing the term 'rule of law', the European Union 
has linked it with the idea of democracy - linking the two terms as synonymous or 
invariably intertwined and necessarily connected. This perspective does not take into 
account that the two concepts are at times, at odds with one another and contradict what 
the other proposed to stand for. 
638 For example, the EU has criticised some associated countries for lacking the proper 
implementation of particular institutions and procedures. (Signs from the Community 
have pointed to their move towards placing more emphasis on the proper implementation 
of institutions and procedures and not just with having them in place.) They are 
concerned with the operation of these in practice in prospective member states, but 
perhaps have overlooked the fact that within its current Community, there are some 
member states who perhaps either lack these same institutions or who have them, but 
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lack proper implementation of them, which has been sometime 'required' by prospective 
members in the enlargement process. 
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